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Cover
An etching by James Gillray (1756–1815),
considered the leading British caricaturist of
the late eighteenth century: “Immortality—
the Death of Admiral Lord Nelson—in
the moment of Victory!—this Design for
the Memorial intended by the City of
London . . . humbly submitted to the . . .
Lord Mayor.” It appeared on 23 December 1805, the day the body of Nelson,
killed on 21 October at Trafalgar, was
transferred from his flagship, HMS Victory,
on its way to the Royal Naval Hospital,
Greenwich, where it would lie in state.
The veneration for the admiral evident
even in this somewhat tongue-in-cheek
image, and still strong in the United
Kingdom today at the bicentennial of his
death, has not been afforded by Americans to any of their own great naval leaders—for reasons, and with implications,
explored in our lead article by James
Holmes.
Reprinted by permission of the Anne S. K.
Brown Military Collection, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, through
the kind assistance of its curator, Dr. Peter
Harrington, and of the Naval War College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime
History and Maritime History Department chairman, Dr. John B. Hattendorf.
The Naval War College Museum, operated
by the Maritime History Department, has
planned an exhibit on the battle of Trafalgar, to be displayed October–December
2005.
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MASTERFUL EXISTENCE—GRACEFUL ELOQUENCE

This eulogy was delivered at the memorial service for Vice Admiral
James Stockdale in the U.S. Naval Academy Chapel, in Annapolis,
Maryland, on 23 July 2005.

L

adies and gentlemen, distinguished guests—Sybil and the sons of Vice Admiral
James B. Stockdale—again, thank you for this trust.
Permit me to speak in the name of God: creator, redeemer, and comforter.
Moreover, for just a moment allow me to hold a lantern above our loss. We have
gathered to celebrate the life of a great man in a chapel he was no stranger to and
a man whose journey of faith never stopped moving.
Admiral James Bond Stockdale knew this as a place that directs us to One
greater than ourselves, to one Who reveals himself through the sacred text, and
to one Who requires much. He understood the classroom forms the thoughts of
man while the sanctuary of faith forms the soul of man, both being essential for
the formation of character so one can persevere under any circumstance.
Writing to Timothy, a young and struggling Christian leader in the infant
church, the Apostle Paul wrote:
In a large house there are articles not only of gold and silver, but also of wood and
clay; some are for noble purposes and some for ignoble. If a man cleanses himself
from the latter, he will be an instrument for noble purposes, made holy, useful to the
Master and prepared to do any good work.

When we survey the landscape of history, looking at the epics of time we recognize that God, in his wisdom, graces the stage of humankind with a servant
given to living the noble life. I can only surmise God’s intent is to provoke our
conscience and call forth from his creation a meaningful manner of living life in
this gymnasium of existence.
The elder sage, Solomon, wrote poignantly about those seeking to convey
truths with just the right words. He said, “The words of the wise prod us to live
well. They’re like nails hammered home, holding life together.” I would submit
to you, this is indicative of the life of Vice Admiral Stockdale. His is a life of masterful existence and graceful eloquence.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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However we knew him, we knew him to be a man of words. Whether tapped
on a wall, written, or spoken, his words confront you. They agitate the mind,
they stir the soul, they disturb our complacency. They also, however, call forth
the best in us, instructing us to live a life worthy of our calling. Just as a pebble
dropped into a pool of still water sends out ripples, likewise his collection of
thoughts extend their influence into many realms.
Yet, his wisdom, born of academic rigor and forged in the hermetic, is for anyone to peer into and learn from—it is, however, a choice. God does not mandate
we learn from the sages, though at our own peril we disregard their prophetic
voice of wisdom. Yet, the invitation is: “he who has ears, let him hear.”
I have asked myself on many occasions if there is one central lesson from the
Admiral. What is it that his life “speaks of ”? What is a common thread running
through his speeches, writings, and discussions? In prison, was it unity over self?
After Vietnam, was it his passion for education? Was it his desire to cultivate officers to become moral leaders? On the other hand, did he want to agitate the
minds of leaders to confront their own moral foundations so they might determine whether they had built on sand or rock? Whatever it is for each of us, I believe his life echoed the words of two men: Marcus Aurelius, who mused, “What
can guide us through this life? Philosophy, only philosophy,” and then that of the
biblical writer James, who wrote: “I will show you my faith—by what I do.”
I consider myself a most fortunate man to have been invited into the winter of his
life. Though we shared a common conviction that “holding the moral high ground
is more important than firepower,” my first lesson contained no such discussion. At
the invitation of Sybil and the Admiral, I joined them for their customary Sunday
evening meal, which was more of a “meeting of the minds.” As we gathered around
the table, the printed lesson was placed in my hands. I wondered what great philosophical or theological concept we might discuss. The topic that evening? Death.
Later that night, while I was on my way home, I reflected on what he had taught.
Though it is a simple lesson, the ramifications are considerable, that being, the certainty of death teaches us to live life with purpose and intent—as God has given.
Ladies and gentlemen, his is a life of masterful existence and graceful eloquence. He understood one does not worry about establishing a legacy, but one
must be concerned about the life lived. Therefore, let us listen to God’s servant,
for “though he is dead, yet still he speaks.”

COMMANDER STEVEN L. SMITH, CHC, USN

Commander Smith is Command Chaplain, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76).
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979,
following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for
Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds
master’s degrees in public administration (finance)
from Harvard and in national security studies and
strategy from the Naval War College, where he
graduated with highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of
Senate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser
Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fiftyfirst President of the Naval War College on 12 August
2004.
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Shaping the Future
I believe in the power of our past to inspire and instruct. We are the
inheritors of a proud legacy. We must capture those lessons, study
them and apply them to current operations where applicable. While
we certainly learn from the past, we cannot—and should not—try to
live in it.
ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

TODAY, OUR LEADERS ARE COMING TO GRIPS with

the implications of a strategic
environment, unique in our history, for military tasks and mission areas. As we
define and understand with increasing clarity what must be done and how to
do it, the importance of shaping the global environment has emerged as a
linchpin of our strategic ways and means. Shaping refers to the wide range of
activities—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—that encourage global, regional, and local developments favorable to democracy, civil liberties, and prosperity and unfavorable to the policies of aggressive nations and to
the formation and operations of violent groups, especially groups employing
terrorism.
Though the geostrategic environment is different, the military instrument of
national power most effective for shaping that environment to better protect the
United States and advance its interests is, to a significant degree, already in place.
History has demonstrated repeatedly the value of the unique set of capabilities
that naval forces bring to our nation and the world—credible combat-capable
forces that are agile and mobile, can persist on scene, and are adaptive (expeditionary), scalable to the task, and unintrusive. These are precisely the traditional
characteristics of U.S. naval forces, and they respond directly to the demands of
the shaping mission. This was the conclusion reached at the Naval War College’s
most recent Current Strategy Forum, where three days were devoted to the intense examination of shaping: what it is, how it works, and what capabilities it
requires.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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What emerged was a consensus that, above all, effective shaping requires two
fundamental attributes of naval forces: the ability to provide sustained presence
in areas where our interests need tending, and to do so while being minimally
intrusive or provocative. A globally distributed, forward-postured, combatcapable Navy, closely cooperating with international partners and commanded
and controlled through a Joint Force Maritime Combatant Commander
(JFMCC), offers immediately available, sustainable, and flexible forces for the
Joint Force Commander to better understand and influence—to shape—the security environment of his region, especially to counter terrorist threats. These
JFMCCs, linked into a global network, begin to operationalize a key strategic
objective—global maritime domain awareness. Maritime domain awareness, in
turn, enables a more coordinated and proactive approach to the nation’s homelanddefense mission.
Never have the Navy and Marine Corps arguments for the value of on-scene
naval forces been more strategically compelling: afloat forces persistently available to the joint commander to coalesce and transition to major conflict operations, routinely and pervasively present with a wide range of capabilities to
counter terror and terrorist development and to defend in depth against threats
to the homeland. These same forces derive additional strategic value by dissuading and deterring potential adversaries while assuring our friends and allies.
Moreover, forward-postured naval forces are uniquely suited to coalition building and to creating persistent, reliable, helpful partnerships with friends and
allies in the theater.
In the twenty-first century, the Naval War College is orienting professional
military education to support the Navy’s ability to influence the maritime and
global security environment. Shaping operations can involve U.S. military
forces deployed either from the United States or from operating locations overseas. They can be conducted in international waters and airspace or on or over
the territory of other countries. In an era where fourth-generation warfare* is a
reality of the international environment, such operations require an unprecedented degree of confidence about what is taking place on, above, or below the
sea—a state of knowledge and understanding known as “maritime domain
awareness.” Here too the Naval War College is focusing its education and substantial research, analysis, and gaming capabilities to ensure that the Navy has
the kind of maritime domain awareness necessary not only in the traditional hot
* “Fourth-generation warfare,” a concept defined in 1989 by William S. Lind and a group of U.S.
Army and Marine Corps officers, and expanded by Thomas X. Hammes, is commonly used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. It refers to warfare, likely to last for decades, in
which one of the major participants is not a state but a network espousing a violent ideology.
Fourth-generation warfare blurs the traditional distinctions between war and politics, soldiers and
civilians, peace and conflict, and battlefields and safe rear areas.
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phases of war but also in precursor and postconflict phases—often referred to,
respectively, as “Phase Zero” and “Phase Four” of a campaign.
On the educational front, Phase Zero effects take place first and foremost at
an individual, person-to-person level. Since its inception in 1884, the Naval War
College has played a continuing role in promoting international understanding,
partnership, and cooperation in the maritime domain, although international
officers were originally present as resident students to a very limited degree. This
changed in 1956, thanks to the vision of Admiral Arleigh Burke. Based on his
wartime and postwar experiences with allies, and faced with the immediate
threats of the Cold War, Burke concluded that it was vitally important for us to
understand our allies and for them to understand us. In 1956, he used his influence as CNO to create a Naval War College program for international officers
aimed at developing a group of international naval officers with common
knowledge, experiences, and goals. Burke hoped that officers brought together
from diverse countries to study war and to get to know each other on a professional and personal basis would be able to establish genuine trust and confidence among themselves, to prevent conflict and advance shared ideals more
effectively in the future. If war did come, they would be better prepared to plan,
fight, and win decisive victories together. He called this program the Naval Command Course (later renamed the Naval Command College, or NCC).
A total of 1,554 students have graduated from the NCC since its first class
ended in 1957. (Another 1,520 have graduated from a similar program for
intermediate-level international officers, known as the Naval Staff College.)
Over the years, alumni have come from 122 different countries. More than
one-third of these officers go on to flag rank. And over 230 have gone on to become heads of their navies, with thirty-seven serving in that capacity at this moment. This includes the current Chiefs of Naval Staff of India, Japan, and
Pakistan, who graduated together in the Class of 1990. The distinguished alumni
from these international programs include heads of state, cabinet members, ambassadors, and successful business leaders. Among the exemplary U.S. alumni
who studied alongside these officers is General M. W. Hagee, the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, who has said: “I can think of several occasions
when I was in a bind in Italy, France, Singapore and Malaysia when I called on
my NCC classmates and they were there to help me out.” These types of relationships are as essential to Phase Zero operations as they are in wartime. Their development cannot be left to the moment of a serious crisis, when time is short
and the atmosphere of trust has yet to be established.
That trust and confidence necessary for cooperation grow well in the professional environment of the Naval War College. In addition to personal relationships with classmates, the College serves as the intellectual source for and host of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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numerous critical international meetings and war games. In 1962, after the
CNO hosted a meeting of chiefs of hemispheric navies, the Naval War College
began a series of meetings among the same countries’ war college presidents,
called the Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas (CNWCA).
CNWCA occurs every two years and features a combined war game; this year it
focuses on the new threats presented by terrorist activities. In October 2004, at
the most recent CNWCA, Argentina took the lead in developing and executing a
war game dealing with terrorism. In the fall of 2005 this game will be played by
each navy (via networked computers) from their respective war colleges. All participants will then meet in Mexico to analyze results and discuss conclusions.
The Naval War College hosts the International Seapower Symposium (ISS)
every other year. At this meeting of navy chiefs from around the world, our CNO
sponsors a robust program of presentations, briefs, plenary sessions, and discussions on a theme chosen to foster trust, understanding, and cooperation. This
year, ISS will focus on the actions necessary to create a global network of nations
working together for a free and secure maritime commons. With an objective of
improving maritime domain awareness, the ISS will lay the groundwork for
gathering and sharing information from the global maritime environment
through regional, voluntary participation by states interested in joining this network. ISS is an ideal forum for initiating this type of activity, generating global
benefits for partner nations from discrete national and regional capabilities.
Since 1996 Italy has hosted four regional seapower symposiums for the navies of
the Mediterranean and Black Sea area. A similar symposium, known as the
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), has been held in the Asia-Pacific region since 1988, and there has been discussion of starting a third regional symposium for the Middle East navies. Our new CNO, Admiral Mike Mullen, kicks
off ISS XVII here on 21 September.
Finally, the College has made significant progress in enhancing college-tocollege bilateral relationships. We are investigating expanding the exchange of
faculty, courses, and ways of sharing information and programs with naval war
colleges in Japan, Chile, the Russian Federation, India, Argentina, and Mexico.
This type of institutional relationship will build on the personal interactions
that take place with international students here in Newport and on the regular
meetings and events, like ISS and war games, to provide a framework for robust
and routine cooperation that in turn enables effective operational coordination
among participating nations.
In addition to the education of foreign officers and regular meetings such as
ISS, the Naval War College’s International Law Department works on international law and rules of engagement (ROE) issues that affect U.S. military policy,
strategy, and operations, as well as those of our allies and partners. Nothing
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:08 AM

14

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Autumn 2005 Issue

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

11

shapes the maritime environment as much as the law—whether it is in peacetime or war. The department conducts research, teaches, participates in war
games, publishes, and holds conferences. In addition to providing legal instruction to resident U.S. and international students, our law faculty conducts seminars at military institutions in Argentina, Canada, Chile, Germany, and Japan.
The Stockton Chair, annually filled by a distinguished visiting international legal expert, maintains the College’s visibility and prestige by participating in international colloquia and meetings to develop consensus on key issues in the law
of armed conflict. We also conduct an annual international law conference that
attracts military and civilian academics and practitioners from around the
world. The papers and discussions are published in the College’s International
Law Studies (“Blue Book”) series, which are distributed to an international audience and are found in the best international law libraries around the world.
The Naval War College continues to build on its ability to support the Navy’s
shaping function through bilateral and multilateral war games. Some of this
gaming activity is of long standing, such as the annual U.S.-Japan
NORTHWESTPAC game. The game has been occurring for many years, but the
topics have evolved to match the changing strategic landscape and the enhanced
U.S.-Japan alliance. More recently, the College has planned and hosted multinational games that directly address the Phase Zero types of operations necessary
in the post-9/11 world. In September 2004, under the sponsorship of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, high-level delegations from seventeen countries
played in a weeklong game designed to test and explore maritime interdictions
of components of weapons of mass destruction, as part of President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative. Through this and other games, the Naval War College
is bringing the logic and rigor of military planning to the interagency processes
of many nations. In return, the College gathers lessons and feeds them back to
the Navy to help define requirements, objectives, and mechanisms for improving
maritime domain awareness.
In the new security arena and in the joint environment, Joint Force Commanders will require Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders to lead
and support operations spanning the full spectrum of warfare. Working closely
with our fleet commanders, the Naval War College is using its education, research, analysis, and war-gaming resources to evolve its Joint Command Center,
routinely used as the command-and-control hub for a wide range of activities at
the College, into a JFMCC Center. This center will build on the knowledge
gained during our participation in support of joint fleet exercises and during the
JFMCC Flag Officer course of instruction. This course brings together prominent senior joint warfighters and government agency leaders as Distinguished
Fellows to augment the College’s core faculty. The first such course, for a dozen
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of our nation’s most promising general and flag officers, began this August. Our
plan is to build this JFMCC capability into the coalition world as well, holding a
Combined Force Maritime Component Commander’s (CFMCC) course, with a
regional focus, in 2006. I will report more on the first course and the way ahead
on this initiative in the next issue of the Review.
To return to our opening thoughts about the value of history as it relates to our
nation’s and our Navy’s strategic and operational challenges, we find many lessons from the past about both the utility of maritime forces and the importance
of maintaining close ties with friends and allies around the world. I assure you
that the College is dedicated to being at the forefront on these vital issues, both
here on our Newport campus and as we reach out to our forward-deployed
forces and to our friends, colleagues, and alumni around the world.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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James R. Holmes is a senior research associate at the
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doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is
the author of the forthcoming Theodore Roosevelt and
World Order: Police Power in International Relations,
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WHY DOESN’T AMERICA HAVE A NELSON?
Does It Need One?
by James Holmes

T

wo thousand five marks the bicentennial of the Battle of Trafalgar. Off the
southern Atlantic coast of Spain, at Cabo (Cape) Trafalgar, a British fleet commanded by Lord Horatio Nelson crushed a larger Franco-Spanish fleet. The encounter answered one of the central questions of the Napoleonic Wars—would
1
Napoleon’s legions be able to invade the British Isles?—with a resounding No.
The British media today are abuzz with talk of Nelson’s exploits. The Royal Navy
planned a full slate of events to honor the man the poet Lord George Byron
2
dubbed “Britannia’s god of war.” Towns and seaports have scheduled their own
tributes. All evidence points to a surge of public enthusiasm for Horatio Nelson
3
in particular, and for Great Britain’s maritime traditions in general. Naval history, in short, continues to shape public discourse.
Not so in America. Why? Like Great Britain, the United States is a maritime
nation. Like Britain, the Republic has—from the day of John Paul Jones forward—
owed much of its prosperity and security to the sea. America’s history is replete
with heroic figures and feats of derring-do, from the single-ship actions of the
4
War of 1812 to the epic struggle with the Japanese navy at Leyte Gulf. Yet in
stark contrast to the hubbub surrounding Britain’s Trafalgar bicentenary, great
naval endeavors are noticeably absent from our national discourse. At this writing the sixtieth anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima, one of the pivotal clashes of
the Pacific War, has passed with scarcely a murmur from the media or the public.
For the good of the U.S. Navy and the nation, American sailors, veterans, and na5
val historians need to put this kind of oversight to rights.
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BRITONS PAY TRIBUTE TO THE GREAT MAN
Why the disparity between such kindred societies? Despite the gap of two centuries and thousands of miles of ocean, it is possible to venture some informed
speculation. First, as Byron and a legion of other admirers would attest, Horatio
Nelson was a unique man. Granted, other naval heroes were his equal in certain
respects. For example, Lord Collingwood showed that he was as skilled in combat
when he took over from Nelson after Nelson was mortally wounded at Trafalgar
6
and ably commanded the fleet, consummating the victory. Some historians
7
would rate Collingwood as Nelson’s equal as a warrior and seaman. Others possessed his force of character. Thomas Cochrane, one of the most accomplished
frigate commanders of Nelson’s day and “the master of small ship tactics and the
ruse de guerre,” served as the model for both Patrick O’Brian’s Jack Aubrey and
C. S. Forester’s Horatio Hornblower—ample testament to his larger-than-life
character.8 However, none could match Nelson in all of these respects.
Lord Nelson’s boldness, strategic and tactical acumen, and sheer bravado endeared him to Britons, as did his high-profile triumphs at the Battle of Santa
Cruz de Tenerife, Corsica (1796); the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797); the Battle of the Nile (1798); and, of course, Trafalgar (1805). At Trafalgar, rather than
have his ships form up parallel with Napoleon’s fleet and pound away—the
usual mode of nautical combat in the Age of Sail—Nelson divided his fleet into
two squadrons and ordered his captains to cut across the Franco-Spanish battle
line, creating a melee that favored British gunners. He admonished his officers to
9
close with and annihilate (one of his favorite words) the Franco-Spanish fleet.
“No captain can do very wrong who lays his ship alongside that of the enemy,” he
10
proclaimed. Nelson exploited the edge in command and control conferred by
11
the Royal Navy’s freshly devised system of signal flags. That he fell at Trafalgar
only served to etch Nelson’s greatest deed into the British public mind—much as
Abraham Lincoln’s death at his moment of greatest triumph made him a fixture
12
atop many rankings of American presidents.
In recent decades it has become fashionable to downplay the impact of individuals on history. Great, impersonal forces, we are told, carry us along to their
own mysterious ends, indifferent to our efforts to influence events. Maybe, but
great men still command the admiration of their countrymen.
Nelson’s like is not to be found in American naval history. The momentary
brilliance of Commodore Stephen Decatur braving the pasha of Tripoli’s guns to
burn the captured U.S. frigate Philadelphia (1804), of Admiral David Farragut
forcing Mobile Bay (1864) despite “the torpedoes,” or of Commodore George
Dewey demolishing the Spanish flotilla at Manila Bay (1898) cannot measure up
to the repeated victories of a Nelson. Nor does the sustained excellence of the
13
U.S. Navy’s World War II elite measure up. Admiral Chester Nimitz oversaw
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the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor, and so was denied the laurels due a fighting
admiral. The Japanese navy made a sucker of Admiral William Halsey at Leyte
Gulf, luring him off with an unarmed fleet. The cerebral Admiral Raymond
Spruance lacked the dash of a Nelson, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, perhaps the
U.S. Navy’s best candidate for the eminence of a Nelson, made his reputation not
by masterminding an epic, Trafalgar-like fleet engagement, but as a destroyer
14
squadron (23) commander—too obscure a post to inspire lasting public ardor.
The U.S. Navy has yet to produce a commander who can equal Nelson’s combination of war-fighting excellence, personal gallantry, and public prominence.
Whether the Navy can do so today, absent a powerful rival on the high seas, is
doubtful at best.
MORTAL THREATS CONCENTRATE MINDS
Great Britain’s national survival was at stake, and the sea was where its fate
would be decided. Gratitude for national salvation only intensified Nelson’s
countrymen’s affection for him. Says Arthur Herman, author of the acclaimed
new book To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World, “It
was the Royal Navy, led by men like Horatio Nelson, that stopped [Napoleon] in
his tracks, and preserved the liberty of Europe and the rest of the world.”15 Naval
supremacy not only fended off attack but allowed British trade—the foundation
of national power—to thrive in the face of French commerce raiding. Alfred
Thayer Mahan credited Britain’s “watery bulwarks, traversed in every direction
by her powerful navy,” with securing the nation’s “peaceful working as the great
16
manufactory of Europe.” Concluded Mahan, “Those far distant, storm-beaten
ships upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the do17
minion of the world.”
Insulated from foreign enemies by two vast oceans, the United States has
never faced the kind of mortal, seaborne threat that menaced Great Britain during its decades-long duel with France. Consequently, Americans are less likely to
18
view their naval heroes as national saviors.
GEOGRAPHY SHAPES ATTITUDES
Geography played a defining role in Britain’s economic, political, and military
life. Lord Halifax observed in 1694, “The first article of an Englishman’s creed
must be that he believeth in the sea.”19 Writing in 1907, the British diplomat Eyre
Crowe agreed, in less lyrical but more analytical terms. Britain’s foreign policy,
declared Crowe, was “determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State . . . whose existence
and survival . . . are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant
20
sea power.”
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Despite Americans’ kinship with and lingering affinity for British society,
their nation’s geography and traditions have attenuated their attitudes toward
the sea. Unlike Britain, America is a continental empire first and a seapower second. Settling the American West consumed the energies of Americans during
21
the nineteenth century, molding habits that persist today. It is no coincidence
that our best known military heroes are soldiers and Marines—less dependence
on the sea, less affection for seafarers.
Beginning in the 1880s with Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval War of 1812, an influential band of expansionists, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, urged Americans to emulate the British model of seapower, acquiring colonies, building
naval and merchant shipping, and wresting a share of international commerce
away from the European great powers.22 At first the expansionists made little
headway with their blandishments. Roosevelt nearly despaired of being able to
rally public support for expansion, bemoaning evidence that Mahan was more
23
popular in Europe than at home. “I am glad Mahan is having such influence
with your people,” wrote Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, “but I
wish he had more influence with his own. It is very difficult to make this nation
wake up. . . . I sometimes question whether anything but a great military disaster
24
will ever make us feel our responsibilities and our possible dangers.”
Lord James Bryce, a British historian, observed during his travels in North
America in the late 1880s that “the general feeling of the nation [was] strongly
against a forward policy” in Hawaii and the other islands that captivated the expansionists. After talking to a cross section of Americans, however, Bryce prophesied that the public “would not stand by and see any other nation establish a
protectorate” over the Hawaiian Islands or tolerate European efforts to occupy
25
Caribbean islands. No amount of abstract seapower propaganda would galva26
nize U.S. public opinion, but a foreign war might. The Spanish-American War
jolted Americans out of their comfortable isolationism, showing how prescient
27
Bryce had been. Only then did the expansionists’ vision of a maritime commercial empire upheld by a potent navy become attainable.
TECHNOLOGY WORKS AGAINST HEROISM
Technological change also discouraged Americans from venerating their naval
heroes. Battleships were romantic weapons, conjuring up images of single combat between mounted champions. These majestic vessels had public appeal. By
the late 1800s, when the United States built its first battle fleet, the days of chivalric battles on the high seas were on the wane—witness the Royal Navy’s vain attempt to replicate Trafalgar during World War I. Unglamorous weapons such as
submarines and torpedoes offset British dreadnoughts at Jutland, the war’s lone
fleet engagement.28 The U.S. Navy’s Great White Fleet never saw action and in
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any event was rendered obsolete when Britain’s turbine-powered, all-big-gun
29
Dreadnought slid down the ways in 1906.
Aircraft carriers emerged as the U.S. Navy’s capital ships during World War II,
relegating battleships to the obscure, if indispensable, roles of providing air defense for the carriers and naval gunfire support to troops ashore. With the advent of naval airpower, naval aviators were more likely than “ship drivers” to
excite the public fancy. Outfitting the Iowa-class battleships with “gee-whiz”
armaments and sensors, notably Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles, restored
some of the dreadnoughts’ romantic appeal. Nonetheless, these warships played
a secondary role in their main modern combat mission, evicting Saddam
Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991, then speedily returned to mothballs.
It is tough to be a Nelson in modern naval warfare.
AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEIR OWN HISTORY
Without its own Nelson to focus attention on the sea, the United States risks allowing its naval power to atrophy. If it does, the nation’s military means could
eventually fall dangerously out of step with its global political objectives. Americans are famously indifferent to their own history—its maritime component
included. Surveys and studies have repeatedly shown how little students know,
even at elite colleges and universities, let alone rank-and-file citizens, about
30
American history. This forgetfulness seems intrinsic to our national character.
Observed the Princeton scholar Bernard Lewis in another context, “In current
American usage, the phrase ‘that’s history’ is commonly used to dismiss some31
thing as unimportant, of no relevance to current concerns.”
Whatever its merits, Americans’ relentless forward-looking nature often
blinds us to the value of historical experience. Nathaniel Philbrick, author of Sea
of Glory: America’s Voyage of Discovery, recently told Naval History magazine that
32
America suffered from “a kind of amnesia” with regard to its maritime heritage.
With the gold rush and the rise of the West, America became obsessed with its own
boundaries as the defining wilderness, when it was the sea that was essential to development of the nation. Not having a nautical or maritime background or perspective,
a lot of historians don’t know what to do with naval history. . . . So it’s been a blind
spot, both in American and global history.33

Moreover, the egalitarian ethos on which the United States was founded works
against public awareness of and interest in the nation’s maritime traditions.
Americans are skeptical of aristocracies, and the U.S. Navy officer corps borders
on being an aristocracy. It is a truism in naval circles that Navy captains are the
world’s last absolute monarchs, enjoying near-total authority once their vessels
put to sea. The endeavors of naval officers, consequently, tend not to resonate
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with ordinary citizens in the same way as the exploits of soldiers and Marines.
The nature of naval history accentuates Americans’ already pronounced tendency to put the past behind them.
WHAT NEXT?
Does it matter whether America has a Nelson, and, more generally, whether
America renews its love affair with the sea? Yes. Philbrick’s “historical amnesia,”
far from being a harmless national quirk, has real strategic repercussions. The sea
is vital to what America is. The loss of its nautical heritage deprives the nation of a
fund of wisdom. Absent a sense of how naval power contributes to national security and prosperity, the electorate—the final authority over U.S. policy and strategy—has no way to balance the claims of the U.S. Navy against other important
national priorities. Losing its historical moorings is perilous for an America with
global interests that demand a vibrant naval strategy and force structure.
Shifts in the global balance of power increasingly place the free flow of commerce at risk. A contemporary scholar—echoing Mahan’s description of the
world’s waterways as a “wide common,” a medium through which commerce
and military power could flow freely—rightly observed that control of the com34
mons was the basis for U.S. preeminence in world affairs. Rising powers, notably China, were amassing the wherewithal to create “contested zones” in which
35
imposing U.S. naval dominance would be difficult if not impossible. Globalization is a predominantly maritime phenomenon, just as it was in the day of
Mahan and Roosevelt. If spreading globalization is in the U.S. national interest, the United States must maintain a navy sufficient to assure free navigation,
36
commerce, and, in the words used by a recent commentator, “connectivity.”
Therefore, it behooves sailors, veterans, naval historians, and the array of institutions friendly to the mission of the U.S. Navy to work to build public awareness of how seapower underpins national security and prosperity, as well as of
the nation’s efforts to foster security and prosperity overseas. Can they manufacture an American Nelson to focus attention on the sea? That is doubtful—
Nelson’s feats were imprinted on the minds of his contemporaries, not artificially recreated decades or centuries hence. There is no mortal threat to the
United States from the sea to concentrate the public mind on maritime pursuits,
let alone naval history, and the United States cannot shed its culture as a continental empire in favor of a maritime culture akin to that of the island nation,
Great Britain. Nor is technological change likely to restore the heroic flair of
nautical warfare. Quite the opposite: The advent of standoff weaponry, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other technological wizardry will likely continue to
drain war on the high seas of its public appeal, perhaps permanently.
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Today’s proponents of naval history, consequently, should work to instill a
more generalized affinity for the Navy and the sea—invent a corporate “Nelson,”
as it were, an amalgam of all the virtues and heroism in U.S. naval history.
This promises to be a laborious undertaking. Cultures and traditions are
stubborn things. As we have seen, even the impassioned pleas of
turn-of-the-century expansionists failed to stir up much enthusiasm for maritime pursuits among the populace. Mahan, Roosevelt, and their cohort of ex37
pansionists, however, wrote primarily for an elite, northeastern audience. They
failed to broaden their appeal and, thus, political support for seapower beyond
this enclave. Today’s enthusiasts for seapower should not repeat this mistake but
should undertake a concerted outreach campaign that extends not only to Middle America, but to U.S. Navy personnel, Congress, administration officials, and
38
across disciplinary lines within the academic community. The starting points
for this enterprise in “public history” are:

• Recognize that seapower is interdisciplinary. Though it might appear to be a
cohesive discipline, seapower is in fact interdisciplinary to an extraordinary
degree. Mahan’s concept of seapower as a phenomenon fusing history,
strategy, economics and trade, geography, and a host of other disciplines
provides a useful reference point. Tying naval history to globalization—and
the prosperity globalization confers—in the minds of the residents of
landlocked areas could amplify the effectiveness of any outreach campaign.
While outreach within the historical profession is essential, moreover, any
campaign must address a far larger cross section of the academic
community.

• Realize that knowledge is scant within the U.S. government. The paucity of
congressmen and administration officials with military service has occasioned
39
much discussion in recent years. Any outreach effort must seek to build a
corps of spokesmen for naval history within the halls of government. To
bolster knowledge and pride within the ranks of the U.S. Navy, it would be
worth examining the extravagant effort the U.S. Marine Corps puts into
40
cultivating these virtues within new recruits and seasoned Marines alike. The
Navy might incorporate elements of the Marines’ training regimen into boot
camps and officer accession programs, as well as more advanced schools.

• Use every tool available. Contemporary advocates of seapower enjoy a
significant advantage over their forebears from Mahan’s day. There is an
abundance of electronic media to go along with the print media exploited
by nineteenth-century expansionists. Naval historians ought to submit
opinion columns on the anniversaries of great events and as opportunities
present themselves. They might also start online journals or “weblogs,”
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frequently updating websites packed with digital photographs and nautical
history. The Naval Historical Center could accelerate the digitization of its
photograph collection, much as the Library of Congress has done with its
holdings—and so forth.
Propagating historical knowledge among a large, diverse populace promises to
be a long, painstaking endeavor. The sooner advocates of American naval history get started, the better.

NOTES

1. Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the
British Navy Shaped the Modern World (New
York: HarperCollins, 2004), pp. 360–94.
2. George Gordon Byron, “Don Juan,” Canto I,
in Byron: Selected Poetry, ed. A. S. B. Glover
(London: Penguin, 1954), p. 194.
3. See, for instance, “The 200th Anniversary of
the Battle of Trafalgar,” Royal Navy website,
12 May 2004, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/rn/
content.php3?page=1&article=792.
4. Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812
(New York: Putnam, 1882; repr., Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987); Hanson W.
Baldwin, “Leyte Gulf: Kinkaid vs. Kurita,
Etc.” in “Fire When Ready, Gridley!” Great
Naval Stories from Manila Bay to Vietnam, ed.
William H. Honan (New York: St. Martin’s,
1993), pp. 251–77.
5. On the importance of maritime history, see
John B. Hattendorf, “The Uses of Maritime
History in and for the Navy,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), available
at www nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/
Spring/art1-sp3.htm.
6. Herman, To Rule the Waves, pp. 360–94; John
Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution
of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking Penguin,
1990), pp. 9–95; Charles R. Low, Her Majesty’s
Navy, Including Its Deeds and Battles (London:
Virtue, 1890), vol. 3., pp. 1–32.
7. Author’s e-mail correspondence with Dr.
John Hattendorf, E. J. King Professor of Maritime History and Chairman, Maritime History Department, U.S. Naval War College, 22
February 2005.
8. Herman, To Rule the Waves, pp. 400–401.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:10 AM

9. Keegan, Price of Admiralty, pp. 9–95.
10. This famous exhortation came in a letter sent
to every captain under his command at Trafalgar. One such letter, sent in 1803 to Captain
Eliab Harvey of the HMS Temeraire, fetched
sixty thousand pounds at auction in 2001—
testifying to Britons’ enduring fascination
with all things Nelsonian. “Nelson’s Letters
for Sale,” BBC News, 9 November 2001,
available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/england/
1646747.stm
11. Herman, To Rule the Waves, p. 382.
12. See, for instance, “C-Span Survey of Presidential Leadership,” C-Span, 1999, available
at www.americanpresidents.org.survey
13. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small
Wars and the Rise of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 3–29; Stephen
Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the
United States Navy, 1775–1991 (New York:
Random House, 1991), pp. 208–209; George W.
Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The
U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 28–39.
14. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War:
A Short History of the United States Navy in
the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown,
1963), pp. 138, 287–90, 437–68.
15. Herman, To Rule the Waves, p. xix.
16. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1894), vol. 2, p. 380.
17. Mahan, French Revolution and Empire, p. 118.
18. Indeed, the 11 September 2001 attacks on
New York and Washington represented the
first time that American soil had been

26

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Autumn 2005 Issue

attacked by a foreign enemy since the British
assault on Washington during the War of
1812. See John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004),
esp. pp. 7–34. One of the classic accounts of
America’s sense of separateness from the Old
World is Dexter Perkins, A History of the
Monroe Doctrine, rev. ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1963), pp. 3–26.
19. See also George Savile, “The Rough Draft of a
New Model of the Sea, 1694,” in Paul M.
Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval
Mastery (New York: Scribner’s, 1976; repr.,
Fontana 1991), p. 4.
20. Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present
State of British Relations with France and
Germany, January 1, 1907,” in British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914,
vol. 3, The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6, ed.
G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly (London:
His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), p. 402.
21. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), esp.
pp. 33–60. See also Frederick Jackson Turner,
“The Significance of the Frontier in American
History, 1893,” paper read at the meeting of
the American Historical Association in Chicago, 12 July 1893, first appeared in the Proceedings of the State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 14 December 1893, repr. Woodbridge, Conn.: Research 1975); Theodore
Roosevelt, “The Spread of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples,” in Memorial Edition:
Works of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 10, The
Winning of the West, ed. Hermann Hagedorn
(New York: Scribner’s, 1926), pp. 1–26.
22. Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812. Mahan’s best
known work was The Influence of Sea Power
upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1890; repr. New York: Dover, 1987),
which purported to derive lessons of permanent value from British naval history.
23. Eyre Crowe, testifying to Mahan’s influence,
noted that “the tremendous influence of
[maritime] preponderance has been described in the classical pages of Captain
Mahan. No one disputes it.” Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,” p. 402. See
also Holger H. Herwig’s “The Influence of A. T.
Mahan upon German Sea Power,” in The

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:10 AM

HOLMES

23

Influence of History on Mahan, ed. John B.
Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 67–80; and James R.
Holmes’s “Mahan: ‘A Place in the Sun’” and
“Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,” Comparative Strategy 23, no. 1 (January–March 2004),
pp. 27–61.
24. Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von
Sternburg, 17 January 1898, in The Letters of
Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison et
al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1951–54), vol. 1, pp. 763–64.
25. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth,
2d. ed. (London: Macmillan, 1891), vol. 2,
pp. 414–16.
26. Carl Schurz, editor of Harper’s Weekly, assailed Roosevelt’s bellicose maxim that “no
triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war.” Schurz rebuked
Roosevelt for failing, “in his combative ardor,” to notice “the logical quandary into
which he has reasoned himself. It is this: according to him a long peace has a tendency to
make a people effeminate and unpatriotic,
while war will invigorate a people and inspire
patriotism. But he argues also that the building of a great fleet of war-ships will be a
means not to bring on war, but to preserve
peace. Ergo, the building of a great war fleet
will effect that which promotes effeminacy
and languishing patriotism.” Carl Schurz,
“Armed or Unarmed Peace,” Harper’s Weekly
Magazine, 19 June 1897, p. 603.
27. Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader
State: America’s Encounter with the World
since 1776 (New York: Mariner’s Books; repr.
1998), esp. pp. 101–21.
28. Keegan, Price of Admiralty, pp. 97–155.
29. Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New
York: Random House, 1991), esp. pp. 468–97.
30. See, for instance, Anne D. Neal, Jerry Martin,
and Mashad Moses, Losing America’s Memory: Historical Illiteracy in the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: American Council of
Trustees and Alumni, February 2000), available at www.goacta.org/publications/Reports/
acta_american_memory.pdf; Michael K.
Block and Robert J. Franciosi with Melissa
Geiger, What Do College Graduates Know? A
Survey of Arizona Universities (Princeton,

27

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

24

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 4, Art. 1

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

N.J.: National Association of Scholars, April
2002), available at www.nas.org/affiliates/
arizona/az_survey_revised.pdf.
31. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War
and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003), pp. xviii–xix.
32. Nathaniel Philbrick, Sea of Glory: America’s
Voyage of Discovery, the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842 (New York: Penguin, 2004).
33. “An Interview with Nathaniel Philbrick:
‘What to Do with Naval History,’” Naval History, February 2005, available at www.usni.org/
navalhistory/articles05/NHPhilbrickFeb.htm.
34. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History,
p. 25.

38. Hattendorf, “The Uses of Maritime History
in and for the Navy.” Hattendorf documents
how sparse knowledge of naval traditions is
among active-duty personnel. This not only
denies the service a fund of historical experience that could be of contemporary use but
makes these personnel poor spokesmen for
the U.S. Navy.
39. A report commissioned in 2000 by Richard
Danzig, then secretary of the Navy, concluded that the service had “failed to use the
rich historical information available to it in
order to manage or apply effectively these resources for internal or external purposes.”
History Associates, Inc., History and Heritage
in the U.S. Navy (Rockville, Md.: October
2000), p. 3.
40. See, for instance, Thomas E. Ricks, Making
the Corps (New York: Scribner’s, 1997), esp.
pp. 53–72.

NA
V

S
TE

E
TH
V I R I BUS

37. Ferguson, Colossus, pp. 33–60.

R COLLE
GE
WA
AL

UNITED S
TA

35. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1
(Summer 2003), pp. 25–46. On China’s strategic outlook and military power, see James R.
Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence
of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,”
Comparative Strategy 24, no. 1 (March 2005),
pp. 53–71.

36. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New
Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004), esp.
pp. 247–94.

TO
M A RI VI C

RIA

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:11 AM

28

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Autumn 2005 Issue

TRANSATLANTIC TENSION AND THREAT PERCEPTION
Mary Elise Sarotte

E

uropeans, now dealing with a second Bush tour of duty, are understandably
wondering whether it will reverse the deterioration in transatlantic relations
begun during the first. That the state of relations declined during the first term is
not in doubt. Despite the initial outpouring of sympathy for the United States in
late 2001 and early 2002, in 2003 a poll by the German Marshall Fund (GMF)
found that an astonishing 81 percent of German and 82 percent of French respondents had come to disapprove of the way that President Bush was handling
1
international policy. In February and March 2004, the Pew Research Center repeated similar poll questions not only in Europe but also worldwide. When
asked if they thought that American and British leaders had honestly believed
that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or had simply lied, 82 percent of French respondents said the leaders had been
Dr. Mary Sarotte, a U.S. citizen, is a tenured faculty
member in the Department of Politics at the University
lying. The French percentage was higher even than that
of Cambridge and a Fellow of St. John’s College. Dr.
of Morocco (48 percent), Pakistan (61 percent), Turkey,
Sarotte received her bachelor’s degree from Harvard
2
and Jordan (both 69 percent). These statistics are
and earned a PhD in history at Yale. She has written for
3
The Economist, Time, Die Zeit, worked for the Interonly a tiny sample; there are many more to this effect.
national Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and
The reasons underlying this unfortunate decline are
served as a White House Fellow. She appears as a political commentator on CNN International and Sky. Her
numerous and have rightly received extensive attention.
publications include Dealing with the Devil (2001)
This essay will not repeat well-known arguments—most
and German Military Reform and European Security
famously, Robert Kagan’s view that Americans are
(2001), as well as popular and scholarly articles.
from Mars and Europeans from Venus—but rather offer
Portions of this article have been published in German
in the journal Internationale Politik; they appear coura new hypothesis. It will suggest how political history—
tesy of the editor.
and particularly the legacy of eighteenth-century politics—can help us to understand the current rift.
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THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
What governments perceive as a threat is determined by what they understand
their areas of responsibility, and their priorities, to be. So, to understand threat
perception, it is necessary to step back and look at the evolution of federal authority. In other words, it is necessary to ask a very basic question: What are the
responsibilities of the central authority? Even a brief historical examination,
such as that provided below, shows that Americans and Europeans have very different notions of federal authority, and that this, in turn, shapes their very differing threat perceptions. An understanding of this discrepancy will help prevent
both sides from talking past each other during the second Bush administration.
METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
A few clarifications are necessary before getting under way. First, this article will
employ the methodology of political history. It will focus on American and
European perceptions of how a national authority can best respond to global
threats and on the impact of the disparity between their views. It will not attempt, in the limited space available, to show that Americans are right and Europeans are wrong, or vice versa. Rather, the goal of this article is to highlight the
discrepancies, which have themselves received insufficient attention. Secondly,
threat perception for present purposes means the public understanding of
4
threat, as displayed in polling data, speeches, and public proclamations.
Finally, it is important to define “U.S. power” as used here. The focus will be
on American military power, because the transatlantic rift is, in large part, a
debate about how that should be used in the world (if at all). As a result, before
debating how to use U.S. might, it is helpful to make at least a brief attempt to
quantify just how much of it there is. Depending on which figures are included,
U.S. defense spending tops that of the next twelve to fifteen nations combined
5
and represents between 40 and 50 percent of all world spending on defense. The
United States maintains 752 military installations in 130 countries, with signifi6
cant numbers of troops in sixty-five of these. As Princeton’s Professor John
Ikenberry puts it, “U.S. military bases and carrier groups ring the world. Russia
is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has
accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first
time in the modern era, the world’s most powerful state can operate on the
7
global stage without the constraints of other great powers.”
Of course, there are many different kinds and levels of power exertion, as anyone with even a passing familiarity with Joseph Nye’s multilevel chessboard
knows. In their book America’s Inadvertent Empire, retired general William
Odom and coauthor Robert Dujarric inventively measure American power not
only by its defense budget but also by the youth of its population and even by the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1
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number of articles published in a year by the Harvard economics faculty (more
8
than that of any continental European country). Yale professor Paul Kennedy
also looks to less obvious indicators. He cites the fact that scholars working in
the United States have won 75 percent of Nobel Prizes in science, medicine, and
9
economics as evidence of American dominance. Indeed, in May 2004, Science
ranked universities around the world on the basis of easily tabulated indicators,
such as numbers of articles cited and prizes won. Of the top fifty universities
10
worldwide, thirty-five were American.
None of this makes the United States invulnerable, of course. Its indebtedness
and current-account deficit render it financially vulnerable. As the world’s
strongest military power, it is also the world’s most tempting target. It also has to
contend with the classic security dilemma—it must perpetually worry about
whether its predominance might provoke a balancing reaction and, if so, when
and in what form. Nonetheless, there is a quantitative strength that informs Bush
administration thinking about its obligations (or lack thereof) to the world.
USING POLITICAL HISTORY TO HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENT
UNDERSTANDINGS OF “FEDERALISM”
How can political history help us understand the current transatlantic rift? It
illuminates the fundamental transatlantic divide as to what kind of security
the central government should provide. Americans and Europeans have very
different views of the role of the federal government in providing for their national security. It is even hard to know what language to use to describe this
gap; the American notion of “federal authority” barely translates into the European context. In continental Europe, “federal” is a word associated largely with
the European Union (EU) and connotes dispersal of authority. In the United
States, the “federal government” (or even the “feds”) is a shorthand reference
to the national government and centralized power—a twist effected centuries
ago by James Madison to co-opt opponents of a strong central government, as
will be discussed below. So, American citizens can talk of federal power, but the
phrase is often lost in translation, since its meaning is different in the European context.
When this discrepancy in the understanding of “federalism” overlaps with
transatlantic debates about how best to ensure security, it becomes apparent that
a curious collision of historical legacies is happening. The three main legacies
are a narrow U.S. interpretation of the role of the federal government, which
originated in the eighteenth-century debate over how much central authority
was permissible; the Cold War expansion of federal power in light of the need for
an extensive American national security apparatus; and a very different European notion of the responsibilities of a central authority.
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A Narrow U.S. View of the Federal Government’s Security Role
To understand the present American view of the federal government’s security
role, it helps to investigate its origins in one of the most revered collections of
documents in the nation’s political history, the Federalist Papers. Authored by
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, these eighty-five essays were
published in the New York Independent Journal newspaper in 1787 and 1788.
They represented an eloquent effort to sway doubting members of the public in
favor of ratifying the draft U.S. Constitution and of creating a strong national
government. Given how revered the Constitution is today, it is important to remember how controversial it was originally. Citizens of the United States at the
time had the evils of overly powerful central authority fresh in their memories.
They had recently fought a war to rid themselves of the rule of the British monarch. However, the weak central authority erected after the war under the Articles of Confederation had proved unequal to the task of governing the fragile
new country. The draft produced at the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787 was a daring attempt to redefine national government. The authors
of these papers were hoping to steal their opponents’ thunder by calling themselves
11
“federalists” and the strong central government they proposed a federal one.
Jay, future chief justice of the Supreme Court, argued in Federalist 3 that
“among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.” He
pessimistically continued in Federalist 4, “It is too true, however disgraceful it
may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they
have a prospect of getting anything by it.” As a result, a crucial justification for
creating a strong national authority was defense. “Leave America divided into
thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one
was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and
money in its defense?”
In other words, the very first justification for political union offered by three
of America’s greatest political minds was what U.S. leaders would today call
homeland security. This view, rather than fading in the following centuries of
American growth and expansion, has remained a significant strain of contemporary conservative political thought. It holds that protecting U.S. territorial integrity is not just the first but the only truly vital mission of the U.S. federal
12
government. It is a view prevalent in much of America to this day, and not just
in the post-9/11 “red states.” In 1996 and again in 2000, RAND, the Kennedy
School, and the Nixon Center jointly organized a Commission on U.S. National
Interests. The commission could find only four: territorial integrity, security of
all of North America, prevention of domination of Europe and Northeast Asia
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1
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by a hostile power, and maintenance of key international trading and financial
13
networks. Of these, the first was the only truly vital one.
In contrast, today’s Europeans—even the British—expect much more from
their national leaders than territorial defense: free (or low-cost) health care and
university-level education, national news broadcasting, and public transportation, to name just a few. In other words, the narrow view of federal authority exemplified by the right wing of the Republican Party is badly at odds with the
view even of those Europeans right of center, to say nothing of the left.
The Cold War Legacy
This narrow American understanding of federal authority, strategic weakness in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the strains of continental expansion and civil war meant that the resulting U.S. foreign policy was an inwardlooking one. Indeed, at first glance it might seem that the only logical foreign
policy that could arise from such a narrow view would be isolationism. Conflict
with Mexico notwithstanding, it took the events of the twentieth century to
prove otherwise—that such a narrow understanding of federal responsibility
can, and does, translate into interventionism. In other words, there has always
been agreement across the U.S. political spectrum on the need to defend the
homeland. The eternal question is how. As memorably phrased by political scientist Michael Roskin, the conundrum is whether that defense starts “on the
14
near or far side of the ocean.”
Woodrow Wilson was the first president to make a sustained effort to defend
U.S. security on the far side of the ocean. Whether he did so out of idealism (as
say his supporters) or imperialism (as say his detractors), the relevant point for
our purposes is that he was clearly unafraid of action overseas. As the British political scientist Michael Cox and others have argued, “he was never squeamish
when it came to using American force abroad: he did so in fact on no fewer than
15
seven occasions between 1914 and 1918.” After the end of World War I, however, he lost the political backing needed to continue engagement abroad in
16
peacetime. He could take the United States into World War I, but he could not
establish interventionism as a legacy, or so it seemed. The matter appeared
firmly settled in favor of isolationism.
The catastrophe of the Weimar era not only reopened the matter sooner than
anyone expected but decisively created a new legacy of American engagement
abroad. In his Surprise, Security and the American Experience, Yale historian John
Lewis Gaddis praises President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for realizing this
sooner and more clearly than anyone else. He argues that FDR’s true genius lay
in his ability to embed “conflicting unilateral priorities within a cooperative
multilateral framework.” In other words, Roosevelt realized that the “pursuit of
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national interests . . . need not preclude the emergence of collective interests, be17
cause nobody had an interest in fighting another great war.” His cooperative
approach—that is, starting U.S. defense on the far side of the ocean in cooperation with the people who lived there—proved to be one of the most successful
grand strategies of all time.
This switch to defending the United States “on the far side of the ocean,”
which defined the Cold War, had far-reaching consequences not only for foreign
policy but also for U.S. domestic politics. The creation of a permanent massive
national security apparatus greatly increased the power of the federal government in Washington, D.C. As Ikenberry and his coauthor Daniel Deudney argue, it also served to strengthen American national identity by overcoming
“ethnic and sectional differences and the ideological heritage of individualism.”18 Writing in 1994, they predicted that the sudden end of the Cold War
would cause these accomplishments to unravel. In other words, the pendulum
would swing back to calling for defense on the near side of the ocean, with a corre19
sponding decrease in interest in international issues. Various statistics from the
1990s support their observation. American spending on coverage of foreign
20
news declined. Foreign language courses emptied of students. Even PhD candiates in political science did not have to learn the language or culture of the
21
countries in which they were supposedly becoming expert.
Crucially, 11 September 2001 stopped the pendulum. This in turn created a
paradox. In responding to the terrorist attacks of that day, the Bush administration launched upon a mission that is, although not in detail, fundamentally Cold
War in spirit. Namely, it is starting the defense of the homeland on the far
(sometimes very far) side of the ocean. As a result, two legacies have collided. The
administration is using U.S. might to undertake a mission consistent with the
Cold War, or interventionist, legacy, even as it subscribes to the earlier legacy of
limited federal responsibility. Its narrow view of the role of the central government is, for example, the rationale that inspires the Bush administration’s fervent
tax-cutting philosophy. The inherent conflict between the two legacies is crucial.
The world is no longer in the post–Cold War, or even post-post–Cold War,
period but rather what might properly be called the Washington Era, for it is
Washington’s convictions and contradictions that define it. This contradiction
is central to the administration’s foreign policy, so it is worth detailing the policy
consequences. The poor fit between these two legacies manifests itself in profound policy-making ambivalence. The chief result is the paradoxical (and
counterproductive) combination of wars of prevention overseas with a decrease
in both taxation and federal programs at home. It produces, first, equally fervent
desires to send troops abroad and to bring them home, both quickly; second,
willingness to call for cooperative security but to defeat or to abandon
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1
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agreements in the Senate or on the campaign trail; and third, insistence that oth22
ers comply with international accords even as the United States exempts itself.
Of course, there are deeper contradictions as well. As historian Mel Leffler rightly
points out, “If one’s credibility is vested in the achievement of too many goals,
23
one’s relative power will erode and one’s core values may become imperiled.”
Moreover, on a practical level, the administration is fighting a new kind of
asymmetric war against transnational, nonstate actors while burdened with not
just Cold War concepts but the very same national security institutions. If the
mission is Cold War in spirit, many U.S. national security institutions are also
Cold War in practice. As the 9/11 Commission’s concluding report of July 2004
maintained, the federal government still has much outdated national security
24
bureaucracy and needs updating as soon as possible. It remains to be seen
whether the intelligence reform bill passed in December 2004 will institute significant changes in the security practices.
American versus European Threat Perceptions
What does this clash of legacies imply for threat perception? To the president
and chief executive officer of RAND, James Thomson, it is apparent that the
breakdown in American-European relations has its fundamental roots “in the
different strategic appraisals of . . . Germany, France and several smaller Euro25
pean countries.” Just as Europeans have different expectations from their national governments, they also have different assessments of what constitutes a
threat to their well-being—in other words, requires a response. What does this
mean in practice?
Post-9/11, the United States senses a new vulnerability and a new kind of existential threat. Its defense budget has risen, topping four hundred billion dollars
in fiscal year 2005. September 11 has even enabled the Bush administration to
explore ways to reexamine the utility of nuclear weapons, in particular so-called
mini-nukes. As deterrence scholar Patrick Morgan puts it, “Inside its military establishment, in Congress, industry and the public there are clusters devoted to
finding better living through nuclear weapons. . . . All are hoping to make nu26
clear weapons steadily more usable.”
In contrast, for many European political leaders, particularly the United
Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Germany, terrorism is an old problem. European
states, and the EU as a whole, did indeed tighten their domestic security measures in response to both the 2001 and the Madrid attacks. But a high-profile
Council on Foreign Relations task force headed by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence
Summers pointed out in 2004 that many NATO allies had begun “questioning
the administration’s insistence that the security of all nations was now at
27
risk.” As Robert Kagan put it, in a 2004 updating of his famous 2002 article,
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Most Europeans never fully shared Washington’s concerns about weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—not during the Clinton administration, and not since. . . . Rightly or wrongly, Europeans do not believe that those
weapons will be aimed at them. To the extent that they do worry, moreover, most
Europeans do not look to the United States to protect them anymore. . . . Instead,
28
they ask, Who will guard the guards?

Even as American politicians sound the alarm, Europeans sound skeptical.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security “orange alerts” provoke shrugs on the
continent. To cite just one example, when Tom Ridge made American headlines
on 6 August 2004 with his elevated-threat warning to financial districts in the
New York and Washington, D.C., areas, EU officials yawned. The union’s
counterterrorism director, Gijs de Vries, remained on vacation. The director of
Germany’s Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy, Rolf Tophoven,
questioned the timing and echoed former U.S. presidential candidate Howard
Dean in his assessment of the August alert: “You shouldn’t forget that there is an
election campaign and that in times of crisis people tend to rally around the in29
cumbent government. This is not a bad thing for Bush.” As Richard Betts has
pointed out, the failings of the American intelligence community in the run-up
to the Iraq war, and subsequent investigations into what went wrong, have cre30
ated enormous skepticism about U.S. worries.
European political leaders are, of course, worried by Islamic extremism. But
their threat assessment encompasses a greater variety of concerns. Although almost never voiced publicly by elected European officials, there is concern about
Russia. It is rarely announced as policy, but the force structure of the
Bundeswehr—still, all these years after the end of the Cold War, organized to defend the homeland against tanks coming from the east—makes it obvious. In a
way that frustrates and confounds its NATO partners, Germany still de facto
prioritizes conventional territorial defense even as it pledges allegiance to the
31
Petersberg tasks,* which presume force projection capabilities.
The Russians returned the favor. In a speech in London on 13 July 2004, Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov spoke bluntly of his country’s feelings about
NATO expansion to the Baltics:
You are all aware of our calmly negative attitude towards expansion of the North Atlantic alliance. . . . What alarms us the most, from the point of view of our own security is the NATO deployment of means and forces on the territory of its new
members. . . . Our anxiety over the state of arms control in Europe is based on the
fact that the “gray zone” in this sphere has evolved in Europe for the first time in the
*Steps designed to improve the operational capability of the Western European Union (WEU), as
contained in the Petersberg Declaration, issued by a WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn,
19 June 1992.
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last fifteen years. We wouldn’t like Europe to return to the principles of balance of
power, but there may be no vacuum in the military-political situation. Especially if
this vacuum is filled with irresponsible statements of nationalistic character. Frankly
speaking, the existence of European states that do not observe standard norms of democracy and human rights is interpreted by Russia as a threat.32

With a few changes of names and dates, much of this language would still represent serviceable Cold War boilerplate. However alarming it might sound to
Europeans, however, it rated barely a mention in the United States. The Bush administration, despite the Yukos Oil Company drama at the end of 2004* and an
internal review begun early in 2005, largely considers Russia to be a solved problem—and it is undertaking significant force restructuring in Europe. On 16
August 2004, President Bush announced to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars that the Pentagon would withdraw sixty to seventy thousand troops
from Europe and Asia—mainly two heavy divisions now based in Germany—
33
over the course of the next ten years. The second-term administration may be
caught very short indeed if de-democratization in Russia accelerates.
There is also an argument, not uncommon in Washington, that the issue that
most concerns European elected officials is not territorial but job security, or to
be more precise, the security of jobs in the European defense industry. European
†
security specialist Mette Sangiovanni has argued forcefully that ESDP is pointless, because lack of European political unity (not to mention the expected need
for a United Nations mandate) would emasculate it in the face of any crisis. But
the one value that even she finds in ESDP is that its success would “restructure
the European defense industry in order to develop a stronger and more efficient
high-tech industrial sector.” It would “offer opportunities to rationalise defence
spending and reduce procurement costs through cooperation on armaments pro34
duction and undo the dramatically increased reliance on U.S. defense products.”
FOR WHAT THREATS TO DOMESTIC SECURITY IS FEDERAL
AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE?
It is an exaggeration, but one useful for highlighting the discrepancy at hand, to
say the main uncontested role of the U.S. national government is to provide territorial security, while the main uncontested role of most European national
governments is to provide economic security. Obviously the two are interrelated,
*That is, the jailing of its founder, then the seizure and forced sale to the government of its largest
unit.
†European Security and Defense Policy, an EU initiative arising from the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty: “The
central aim is to complete and thus strengthen the European Union’s external ability to act through the
development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management.” (“External Relations,” Europa, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/.)
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but they remain distinct. The job of territorial security in Europe has de facto
been “outsourced” to—depending on the circumstances—nascent EU security
institutions, NATO, or coalitions of the willing. Even British military planning is
now based on the assumption that any military conflict involving the United
Kingdom would also involve the United States, and its leaders shape procure35
ment accordingly.
To repeat the argument stated in brief at the outset, what a government perceives as a threat is determined by what it understands its areas of responsibility—
and its priorities—to be. For the U.S. federal government, maintaining territorial integrity is a much higher priority than, say, enabling its citizens to obtain a
university-level education. It would be absurd to say that European national
governments do not care about territorial integrity; obviously, they do. But
other priorities accompany it near the top of their lists of concerns. Their understanding of what constitutes “homeland security”—a phrase not commonly
used in Europe, as opposed to the United States—is much broader than the
American view, as it includes a commitment to social welfare programs unmatched in the United States. European leaders, and particularly Germans, place
a much higher priority on such challenges as European integration and management of their social market economies. Moreover, European voters and national
governments alike worry, in a way that the United States does not understand,
about the threat posed by America itself. The worry is not a straightforward notion that somehow the United States will become an enemy of Europe again.
Rather, there exists concern both that American behavior will damage the efficacy
of a rule-based international order and that its actions will create an enormous
anti-Western backlash that could engulf Europe as well as the United States.
In short, because of profoundly varying understandings about both the nature and responsibilities of federal authority, Washington and European leaders
are talking past each other. The answer to the question, “What threats to domestic security is federal authority responsible for?” is a very different one on opposite sides of the Atlantic. To answer this question, Europeans would first need to
clarify what is meant by “federal” authority. Then they would produce a long list
of duties. Hence, the individual national capitals have fewer resources to devote
to each of the tasks, and the European Union security apparatus is still too new
to compensate with economies of scale in the provision of security.
The American response would be a different and—as the historical analysis
here has shown—internally contradictory one. The Bush administration, contrary to the sweeping proclamations made in the second inaugural speech on 20
January 2005, ultimately adheres to a narrow version of federal authority. For this
reason the White House spent much of the day after the inaugural speech
36
downplaying its significance, a curious follow-up to a major presidential address.
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In summary, the U.S. position represents the awkward combination of two
different historical legacies. The contradictions inherent in these legacies help to
explain some of the paradoxes of first-term Bush administration foreign policy,
and the same clash of legacies will continue to inform policy making in the second term. When the Bush team said “four more years” during the campaign, it
meant just that. The second Bush administration is peopled largely by individuals who do not feel that they need to change their approach drastically. Hence
contradictions from the first term will persist. The more that its European partners understand about this inherent contradiction, and the more that Americans understand about the very different European understanding of
“homeland security,” the better they will be able to deal with each other in the
coming years.
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COME THE REVOLUTION
Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries
Richard A. Bitzinger

D

efense transformation has preoccupied the U.S. Defense Department for
over a decade. In recent years as well, militaries and governments throughout the Asia-Pacific region have begun to pay attention to the promise and requirements of defense transformation and to the emerging information-based
revolution in military affairs (RMA). Increasingly, their conceptions of defense
transformation, along with their intentions, efforts, and capabilities to transform
their militaries, could have a profound effect upon regional stability and security.
These activities could particularly affect future American security interests and
military operations in the Asia-Pacific—both due to their potential to influence
joint operations and interoperability with U.S. forces and by endowing new capabilities upon potential competitors and adversaries—and therefore could inject
new uncertainties and complications into the regional security calculus.
Defense transformation is much more than the “mere” modernization of
one’s armed forces—that is, being able to fight better the same kinds of wars.
Rather, it is the promise of a paradigm shift in the character and conduct of warfare. At the same time, it is more than simply overlayMr. Bitzinger is an associate professor with the Asiaing new technologies and new hardware on existing
Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii.
He is the author of Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?
force structures; it requires fundamental changes in
an International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi
military doctrine, operations, and organization. For
Paper (2003).
these reasons, therefore, transformation is an increasThe analyses and opinions expressed in this paper are
ingly loaded issue, with many implications for defense
strictly those of the author and should not be construed
as representing those of the U.S. Department of Defense
and security in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, for these
or of any other U.S. government organization.
same reasons, transformation in the region is beset
with considerable challenge.
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This article specifically addresses the process, problems, and prospects of and
for defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific region. Basically, it argues that
while several countries there are closely studying and assessing the implications
of the emerging revolution in military affairs, they have, for a variety of reasons,
made little progress so far in actually transforming their armed forces along its
lines. In fact, most countries in the region are unlikely, despite their best efforts,
to move beyond “modernization-plus,” at least not any time soon. Even this process of innovation, however, could still have many repercussions for regional security and stability, and in ways not currently being contemplated.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION?
“Defense transformation” is an ambiguous but nevertheless bounded term. No
strong consensus exists as to what defense transformation exactly means or entails. Some analysts and proponents of defense transformation view it as simply
1
another name for the revolution in military affairs. Certainly the two terms are
used increasingly interchangeably. But this still leaves unanswered what we
mean by a revolution in military affairs and what the current RMA stands for. To
cloud the issue even further, some students of defense transformation define it
mainly as a process of implementing an RMA, while others see it as an objective
in and of itself.
A revolution in military affairs is generally described as a “discontinuous,” or
2
“disruptive,” change in the concept and mode of warfare. For example, it has
been argued that a revolution in military affairs occurs when “the application of
new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with
innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of a conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase . . . in the combat potential and military effectiveness
3
of armed forces.” In a similar vein, the RAND Corporation defines an RMA as
“a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either
renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies in a dominant
player, or creates one or more core competencies in some dimension of warfare,
4
or both.”
Most analysts and proponents of defense transformation are in general agreement that the current RMA—and therefore the current process of transformation—has been primarily driven and enabled by dramatic advances in information
technology (IT) over the past two or three decades. The information revolution,
supplemented by recent advances in new materials and construction techniques,
has made possible significant innovation and improvement in the fields of sensors,
seekers, computing and communications, automation, range, precision, and
5
stealth. In one sense, therefore, defense transformation is inexorably linked to
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emerging concepts of network-centric warfare (NCW, sometimes referred to as
“network-enabled” warfare)—vastly improved battlefield knowledge and connectivity through IT-based breakthroughs that create more capable command, control,
communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) networks. NCW, according to the Defense Department’s Office of Defense
Transformation, “generates increased combat power by networking sensors,
decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of
command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and
6
a degree of self-synchronization.”
The key characteristics of a transformed force, therefore, include:

• Networked C4ISR, weapons, and platforms
• Shared situational awareness
• More accurate and standoff engagement
• Agility, speed, rapid deployability, and flexibility
• Jointness and interoperability.7
In a larger sense, too, defense transformation is synergistic—it entails the integration and employment of C4ISR systems, platforms, and weapons (particularly smart munitions) in ways that increase their aggregate effectiveness and
capability beyond their individual characteristics. This bundling together is
reminiscent of William A. Owens’s “system of systems” concept, in that it entails
the linking together of several types of discrete and even disparate systems
across a broad geographical, interservice, and electronic spectrum in order to
8
create new core competencies in war fighting.
Obviously, defense transformation entails much more than just force modernization. Hardware and technology are obviously crucial and primary components, fundamental building blocks in the modern, IT-based RMA, centered on
network-centric warfare and reconnaissance-strike complexes. Transformation,
however, is not simply a techno-fix. It entails fundamentally changing the way a
military does its business—doctrinally, organizationally, and institutionally. It
also requires advanced systems integration skills to knit together disparate military systems into complex operational networks. Finally, it demands elemental
changes in the ways militaries procure critical military equipment, and reform
of the national and defense technological and industrial bases that contribute to
development and production of their transformational systems. All this, in turn,
requires vision and leadership at the top in order to develop the basic concepts of
defense transformation, establish the necessary institutional and political momentum for implementing transformation, and allocate the financial resources
9
and human capital required for the task of implementation.
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DEFENSE MODERNIZATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Many militaries in the Asia-Pacific have greatly expanded their war-fighting capacities since the beginning of the 1990s. This modernization effort has gone far
beyond merely replacing older fighter aircraft with more sophisticated versions
or buying new tanks and artillery pieces; rather, they have over the past decade
added capabilities that they did not possess earlier, such as new capacities for
force projection and standoff attack, low observability (stealth), and greatly improved C4ISR. Consequently, several armed forces in the Asia-Pacific now deploy or will soon acquire several new weapons platforms, advanced armaments,
or sophisticated military systems, including aircraft carriers, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, air-to-air refueling aircraft, longer-range air-to-air missiles,
and modern antiship cruise missiles. For example:

• China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan have either
expanded or else are in the process of expanding their blue-water navies
with modern, foreign-built—or foreign-designed but locally constructed—
destroyers, frigates, missile patrol boats, and diesel-electric submarines.

• Thailand has acquired a small aircraft carrier from Spain; India has recently
concluded an agreement to purchase a used, refurbished, and reequipped
carrier from Russia; and Japan plans to construct two flat-top “helicopter
destroyers.”

• China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore have all received
or will soon acquire tanker aircraft for air-to-air refueling.

• Nearly every Asia-Pacific country currently possesses at least some fourthgeneration fighter aircraft—such as the Russian Su-27, Su-30, or MiG-29;
the American F-16 or F/A-18; and the French Mirage-2000—capable of
firing standoff, active, radar-guided air-to-air missiles like the U.S.
AMRAAM or the Russian AA-12.

• India is developing a supersonic antiship cruise missile in cooperation with
Russia, while China has purchased such missiles from Russia to outfit its
destroyers.

• Australia, India, Japan, and Taiwan have plans to acquire missile defenses,
either in cooperation with other countries or through the purchase of
off-the-shelf systems.
In particular, most Asia-Pacific militaries are greatly expanding and upgrad10
ing their C4ISR capabilities. China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan all possess
airborne early warning and command aircraft, while Australia, India, and South
Korea intend to acquire them in the near future. Australia, Japan, and South
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Korea have or will soon have the Aegis naval sensor and combat system deployed
on their largest surface combatants, while Taiwan is buying long-range earlywarning radar. Nearly every major military in the region is acquiring unmanned
aerial vehicles and are increasingly using space for military purposes, including
satellites for surveillance, communications, and navigation/target acquisition.
Several countries in the region—particularly Australia, China, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan—have also made or are presently making considerable
investments in new types of information processing and data fusion, command
and control, and the digitization of their armed forces. South Korea, for example, is developing a new tactical integrated communications system, while
Taiwan is spending more than two billion dollars on a new military-wide C4ISR
network that will link communications, computers, and sensors.11 China is reportedly working hard to expand and improve its C4ISR
Ultimately, “defense transformation” does not
and information operations/
adequately describe current efforts by Asia-Pacific
information warfare capabilinations to upgrade and reform their militaries—
ties, with particular attention
“modernization-plus” is more apt.
to creating a separate military
communications network,
using fiber-optic cable, satellites, microwave relays, and long-range, highfrequency radio. Much of the hardware and technology bolstering China’s
emerging C4I and information operations capability is basically dual use in nature; the military has benefited indirectly from developments and growth in the
12
country’s commercial information-technology industry. Singapore already
possesses a nationwide secure C4I network, utilizing microwave and fiber-optic
13
channels linked to air and maritime surveillance systems.
The acquisition of these new military capabilities has many implications for
militaries in the Asia-Pacific. At the very least, they promise to upgrade and
modernize war fighting in the region significantly. Certainly, Asia-Pacific militaries are acquiring greater lethality and accuracy at greater ranges, improved
battlefield knowledge and command and control, and increased operational
maneuver and speed. Standoff precision-guided weapons, such as cruise and
ballistic missiles and terminal-homing (such as GPS or electro-optical) guided
munitions, have greatly increased combat firepower and effectiveness. The addition of modern submarines and surface combatants, amphibious assault ships,
air-refueled combat aircraft, and transport aircraft have extended these militaries’ theoretical range of action. Advanced reconnaissance and surveillance platforms have considerably expanded their capacities to look out over the horizon
above, below, and on the sea surface. Additionally, through increased stealth and
active defenses (such as missile defense and longer-range air-to-air missiles),
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local militaries are adding substantially to their survivability and operational effectiveness. Consequently, conflict in the region, should it occur, would likely be
more “high-tech” than in the past—faster, longer in reach, and yet more precise
and perhaps more devastating in its effect.
More important, many Asia-Pacific militaries are acquiring military equipment that, taken together, forms the kernel of what is required to transform their
militaries fundamentally. In particular, those systems related to precision strike,
stealth, and above all C4ISR constitute some of the key hardware ingredients essential to a modern RMA. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have real potential to affect strategy and operations on tomorrow’s battlefield and hence to alter
the determinants of critical capabilities in modern warfare.
DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
If Asia-Pacific militaries have been amassing much of the hardware necessary
for defense transformation, “the acquisition of new technology is only the first
and often the easiest step” in realizing an RMA.14 It is necessary as well, therefore,
to develop the “software”—the doctrine, tactics, and organization—necessary
to take full advantage of these new technologies. Accordingly, many militaries
and governments in the Asia-Pacific region are studying, assessing, and even experimenting with such aspects of transformation.
Much of this speculation and experimentation has been driven by the current
debate over the future transformation of the U.S. armed forces. The United
States is recognized to be at the forefront, in terms of strategy, operations, and
technology, when it comes to conceptualizing and implementing transforma15
tion. Consequently, American models of the information technology–based
RMA and defense transformation have typically been the point of departure for
discussion and evaluation in the Asia-Pacific.
Talking the Talk . . .
Interoperability with U.S. forces has been a key factor, driving much of the current thinking about defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. allies and
friendly nations in the region—particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan—appear to be particularly keen on studying and possibly implementing
transformations of their respective militaries specifically in order to remain
compatible with U.S. forces, particularly as the likelihood of coalition operations with the United States—such as in Iraq or Afghanistan—is expanding.
This enhanced interoperability is especially crucial for regional allies as the
United States continues to transform its own armed forces, since it would permit
their militaries to tie into and take advantage of American progress in
transformational warfare. The Aegis combat system could enable Japanese and
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South Korean ships to link with U.S. naval forces in cooperative engagements
against opposing forces, or, in the case of Japan, to work with the United States in
developing and deploying ship-based missile defenses. At the same time, defense
transformation on the part of key U.S. allies and other friendly countries in the
Asia-Pacific could greatly benefit the United States, by strengthening bilateral
military alliances and burden sharing.
Australia. In 1999, having looked at the issue of defense transformation since
mid-decade, the Australian Department of Defense established an Office of the
Revolution in Military Affairs to review technological developments and explore strategies for implementing an Australian RMA, particularly in partner16
ship with the United States. According to one report, the four key components
of the Australian RMA are weapons lethality, force projection, information pro17
cessing, and intelligence collection. In terms of practical results, Australia
stresses developing and enhancing the mobility, firepower, and sustainability of
the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) by expanding interservice jointness, increasing logistical support, strengthening amphibious and expeditionary capabilities, and making improvements in precision strike and in intelligence
18
gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
In particular, the ADF places increasing emphasis on network-centric
19
warfare as a way to gain a “knowledge edge” over potential competitors. The
knowledge-edge concept is “the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effective20
ness.” NCW is intended not only to provide the ADF a force multiplier that
maintains a technological edge over much larger potential adversaries (such
as Indonesia) but to enhance cooperation and interoperability with U.S.
21
forces. In this regard, Australia especially looks to leverage its limited indigenous high-technology core competencies—such as its Jindalee over-thehorizon radar network—in collaborative weapons programs with the United
States. 22
China. Beijing has also been particularly influenced by the emerging IT-based
RMA. China is currently engaged in a determined effort to modernize its armed
forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in order to be able to fight and win
23
“limited wars under high-tech conditions.” This doctrine revolves around
short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed, and
long-range attack, employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic battle space, and relying
heavily upon extremely lethal, high-technology weapons. PLA operational doctrine also emphasizes preemption, surprise, and shock, given that the earliest
stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war.
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In this regard, many in the PLA see considerable potential for force multiplication in such areas as information warfare, digitization of the battlefield, and
24
networked systems. As already mentioned, China is greatly expanding its
C4ISR capabilities. At the same time, it sees adversaries who are highly dependent upon advanced technology—such as the United States—as susceptible to
low-tech countermeasures or attacks on their own command, control, and communications capabilities. Consequently, the PLA has devoted increasing atten25
tion to asymmetric responses that enable “the inferior to defeat the superior.”
These systems are sometimes lumped together as “assassin’s mace” or “trump
26
card” weapons. Some assassin’s-mace weapons would be used against an enemy’s vulnerabilities, as in computer-network attacks. Information warfare is a
potentially critical new development in the PLA’s war-fighting capabilities. The
PLA is reportedly experimenting with information-warfare operations, and it
has established special units to carry out attacks on enemy computer networks
27
in order to blind and disrupt an adversary’s C4I systems.
Other assassin’s-mace weapons are existing systems, development or deployment of which have been accelerated because they have proved to be among the
most effective weapons in the PLA’s arsenal. This category of weapons particularly
includes tactical ballistic missile systems—such as the six-hundred-kilometerrange CSS-6 and three-hundred-kilometer CSS-7 missiles—which are being fitted with satellite-navigation guidance for improved accuracy and with new
types of warheads (such as cluster submunitions and fuel-air explosives) for
higher lethality. Finally, there are the so-called new-concept arms, such as kineticenergy weapons (such as railguns), lasers, radiofrequency and high-powered
28
microwave weapons, and antisatellite systems.
India. The 1991 Gulf War led India to pay closer attention to the promise and
challenges of the emerging IT-based RMA. Many Indians have become increasingly concerned about growing American technological prowess and the
near-global dominance of the United States as a conventional military power.
Some Indians have called for corresponding, if perhaps asymmetric, capabilities
29
to deal with this new military-technological reality. This response holds that
India must in particular exploit the emerging information revolution in warfare
if it wants to be taken seriously as a regional and global power, to have a “fighting
30
chance in future conflicts.” India’s rapidly growing information-technology
31
sector is seen as potentially critical in this effort.
Japan. Japanese interest in defense transformation is largely rooted in the 1998
North Korean Taepo Dong missile test, which alerted Tokyo to the need to reform and reorient its Self-Defense Forces to new threats, particularly ballistic
32
missiles and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Other concerns
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driving Japan’s interest in transformation include the possibility of cyber attacks
on its national information infrastructure, the likely expansion of involvement
in international military operations (such as in Iraq), and increased military cooperation with the United States in regional security undertakings (such as the
33
Proliferation Security Initiative). At the same time, the Japanese must cope
with severe fiscal constraints and a political need to keep casualties low in the
34
event of conflict.
The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has designated its transformational concept
the “Info-RMA.” This Info-RMA is based on the premise that future warfare will
be characterized by a huge leap in battlespace awareness, precision-strike engagement, coordinated attack by small, widely dispersed units, the heavy use of
cyberspace and unmanned battlefield systems, expansion of the operational
theater and increased speed, and a move away from attrition to “decisive” (also
called “effects based”) warfare. The Info-RMA, which according to the JDA is
based on “the application of advanced information technologies to the military
sphere,” entails information sharing through the creation of an all-inclusive
C4ISR network, greater jointness and speed (particularly in command and control), increased combat efficiency and effectiveness, greater organizational flexibility, protection of critical information systems (such as command and control
nodes), and expanded interoperability with U.S. forces. The objective of the
35
Info-RMA is “a quantum leap in the efficient achievement of military objectives.”
Many of the principles of the Info-RMA can be found in the Self-Defense
Forces’ future defense capabilities requirements. In particular, the JDA’s 2003 defense posture review calls for a joint information-sharing network for ground,
sea, and air self-defense forces, a “technology oriented,” rather than “scale oriented,” force structure (i.e., using technology as a force multiplier), and
interoperability with the United
States through modernization
New military capabilities of the Asia-Pacific
militaries, at the very least, promise to upgrade and digitization.36 In addition, Japan plans to increase greatly its
and modernize war fighting in the region
missile defense initiatives, in part
significantly.
by upgrading its naval Aegis systems to defend against missile attacks and by expanding cooperation with the
United States on joint missile defense research and development. In fact, missile
defense could become a catalyst for defense transformation in Japan, as it could
effect critical policy changes (such as amendment of Article 9 of the constitution
to permit expanded U.S.-Japan cooperation in collective self-defense), promote
the acquisition of a joint C4ISR network, and help reform Japan’s defense re37
search, development, and industrial infrastructure.
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Singapore. Interest in defense transformation in Singapore stems both from
strategic weaknesses—lack of strategic depth, a small and aging population, and
relatively limited defense resources—and economic and technological advantages, particularly a highly educated workforce and strong information technologies. Singapore’s Ministry of Defense sees information technologies as critical,
perhaps decisive, in future conflict. The IT-based RMA will
change the nature of warfare. Superior numbers in platforms . . . will become less of
an advantage unless all these platforms can be integrated into a unified, flexible, and
effective fighting system using advanced information technologies. At the same time,
the ever-increasing reliance upon information technology means that protecting
one’s own information systems and disrupting the enemy’s will become a major aspect of warfare.38

Accordingly, Singaporean transformational efforts—referred to collectively
as “Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control” (IKC2) doctrine—
emphasize the acquisition, development, and integration of technologies for
command and control with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sys39
tems and with precision-guided weapons. RMA-related areas currently receiving particular focus include advanced electronics and signal processing,
information systems security, advanced guidance systems, communications,
40
electronic warfare, sensors, and unmanned vehicles. Two new agencies—the
Future Systems Directorate and Center for Military Experimentation—have
been established to help implement IKC2 in Singapore.
South Korea and Taiwan. The Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces are aware
that future warfare will be quite different from today, that “it will be nonlinear,
41
small-scale, nonconcentrative, and far-separated.” Consequently, they acknowledge that future forces will need improved C4ISR, including networked
platforms, unmanned systems, and real-time command and control, as well as
enhanced capacities for precision strike. Additionally, the ROK-U.S. alliance is
undergoing a shift, with South Korea expected to play a larger role in its own defense; Seoul is exploring ways in which it can become more self-reliant (particularly in early warning, intelligence, and surveillance) but remain interoperable
with U.S. forces.42 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the Korean RMA is still
43
very much in its early stages.
Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs is largely predicated on Chinese threat
scenarios and accordingly is very much influenced by Chinese thinking about
44
the RMA. Not surprisingly, Taipei is focused on defending against missile
strikes and securing its command and control network from attacks by the PLA,
while engaging in offensive information warfare against China. Elements of
its approach include early warning systems, reconnaissance capabilities, and
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an integrated and secure command and control system, along with antimissile
45
interceptors and possibly retaliatory ballistic missile systems.
In their efforts to implement RMAs, Seoul and Taipei are aided by large and
growing information-technology sectors. South Korea and Taiwan are both extensively “wired” in terms of cable and cellular systems, Internet use, and elec46
tronics industries. In particular, they possess sizable manufacturing bases in
the fields of computers and telecommunications; together they dominate the
global production of dynamic random-access memory semiconductor chips.
. . . But Not Walking the Walk
Notwithstanding all the discussion, debate, and evaluation regarding the value
and effectiveness of the information technology–based revolution, most
Asia-Pacific countries have made little actual progress in transforming their
militaries. In particular, there has been little implementation of the organizational, institutional, and doctrinal change that would be needed. Few militaries
in the region have moved beyond the initial “speculation” phase of defense
transformation, and even fewer are testing new organizations or new methods
of warfare, or specifically developing strategies for transforming their armed
forces, or directing resources toward this end. An observation made about recent European transformational activities is equally apropos to the Asia-Pacific,
that they “have been more about producing PowerPoint slide shows than build47
ing demonstrators or pursuing field experimentation.” Even of those that have
done so, none has yet revised its doctrine or fielded reorganized force structures
48
in line with transformational concepts of the IT-based RMA. In some countries—particularly India, Japan, and South Korea—even the debate is still rather
thin and theoretical; any tangible movement toward transformation would appear to be far off.
Even in the case of China—whose “efforts to exploit the emerging RMA arguably are the most focused” of any country in the Asia-Pacific—there is still considerable disagreement as to the significance and potential military effectiveness
49
of PLA force modernization over the past decade. Certainly, the PLA has made
considerable progress over the past decade in adding new weapons to its arsenal,
and China has noticeably improved its military capabilities in several specific areas,
particularly missile attack, air and naval platforms, and information warfare. In
addition, the PLA is reportedly experimenting with digitization and RMA-type
50
campaign tactics. Nevertheless, the PLA continues to suffer from substantial
deficiencies and weaknesses that limit its ability to constitute a modern, trans51
formed military force, and its pace of reform and change has been slow. “Not all
52
military leaders embrace RMA ideas”; consequently the PLA remains overwhelmingly a ground-based army, composed largely of infantry and oriented
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toward linear, attrition-based “People’s War.” Much of its weaponry is still of
1960s- and 1970s-era vintage. In particular, the PLA still lacks the logistical and
lift capacity—either by sea or by air—for projecting force much beyond its bor53
ders. Finally, China’s capabilities in the area of C4I architectures, information
warfare, and surveillance and reconnaissance are still very much in the early
stages of research, development, and deployment. Consequently, China has a
long way to go in terms of defense transformation and of acquiring and applying
54
the state of the art.
Ultimately, “defense transformation” does not adequately describe current
efforts by Asia-Pacific nations to upgrade and reform their militaries. If defense
transformation entails a fundamental and disruptive change in the concept,
character, and conduct of war fighting, then most Asia-Pacific nations are engaged not so much in transforming as in basically modernizing their armed
forces—that is, adding new capabilities and new capacities for warfare but without necessarily altering their fundamental modes of warfare. “Modernizationplus,” therefore, is perhaps a more apt descriptor of what is currently transpiring
in most Asia-Pacific militaries. Many militaries in the region, by buying new
types of precision-guided munitions, airborne early warning aircraft, submarines, air-to-air refueling aircraft, data links, and improved command and
control systems, are certainly acquiring capabilities that they did not possess
earlier, such as new capacities for force projection and standoff attack, low
observability, and greatly improved C4ISR. Nevertheless, this modernizationplus effort is in general evolutionary, steady state, and incremental, and the in55
novation seen here is less a disruptive than a sustaining process.
IMPEDIMENTS TO DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC
Several factors currently inhibit defense transformation among the Asia-Pacific
militaries. The first comprises costs and resource constraints: transformation, it
turns out, doesn’t come cheap, despite assertions made early on by some proponents that the exploitation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies
would greatly reduce costs.56 Rather, even to make a start requires the acquisition
of many new and expensive types of military-unique systems. Even many
dual-use COTS information and communications technologies are not easily
(or cheaply) adapted to military use, as they often require substantial modification, such as ruggedization or additional capabilities.57
At the same time, funding for transformational systems must generally compete with large and expensive “legacy” programs—such as fighter aircraft,
tanks, and large warships, as well as huge manpower costs usually associated
58
with sizable ground forces. In fact, in the case of most Asia-Pacific militaries,
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such legacy spending continues to siphon off money that could pay for
59
transformational systems.
Ironically, defense transformation is lagging in the Asia-Pacific despite the
fact that most countries in the region have actually increased defense spending
over the past decade. Military expenditures in the Asia-Pacific market grew by
nearly 27 percent in real terms over the past decade, and an extra $126 billion
was added to regional defense budgets between 1992 and 2002. India’s defense
budget has doubled since the early 1990s, for example, while Chinese military
expenditures have increased more than threefold in just the past seven years
60
(1997–2004). Even the Asian financial crisis of 1997 appears to have only temporarily dampened regional military expenditures; nearly every major country
in the Asia-Pacific had by 2002 sufficiently recovered to raise their defense budgets above 1992 levels.
Nevertheless, even these rising military expenditures may not be sufficient to
fund both legacy and transformational systems or to acquire new systems in sufficient quantities so as to be transformational in their effects. Many Asia-Pacific
countries—such as India and South Korea—still spend less than twenty billion
dollars on defense, and most—including Australia, Singapore, and Taiwan—
61
spend less than ten billion. In the case of Japan—perhaps the only country in
the region with the indigenous technological and industrial capabilities for exploiting the IT-based RMA for transformation—defense budgets have been
62
stagnant for years. Only China has been able to maintain substantial and sustained increases in military spending over the past decade.
In some cases, military expenditures are expected to rise over the next few
years. South Korea, for example, plans to invest more than twenty-eight billion
dollars in modernizing its armed forces over the 2004–2008 time frame. Taiwan
intends to spend an additional fifteen billion dollars over the next decade on
new military equipment, including eight diesel-electric submarines and an
anti–ballistic missile system. It is probably too soon to tell, however, how much
of this extra money will underwrite transformation.
Second, the organizational and institutional cultures found in most AsiaPacific militaries impede transformation. Militaries in the Asia-Pacific are often
extremely conservative, risk-averse, and highly bureaucratic organizations. Of
course, large organizations anywhere, certainly militaries and defense ministries, are typically resistant to change—especially disruptive change, since it can
threaten the stability of normal day-to-day operations, standard operating procedures, war plans, and even career paths. Armed forces are especially hierarchi63
cal, with heavily top-down command-and-control structures. In the
Asia-Pacific, however, the conservative and hierarchical nature of military organizations is often compounded by Confucian principles of harmony, seniority
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over merit, respect for elders (age is often synonymous with rank or leadership),
and concern with face. Consequently, local militaries may be resistant or even
hostile to the disruptive, leveling, and decentralizing nature of transformation
64
and the information technology–based revolution in military affairs.
Another implication of the decidedly conservative nature of regional defense
establishments is a characteristic preference for traditional systems. Local militaries often prize large and conspicuous weapons platforms—such as main battle tanks, modern fighter aircraft, and aircraft carriers—more than less visually
striking but transformational systems, such as UAVs, C4I networks, and precisionguided munitions. In addition, high-ranking military officials seeking to
advance their careers have tended to prefer immediate, high-profile hardware
65
acquisitions over longer-term software fixes. Finally, ground forces predominate many Asia-Pacific militaries (this is particularly evident in China, India,
South Korea, and Taiwan), marking their entire defense establishments with
their penchants for mechanized armor, large ground forces, and force-on-force
66
warfare.
In many cases too this conservative and risk-averse behavior is exacerbated by
“old boy” networks in defense decision making. Throughout the Asia-Pacific,
critical decisions and policies pertaining to national security—particularly
arms procurement, doctrine, and force structure—are commonly made by
small, insular groups of military officers, career civilian defense officials, defense
industry representatives, and private advisers (many of whom are ex-military
men or former bureaucrats, a pattern known in Japan as amakudari, or literally
67
“descent from heaven”). This insularity—often coupled with corruption and
bribery—reinforces a “business as usual” approach, limits linkages to centers of
innovation in the commercial and business worlds, and thereby makes it harder
68
to implement transformation.
Many militaries in the region also lack any tradition of joint operations and
instead possess strong single-service cultures and severe interservice rivalries. In
such a state of affairs it is doubly difficult to introduce ideas of jointness,
interoperability, and combined-arms operations as basic war-fighting concepts,
69
or to create common C4ISR and logistical support systems.
Third, most defense technology and industrial bases in the Asia-Pacific are ill
equipped to contribute much to defense transformation. Most regional defense
research, development, and industrial bases—even in Japan—lack the design
skills, technological expertise, or links to advanced commercial technology sectors (particularly local IT industries) needed to develop and manufacture trans70
formational systems. In particular, these countries’ defense industries do not
possess sufficiently advanced systems-integration capabilities to link together
highly complex systems of systems, such as C4ISR networks. Most of these firms
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are simply not set up to function as “lead systems integrators”—such as a
Lockheed Martin or a BAE Systems—building and leading large teams of disparate subcontractors in a systematic program to design, develop, and manufac71
ture a system to customer specifications. Defense industries in the region tend
to be primarily “metal bashers” as opposed to innovators; local arms manufacturing typically involves production either under license or of relatively simple
indigenous systems, such as artillery pieces or small arms. In addition, heavy
emphasis in most of these countries on self-reliance in arms production means
that resources are often wasted on duplicating the development and manufacture of weapons systems already widely available on the global arms market.72
Local arms manufacturers push their governments to buy systems they are already capable of producing or that offer prestige and global presence—again,
mostly legacy systems, such as fighter aircraft or large surface combatants—
rather than potentially transformational ones, such as advanced precisionguided weapons and joint, networked C4ISR infrastructures.
Should a country choose to acquire transformational systems, it will likely
have to buy them off the shelf from foreign suppliers (particularly the United
States) or develop them collaboratively with foreign partners (again, the United
States). Such programs will have to compete with locally built systems, around
which strong political lobbies often cluster, both for the sake of jobs and in order
to preserve so-called strategic industries.
Fourth, militaries and defense industries in the Asia-Pacific region have few
strong linkages to innovative local industries, such as the information technology sector, limiting the potential for “spin-on”—that is, from commercial to
military. Most regional arms industries are state owned and insulated from both
market forces and the private sector. This demarcation, however, makes it more
difficult for the defense sector to benefit from cross-fertilization with commercial technologies, as well as making it harder and less attractive for civilian in73
dustries to participate in military research, development, and manufacturing.
At the same time, local militaries in general remain distrustful of commercial
74
off-the-shelf technologies and prefer “mil-spec’ed” equipment.
Fifth, the capabilities of local commercial high-technology industries—particularly local IT firms—may be overrated and actually of little use to defense
transformation. While many Asia-Pacific countries boast sizable information-technology sectors, the emphasis has largely been on production engineering, not innovative research and development. The science and technology bases
of most countries in the region are still weak; like local arms manufacturers, they
particularly lack the necessary systems-integration skills to adapt and incorporate commercial technologies in military systems. Hence, with the exception of
Japan, most regional IT production has been at the decidedly low end of the
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75

technology spectrum. Most of Taiwan’s and China’s IT industries are still oriented toward production and assembly according to original-equipmentmanufacturer specifications, for example, rather than indigenous design and
76
manufacturing. Huawei and ZTE, two of China’s much-vaunted telecommunications vendors (the former has indirect ties to the PLA), have prospered by
occupying generally the low end of the telecoms sector—producing basic cable
and wireless systems—keeping prices and production costs low, and selling to
77
the developing world. Even India’s software industry is still largely geared toward delivering highly specialized programs according to strict customer specifications or toward the “grunt work” of the global IT industry (such as
debugging Y2K software or handling technical-support calls).78
As previously noted, South Korea and Taiwan are the world’s leaders in the
design and manufacture of memory chips, but this is in effect the exception that
proves the rule. Dynamic random-access memory chips have practically become
a commodity product, and their
Defense transformation is much more than the manufacture is increasingly being
sent offshore to countries where
“mere” modernization of one’s armed forces.
production costs can be kept low
(such as China, which is becoming an important producer—again, to original-manufacturer specifications—
of semiconductors). At the same time, much of the technology found in South
Korea’s and Taiwan’s semiconductor industry does not seem to be making its
way into military systems; even locally produced defense electronic systems rely
79
heavily on imported designs and components.
Consequently, exploitation of dual-use technologies for defense transformation is unlikely to occur to any large degree in the Asia-Pacific. While nearly all
countries in the region see the great promise of advanced commercial technologies for military uses—particularly information technologies or space—few
have made actual, deliberate, and concerted efforts to engage in such spin-on.
Most exploitation of dual-use technologies in the region has so far been serendipitous and modular—that is, simply “piggybacking” on existing or emerging
commercial systems (such as nationwide fiber-optic telecommunications net80
works) rather than adapting commercial technologies to military purposes.
Even then, dual-use efforts have not always found success, as witnessed by Ja81
pan’s recent setbacks in its space program.
Finally, certain Asia-Pacific militaries face country-specific impediments to
defense transformation. Japan, for example, is still greatly constrained by its
constitution, which bars the country from possessing an offensive armed force;
82
this restriction could be interpreted as applying to transformation. For its part,
India, given the likely threats it perceives from Pakistan and China, appears to be
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more interested in acquiring an effective nuclear strike capability than in engag83
ing in an IT-based RMA.
WHERE IS THE ENDGAME?
It may be premature or even irrelevant to talk about defense transformation in
the context of the Asia-Pacific militaries. Most countries in the region—despite
their best efforts—are unlikely to transform their militaries to the extent made
possible by the information revolution and the emerging revolution in military
affairs, at least not any time soon. There are simply too many factors hindering
or impeding the ability of even the most technologically advanced or motivated
militaries in the Asia-Pacific—including Australia, China, India, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—to move beyond modernization-plus. These
factors particularly include budgetary constraints; cultural, organizational, and
bureaucratic resistance; the effect of legacy systems and preexisting procurement commitments; weaknesses in national defense technology and industrial
bases; and underappreciation of the complexity of adapting commercial
dual-use technologies to military purposes. Overall, defense transformation
may simply be too disruptive and too threatening to military and civilian elites,
too expensive, and technologically too demanding.
Of course, it is easy to criticize. Change—especially radical change inherent
in the RMA—is always hard, and it is human nature to be suspicious of and hostile toward the unknown. It should not be surprising to see so much organizational, institutional, and cultural resistance to the idea of transformation. Even
in the United States and Europe there still exist considerable skepticism and
84
foot-dragging with regard to defense transformation. Moreover, transformation as a concept suffers from the fact that it is basically an open-ended, continuous process—since there will always arise new technological innovations that
can affect the character and conduct of warfare, and therefore military doctrine
and organization, where is the endgame? When does a military decide that it has
finally and successfully transformed itself? In point of fact it never can, and so to
fault a country for being at “only” a certain level of transformational capability
or for making “only” a certain degree of progress toward implementing a revolution in military affairs is perhaps unfair.
As a leading scholar has succinctly noted, “hardware may be easily acquired
but the accompanying software (e.g., doctrine, tactics, organizational form, and
macrosocial change) [of defense transformation] is far more difficult to develop
85
and implement.” At the same time, however, transformation along the lines of
the U.S. model may not be necessary to “get the job done.” A modernizationplus strategy—that is, evolutionary and sustaining innovation—alone may be
sufficient to meet most of these countries’ defense requirements, particularly
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with respect to their strategic context (that is, their immediate threat perceptions and defense requirements) and their available resources. These countries
do not need to emulate the American transformation paradigm in order to derive valuable new capabilities and other benefits from their current modernization efforts—a partial solution could be, if not revolutionary, more than
adequate. In particular, even overlaying a more capable C4ISR infrastructure on
existing forces could greatly improve these militaries’ fighting effectiveness.
In addition, it may be enough for friends and allies of the United States in the
region to modernize sufficiently for greater interoperability with U.S. forces—
especially with respect to network-centric warfare—rather than attempt to acquire a complete set of transformational systems, in order to fill important
niches in coalition operations. For example, it would be mutually beneficial
were these countries able to cooperate with the United States on missile defenses, such as establishing joint capabilities for early warning and cooperative
engagement in order to bring both U.S. forces and friendly nations under a single defensive shield. In addition, missile defenses, particularly if implemented
collaboratively, could catalyze the development and deployment of advanced
(and shared) C4ISR infrastructures.
On the other hand, simply settling for modernization-plus could mean that
Asia-Pacific militaries—especially those friends and allies of the United States—
will be unable to take full advantage of the potential and synergy of the advanced
systems they are currently acquiring. A particularly pertinent criticism made of
American efforts in 2003 to fight a network-enabled war in Iraq was that it “fatally grafted” advanced sensors and communications onto “old-fashioned command and control systems.” Intelligence had to go up and then down the chain
of command, resulting in delays and “magnification of individual communica86
tions failures.” Such glitches could only be worse for countries that are even less
prepared than the United States to exploit NCW.
In addition, should a country not transform its forces, what recourse might it
have against adversaries who do? In such a case, a country might pursue offsetting asymmetric responses, such as WMD capabilities (along with their delivery
systems, such as ballistic missiles) or low-intensity insurgency and guerrilla tactics; either could result in new threats undermining regional stability. Finally,
the ability of nontransformed countries to participate in joint campaigns with
the United States or operate with American military forces could be greatly limited. Many of these countries (along with America’s allies in Europe and North
America, by the way) are already worried about a growing capabilities gap with
respect to U.S. forces and how it might affect future joint operations and, in
turn, their national security.87 Failure to keep pace with U.S. transformation
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could only widen this gap and reduce these countries to “tool box” status, playing only minor roles in coalition operations.
At the same time, the prophets and advocates of defense transformation need
to do a better job of translating their broad, abstract visions into tangible and
practical realities. What, for example, does network-centric warfare demand in
terms of both hardware and software? What do we mean, operationally speaking, by jointness, interoperability, and networking? For that matter, what do we
mean by “disruptive” innovation, and how do we know when we have truly arrived at a “paradigm shift” that “fundamentally alters” the character and conduct of warfare? If these questions cannot be answered in ways that are
meaningful to war planners, defense transformation will remain an empty
concept.
The issue of defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific region will likely remain a legitimate subject for discussion and debate for some time to come. In
particular, transformation will continue to be a contentious issue, as it is increasingly linked to a number of already critical regional security concerns, including alliance relationships and interoperability, regional competition and
cooperation, arms sales and arms procurement, civil-military relations, internal
security and stability, and the impact of technology and economic development
on comparative advantage. Despite the many challenges of implementation,
therefore, the enormous potential and promise of transformation will continue
to drive regional militaries to explore and experiment with concepts of the
emerging revolution in military affairs.
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MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Abu Sayyaf Threat
Rommel C. Banlaoi

S

outheast Asia is fast becoming the world’s maritime terrorism hot spot, because of a very high incidence of piracy and a burgeoning threat of terrorism.
Southeast Asia is the region most prone to acts of piracy, accounting for around
50 percent of all attacks worldwide. This situation is aggravated by indigenous
terrorist groups with strong maritime traditions. The growing nexus between
piracy and terrorism makes maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia a regional security concern.
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are three terrorist groups in Southeast Asia with the intention and proven capability to wage
maritime terrorism. Of these groups, Abu Sayyaf is the best known but least un1
derstood.
This article addresses the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia, with
emphasis on the ASG—its organizational structure, membership, and strategy,
and its implications for maritime security in Southeast Asia.
THE NEXUS BETWEEN PIRACY AND TERRORISM
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported in 2003 that out of 445 actual and attempted pirate attacks on merchant ships, 189 attacks occurred in
Southeast Asian waters, 121 of them in the Indonesian Archipelago and
thirty-five around Malaysia and Singapore, particularly in the congested Strait
of Malacca.2 The 2003 figure represented an increase of thirty-three attacks in
the region over the preceding year. Pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters were
much more frequent than in Africa or Latin America. In 2004, the IMB reported
that pirate attacks dropped to 325, but Southeast Asia continued to top the list.
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Out of the total pirate attacks worldwide in 2004, the IMB recorded ninety-three
in Indonesian waters alone. A worrisome IMB report states that pirates preying
on shipping were more violent than ever in 2004, murdering a total of thirty
3
crew members, compared with twenty-one in 2003.
Because piracy is frequent in Southeast Asia, terrorists have found it an attractive cover for maritime terrorism. Though the motives of pirates and terrorists are different (the former pursues economic gains while the latter advances
4
political objectives), terrorists could adopt pirate tactics of stealing a ship, which
they could then blow up or ram into another vessel or a port facility, to sow
fear. Thus, security experts consider the line between piracy and terrorism to
have blurred in Southeast Asia: “Not only do pirates terrorize ships’ crews, but
terror groups like al-Qaeda could also use pirates’ methods either to attack
ships, or to seize ships to use in terror attacks at megaports, much like the Sept.
5
11 hijackers used planes.” A more sinister scenario is that a small but lethal bi6
ological weapon could be smuggled into a harbor aboard ship and released.
Terrorist groups regard seaports and international cruise lines as attractive
targets, because they lie in the intersection of terrorist intent, capability, and
7
opportunity.
The growth of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia makes the challenge of
piracy and maritime terrorism in the region alarming. Since 1999 the U.S. Coast
Guard Intelligence Coordinating Center has forecast that world commercial
shipping will increase enormously by 2020 and that this will trigger the prolifer8
ation of transnational crime and terrorism at sea. It has also forecast that growth
in the cruise-line industry and the emergence of high-speed ferries will be key
9
developments in the maritime passenger transport business through 2020.
Shipping has long been the major form of transport connecting Southeast
10
Asia to the rest of the world. Four of the world’s busiest shipping routes are in
11
Southeast Asia: the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. Every year
more than 50 percent of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage transits these
straits, and more than 15 percent of the value of world trade passes through
12
Southeast Asia. These figures are projected to grow unless major disasters occur in the region.
The Malacca Strait alone carries more than a quarter of the world’s maritime
trade each year—more than fifty thousand large ships pass, including forty to
13
fifty tankers. Because the strait is the maritime gateway between the Indian
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it will remain a world center of maritime activity.
It has been argued that it would be difficult for terrorists to disrupt shipping in
14
the strait by sinking a ship in a precise spot. However, were terrorists to hijack
one and turn it to a floating bomb to destroy ports or oil refineries, the effect
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would be catastrophic. Such an attack incident would not only cripple world
trade and slow down international shipping but spread fear—more broadly
than on 9/11. The prospect of such a maritime incident is not remote. Container
shipping is highly vulnerable, and the possibility of its use as a weapon of mass
15
destruction has been documented. Thus, maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia
must prudently be considered no longer a question of if, but rather of when and
16
where. One maritime security analyst goes farther—that maritime terrorism
in Southeast Asia is not even a question of when but of how often and what we
17
are going to do about it.
Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia is all the more serious a regional security concern because al-Qa‘ida and its operatives have a keen awareness of mari18
time trade and understand its significance to the global economy. Al-Qa‘ida
knows the impact of maritime terrorist attacks on shipping and has therefore
19
planned to carry out acts of maritime terrorism.
Al-Qa‘ida’s capability to do so has already been demonstrated by suicide attacks on the destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) in 2000 and the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Fifteen cargo ships are believed to be owned by al-Qa‘ida, which
20
could use them for terrorist attacks. Al-Qa‘ida operatives are also being trained
21
in diving, with a view to attacking ships from below.
Southeast Asia has already experienced maritime terrorism. In the Strait of
Malacca, for example, Aegis Defense Services, a London-based security organization, has reported that the robbery of a chemical tanker, the Dewi Madrim, appeared to be the work of terrorists “who were learning how to steer a ship, in
22
preparation for a future attack at sea.” In Singapore, intelligence and law enforcement forces have uncovered a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to bomb the U.S. naval
facility there. The sinister linking of terrorists and pirates has made Southeast
23
Asia a focal point of maritime fear. It is for this reason that the Singapore home
affairs minister, Wong Kan Seng, declared in 2003 that pirates roaming the wa24
ters of Southeast Asia should be regarded as outright terrorists. In an interview,
the minister argued, “Although we talk about piracy or anti-piracy, if there’s a
crime conducted at sea sometimes we do not know whether it’s pirates or terror25
ists who occupy the ship so we have to treat them all alike.”
ABU SAYYAF AND MARITIME TERRORISM
One terrorist group that has developed a capability to wage maritime terrorism
in Southeast Asia is the Abu Sayyaf Group. Various analysts have already discussed its historical and financial ties with al-Qa‘ida.26 Yet little is known about
its organizational structure, strategy, tactics, or maritime terrorist capabilities.
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The Early Years and Historical Roots
Originally called Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), Abu
Sayyaf was organized in the Philippines as an underground militant Muslim
group in the early 1990s by the late Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, who was recog27
nized as its overall “amir.” Janjalani founded the ASG in the context of a global
28
and regional Islamic resurgence. A veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war, Janjalani
had developed a close friendship with Osama Bin Laden and Ramzi Yousef in the
early 1980s while in Peshawar, Pakistan. Yousef was the mastermind of the
“Bojinka plot” to bomb eleven American jetliners and to assassinate Pope John
Paul II during a visit to Manila in 1995. Through Janjalani, Yousef was able to es29
tablish an al-Qa‘ida terrorist cell in the Philippines.
Janjalani, however, was no mere Muslim fighter or mujahideen; he was a
charismatic and a serious Muslim scholar. Born on the Philippine island of
Basilan (see map), today an ASG stronghold, Janjalani (ironically) attended high
school in the Catholic-run Claret College in the Basilan capital, Isabela. Though
he did not finish high school, he obtained a scholarship from the government of
Saudi Arabia to the Ummu I-Qura in Mecca, where he studied Islamic jurispru30
dence for three years. Later he studied Islamic revolution in Pakistan, becoming attracted to the concept of jihad.
In 1984, Janjalani went back to Basilan and became an avid preacher, if to limited audiences, in the Santa Barbara madrassa in Zamboanga City. His various
theological statements and public proclamations revealed a deep grasp of Islam,
particularly Wahhabi theology, which considers other Muslim communities heretical. Janjalani delivered at least eight discourses, or khutbah, within a radical
framework based on the Quranic concept of jihad fi-sabil-lillah (fighting and
31
dying for the cause of Islam). His discourses indicted both Muslims, even mullahs, and non-Muslims for superficial knowledge of the Quran and the Hadith
(the collected tradition of Muhammad and his sayings). One of his discourses
vehemently condemned the Philippine constitution as a guide for Philippine society and asserted the Quran “as the only worthy guide for human life since it is
32
perfect creation of Allah who cannot err and who knows everything.” He lamented the sufferings of Muslim Filipinos as victims of oppression, injustice,
and lack of development, urging them to fight and die for Islam, thus to deserve
33
“paradise as martyrs.”
After his brief preaching stint in Zamboanga City, Janjalani organized a
movement he called the Juma’a Abu Sayyaf, rendered in English as the Abu
Sayyaf Group. The name has been mistranslated as “bearer of the sword”; it actually means “Father of the Swordsman,” in reference to, and in honor of, the
34
Afghan resistance leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The main objective of the ASG
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was to establish an independent theocratic Islamic state in the southern
Philippines.
The struggle of ASG, like those of other Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, is deeply rooted in indigenous sociocultural, political, economic, and historical factors that can be traced to the fourteenth century.35 In that century,
seafaring Muslim traders and teachers from Indonesia and other neighboring
nations reached the largely pagan Philippine Islands, spreading Islam on
Mindanao and Luzon. In 1521, however, the islands were colonized for Spain by
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Magellan, and the new occupiers prevented the further spread of Islam. Muslim
leaders resisted the Spanish from the beginning; Filipino Muslims fought Spanish, American, and Japanese colonialism for almost four hundred years, and
when the Philippines gained its independence in 1946, they continued their
36
struggle against what they call “Imperial Manila.” Filipino Muslims, then,
have nurtured a sense of separatism for nearly as long as Islam has existed in the
37
Philippines.
Janjalani recruited to his new movement followers from Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga City, and General Santos City. Most were disgruntled
former members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) or the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
During its formative period, the ASG lacked adequate funds to advance its
program. Abu Sayyaf solicited foreign funding, using the name Al Haratatul38
al-Islamiya, (“Islamic movement”). Abu Sayyaf also engaged in kidnapping for
ransom to raise funds. One of its prominent victims was Ricardo Tong, a shipyard owner, who was released on 17 January 1994 after paying a five-millionpeso ransom. The ASG also conducted various extortion activities to generate
39
funding.
Structure and Membership
Janjalani envisioned a highly organized, systematic, and disciplined organiza40
tion of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters. Toward this end he formed and
chaired the Islamic Executive Council (IEC), composed of fifteen “amirs,” heads
of armed groups, as the main planning and execution body. Under the IEC were
two special committees. The first committee was the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group, in charge of fund-raising and Islamic education; the
second was the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee, in charge of agitation and
propaganda.
The ASG also formed a military arm, the Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah, composed predominantly of former members of the Moro National and Moro Islamic liberation fronts. This military arm had three main units: the Demolition
Team, the Mobile Force Team, and the Campaign Propaganda Team. The Demolition Team, composed mostly of trained fighters, could manufacture its own mines
and explosives. The Mobile Force Team—its members mostly affiliates of radio
clubs, traders, businessmen, shippers, and professionals—was in charge of collaboration and coordination. The Campaign Propaganda Team—professionals,
students, and businessmen—gathered information necessary to the mission of
the Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah.
Though the fact is not widely known, the first mission of the group was a
maritime operation, the bombing of a foreign missionary ship, the motor vessel
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Doulous, on 10 August 1991 in Zamboanga City. The attack killed two Christian
missionaries. The M/V Doulous bombing was a watershed event demonstrating
the maritime terrorist capability of the Abu Sayyaf.
But its original organizational setup was short-lived. When the Philippine
National Police and armed forces killed Janjalani in a bloody encounter in December 1998 in Lamitan, Basilan, Abu Sayyaf suffered a severe leadership vacuum, leading to the disaffection of some of its members. The organization set up
by Janjalani crumbled rapidly; in particular, the IEC, once headed by Janjalani,
died with him. The remaining leaders appointed Janjalani’s younger brother,
Khadaffi Janjalani, as his successor, but Abu Sayyaf had lost its organizational
and theological cohesiveness. Most of its members resorted to banditry, piracy,
and kidnapping for ransom.
The group became, and has remained, factionalized. At present, there are two
major factions of the ASG operating independently in two major areas in the
southern Philippines, the islands of Basilan and Sulu. Khadaffi Janjalani heads
the Basilan-based faction, while Galib Andang, otherwise known as “Commander Robot,” led the group on Sulu. Philippine law enforcement authorities
captured Commander Robot in December 2003. He was killed in a bloody jailbreak attempt in March 2005. Other intelligence reports mention another faction operating in Zamboanga City, with Hadji Razpal as the head. But Radzpal
has been identified by some intelligence sources as one of the leaders of the
Sulu-based faction.
The Basilan ASG had seventy-three members as of 2002, with ten different
41
leaders heading their own independent groups. Its hard-liners comprised
thirty personal followers of Khadaffi Janjalani, thirty followers of Isnillon
Hapilon, and thirteen of Abu Sabaya. The group led by Hapilon was the main security arm of the Basilan ASG. Abu Sabaya’s men joined the group of Khadaffi
Janjalani in the daily planning and administrative affairs of the group. The Philippine military claims to have killed Sabaya and two others in June 2002.
Sabaya’s body was never found, however, and speculation has arisen that he may
still be alive despite repeated pronouncements that Sabaya was among those
42
who drowned in Sibuco Bay in Zamboanga del Norte.
The Sulu ASG is a loose assemblage of Muslim secessionist fighters loyal to
Commander Robot. As of 2002, the Sulu ASG was composed of sixteen armed
groups operating independently in different areas of Sulu. This faction was
responsible for the kidnapping of twenty-one tourists at a resort on Sipadan
Island in Malaysia on 23 April 2000. But as stated earlier, this group lost its leader
with the capture and subsequent death of Commander Robot. His capture
yielded further information on the links between Abu Sayyaf and the
43
al-Qa‘ida-linked regional Islamic militant group Jemaah Islamiyah.
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Though ASG’s main area of operation is in Mindanao, it also has attracted secret
followers on Luzon, in Manila, the Philippine capital. The Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) is the most significant Muslim organization in Manila known to have
established links with ASG. Hilarion del Rosario, Jr. (also known as Ahmed Santos)
is known to have been the founder of the RSM. The group, formed in 2002, is
named after the last king of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 1500s. Most
of its members are Muslim converts. Like the ASG, the converts want to remake the
44
country as an Islamic state. Reportedly, the Rajah Solaiman Movement has a special operations group and a special action force and is financed by Saudi Arabian
money channeled through various charities in the Philippines. Khadaffi Janjalani
allegedly gave the Rajah Solaiman Movement the equivalent of about two hundred
thousand dollars for operations in Manila, which include converting Christians to
45
Islam, then recruiting and sending them for terrorist training.
ASG Strategy and Tactics
A research project of the Philippine Marine Corps asserts that Abu Sayyaf is “not
basically a conventional or semi-conventional offensive unit in the strictest
46
sense of the word.” Originally, Abu Sayyaf aimed to form an Islamic state, on
the Taliban Afghan model, through covert guerrilla action. Today it is an organization of Muslim bandits and pirates “seeking government and international at47
tention to claim influence and power.” However, its doctrine is much the same
in important respects:

• Well planned operations, with high probability of success.
• High mobility and adeptness in guerrilla tactics.
• Rapport with and support from local MNLF and MILF fighters. (For major
armed actions ASG seeks augmentation by active or former members of
these groups, particularly those who are relatives of ASG members.)

• Dispersal, when pursued, into small groups to blend with sympathetic local
civilians (often in MNLF/MILF strongholds where troops can be confused,
delayed, and contained).

• Separate negotiating team in kidnaps for ransom. (The negotiation cell
establishes and maintains contact with the victims’ relatives; payments are
either personally handed over or laundered through banks. If an entire
family is held hostage—such as the Dos Palmas kidnapping—the group
releases a family member to arrange ransom for the remaining members.)

• Displays of sympathy to known international terrorist organizations.
Willingness to kill or injure Muslims in operations (contending that all
Muslims must be willing to shed blood for the glory of Allah).
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• Urban terror to divert government attention to mountain hideouts.
• Deliberate dissemination, to evade troops, of false information through
commercial VHF radio and unsuspecting members of the populace.

• Kidnapping religious personalities (like Father Cirilo Nacorda, Charles
Walton, and two Spanish nuns) for later release—with wide media
48
coverage.
49

The Basilan and Sulu groups use similar if not identical tactics. Both factions employ a “water lily” strategy, a concept that aims to avoid military contact
by simply sidestepping when military presence is detected and going back when
50
troops are no longer in the area.
The Threat to Maritime Security
Most ASG members and followers (regardless of faction) belong to Muslim families with strong, centuries-old seafaring traditions. Their deep knowledge of the
maritime domain gives them ample capability to conduct maritime terrorism.
In addition, Abu Sayyaf also possesses equipment that can be used for maritime
operations. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSO-J3)
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reports that it has used night-vision
devices, thermal imagers, sniper scopes, various types of commercial radio, satellites, cellular phones, and high-speed water craft.51 Further, ASG has a proven
ability to establish linkages with like-minded terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.
One of them in particular, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, has seaborne resources that can be harnessed for maritime terrorism. MILF demonstrated its
maritime terrorist capability in February 2000, when it attacked the vessel Our
52
Lady Mediatrix, killing forty persons and wounding fifty.
The explosion of Superferry 14, carrying 899 passengers, on 27 February
2004 put the ASG in the spotlight. The tragedy claimed nearly a hundred
lives. The Philippine government officially denied that Abu Sayyaf had been
involved; President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued a statement dismissing
speculation that ASG had masterminded the incident. But an ASG spokesperson, Abu Soliman, insisted that Abu Sayyaf was indeed responsible,
53
claiming that the attack was revenge for violence in Mindanao. Soliman
identified “passenger 51,” Arnulfo Alvarado (a pseudonym of Redento Cain
Dellosa), as the bomber. Khadaffi Janjalani confirmed Soliman’s claim
and warned the Philippine government that Abu Sayyaf ’s “best action” was
54
yet to come.
A Marine Board of Inquiry that investigated the incident ultimately con55
firmed that Abu Sayyaf attacked Superferry 14. Former Philippine national security adviser Norberto Gonzales has stated in an interview that “because of the
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nature of the wreck, half-submerged in the bay, it will be difficult for investigators to prove 100% that it was Abu Sayyaf. But the overwhelming evidence points
56
that way, and I’m certain they were the ones behind the attack.” On 10 October
2004, the Philippine government finally concurred that the ASG had planted the
57
bomb that sank Superferry 14. Presumably it was the work of the Basilan faction
with the assistance of the RSM. Redento Cain Dellosa, an RSM member, confessed
during police interrogation that he had planted a bomb on the ferry.
Plainly, Abu Sayyaf, once a predominantly land-based terrorist organization,
is becoming more and more maritime in its operations, to escape the predominantly land-based Philippine military responses to internal security threats.58
The Philippine government in 2002 described Abu Sayyaf as a “spent force.”
Nonetheless, the ASG has apparently become more innovative in its terrorist
tactics not only in the Philippines but in neighboring countries of Southeast
Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia. In a telephone interview about the
Superferry 14 incident, Soliman taunted the Philippine government: “Still
doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war
that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes, and streets. We will multi59
ply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people.” Indeed, the
capability of ASG to wage maritime terrorism should not be underestimated.
Intelligence reports indicate that it can still exploit Islam to recruit members and
solicit support. Its cellular structure makes detection difficult; thus, it can still
launch terrorist acts far from its traditional areas of operation. The ASG is also
highly elusive, due to its maritime capability and experience.
Abu Sayyaf has an extensive history of maritime terrorist attacks. Two have
already been mentioned: the 1991 bombing of the M/V Doulous and the 2000
60
kidnapping of tourists on Sipadan. A few months later, on 30 September 2000,
ASG kidnapped three Malaysians in Pasir Beach Resort in Sabah using a speedboat. The April 2000 kidnapping ended only in 2001, when the ASG reportedly
61
received a fifteen-million-dollar ransom from the Philippine government. The
September 2000 kidnapping was resolved more quickly; Philippine troops rescued the three Malaysians in Talipao, Sulu.
On 27 May 2001, the ASG waged another act of maritime terror when it abducted three American citizens and seventeen Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort
on Palawan. This act can be considered a maritime attack, because the target was
a maritime area—a beach resort. Some ASG members involved in the incident
were disguised as diving instructors. The incident received international coverage, because several of the victims, including an American citizen, were murdered and beheaded. During a rescue operation mounted by the Filipino
62
government in 2002, two victims, one of them a U.S. citizen, were killed. The
63
Dos Palmas incident was a wake-up call for the United States. The result was a
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controversial joint operation in 2002, BALIKATAN 02-1, aimed at destroying Abu
64
Sayyaf. BALIKATAN 02-1 resulted in the neutralization of many ASG members,
including, as noted, the reported death of Abu Sabaya and the eventual capture
and death of the Sulu faction leader, Commander Robot.
Nonetheless, to generate funds in an attempt to recover from the impact of
BALIKATAN 02-1, in September 2003 Abu Sayyaf threatened to hijack vessels of
the Sulpicio and WG&A lines. In April 2004, just two months after the Superferry
14 incident, the ASG kidnapped two Malaysians and an Indonesian in a sailing
craft. By this time the Philippine Coast Guard was considering the Philippines
65
increasingly under threat of maritime terrorism. Manila has identified
66
twenty-six ports and anchorages vulnerable to such maritime terrorist attacks.
THE PHILIPPINE RESPONSE TO MARITIME TERRORISM
In its 2003 annual report of accomplishments, the Philippine Department of
National Defense (DND) reported 117 armed engagements with Abu Sayyaf. Of
them, eighty had been initiated by the Philippine forces, the rest by the ASG—
twenty in ASG guerrilla operations, seventeen in terrorist activities. The DND
reported the neutralization of 174 ASG members—eighty killed (including Father
Roman Al-Ghozi, an international terrorist linked to the group), seventeen captured, three surrendered, and seventy-four apprehended. In that year Philippine
forces also arrested Commander Robot and rescued all kidnapped victims in
2003, including four Indonesian hostages. The Philippine armed forces aimed to
reduce Abu Sayyaf strength to less than one hundred, from 461, by the end of
67
2004. But Abu Sayyaf ’s strength has only been cut to 380, as of the second quarter of 2005. Nonetheless, the Department of National Defense reports that “the
ASG is presently factionalized and its remnants have splintered and are con68
stantly on the move due to continued military pressures.”
Notwithstanding this drastic reduction in numerical strength, Abu Sayyaf
continues to be a maritime threat, “a group we must monitor closely, not only
because it might desire to strike the broader maritime sector, but because its
membership includes well equipped, highly trained fighters with significant ex69
perience in both day and night maritime combat operations.” Addressing this
threat will require a strengthening of the intelligence capability of law enforcement agencies in the Philippines. A sound intelligence system is a vital component of any counterterrorism strategy, whether land-based or maritime, as a
source of information on the nature of terrorist groups, the threat they repre70
sent, and their intentions, capabilities, and opportunities. Accurate and reliable intelligence may in fact be the most effective weapon against terrorism,
enabling “operational agencies and law enforcement authorities to develop
71
measures to detect a terrorist threat at the planning and preparation phases.”
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Philippine military officials, however, admit that the nation has a very weak
intelligence network. Despite Administrative Order 68, issued by the government on 8 April 2003 to strengthen the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency (NICA), state intelligence capability remains weak. A former armed
forces chief of staff, General Narciso Abaya, has candidly acknowledged that the
nonsharing of intelligence information is hampering the government’s
72
antiterrorism campaign. Abaya believes that a culture exists among intelligence units in the Philippines to withhold vital intelligence information: “I
think we have to improve on our intelligence. The trend now is not the need to
know but the need to share. That is the emerging trend among intelligence units
73
all over the world.” In fact, he lamented, “sometimes, our intelligence units
zealously keep to themselves intelligence information that, if fused with the information of other intelligence units, would give a more comprehensive picture
74
of the enemy.”
There have also been serious allegations that the military and provincial governments are coddling Abu Sayyaf. The International Peace Mission that went to
Basilan on 23–27 March 2002 reported that “there are consistent credible reports that the military and the provincial government are coddling the Abu
75
Sayyaf.” In such circumstances a military approach “will not work to solve the
76
problem.” As early as 1994, in fact, there were charges that police and fake police officers were involved in an ASG attempt to smuggle firearms into
Zamboanga City from Manila and Iloilo on board the motor vessel Princess of
the Pacific. The police and the military authorities insist that connivance with
ASG is not being tolerated and that those found guilty of it will be punished.
Nonetheless, the Philippine military recognizes that a military solution alone
cannot defeat Abu Sayyaf. An after-action report of the ASG Combat Research
and Study Group of the Training and Doctrine Command of the Philippine
Army submitted on 19 September 2001 to the commanding general of the Army
states:
The ASG problem cannot be solved through military solution alone. It should be approached by complementary and mutually reinforcing efforts by the civil agencies
and the military. The government must concretely pursue social, economic and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem. Effective measures
must also be undertaken to ensure the welfare and protection of civilians and reduce
the impact of the armed conflict on them. These should necessarily include intensified delivery of basic services to conflict areas.77

In other words, the Abu Sayyaf threat needs a comprehensive and holistic approach. To that end the Philippine government established the Cabinet Oversight
Committee on International Security (COCIS). COCIS uses what is known as the
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“strategy of holistic approach” (SHA) to overcome insurgency problems in the
Philippines generally. The SHA has four major components: political, legal, and
diplomatic; socioeconomic and psychosocial; peace, order, and security; and
information.
The political/legal/diplomatic component of the SHA envisions political reforms and institutional development to strengthen democratic institutions and
empower the citizenry to pursue personal and community growth. This component aims to develop and propagate Philippine democracy to confront the communist and Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Its cornerstone is a process based
on “Six Paths to Peace”:

• Pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms
• Consensus building and empowerment for peace
• Peaceful, negotiated settlement with rebel groups
• Programs for reconciliation, reintegration, and rehabilitation
• Conflict management and protection of civilians caught in armed conflict
• Construction and nurturing of a climate conducive to peace.
The socioeconomic/psychosocial component of the holistic approach, for its
part, aims to alleviate poverty in the country through the acceleration of development programs of the Philippine government. It also set out to develop and
strengthen a spirit of nationhood among the people, by developing national
character/identity without loss of cultural integrity. The peace and order/security
component is designed to protect the people from the insurgents and provide a
secure environment for national development. More importantly, this component has the specific goal of denying the insurgents “access to their most important resource—popular support.” Finally, the information component
integrates the SHA. It “refers to the overall effort to advocate peace, promote
public confidence in government and support government efforts to overcome
insurgency through tri-media and interpersonal approaches.”
The operational aspect of the holistic approach is of a dual nature. President
Arroyo explains, “How do we address this problem [of] insurgency? Through
the right-hand and left-hand approach. [The] right hand is the full force of the
law and the left hand is the hand of reconciliation and the hand of giving support
78
to our poorest brothers so that they won’t be encouraged to join the rebels.”
While the SHA is meant to primarily combat communist insurgency, it is also
79
being applied to terrorist threats. The Philippine government disestablished
COCIS in October 2004 and transferred its related responsibilities to the
Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), which had been formed on 24 March 2004.
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The ATTF is presently the central government body responsible for strategies,
policies, plans, and measures to prevent and suppress terrorism in the Philippines, particularly by Abu Sayyaf.
The ATTF’s main operations, however, are predominantly land based rather
than maritime, and in general it is too early to assess the effectiveness of SHA in
countering Abu Sayyaf. According to its own reports, however, from March to
June 2004 the ATTF killed fourteen ASG members, captured fourteen, and ar80
rested twenty-nine others. Through the ATTF, the Philippine government in
October 2004 charged six suspected ASG members with responsibility for the
Superferry 14 attack. Two, believed to have planted the bomb, are in police cus81
tody; four others, including Khadaffi Janjalani and Abu Soliman, remain at large.
To deal with the maritime terrorist threat posed by Abu Sayyaf, it is imperative
that the Philippine government strengthen its intelligence capacity. Still, intelligence is a short-term remedy; a long-term solution requires addressing root
causes. The root causes of Abu Sayyaf ’s struggle are comprehensive and multidimensional—if most of its original members have resorted to banditry and piracy, there are others who adhere to its original religious aim—and therefore so
must be the state response.
The “strategy of holistic approach” is an attempt to operationalize that necessity. However, the operations it has generated are predominantly on land. Moreover, its success will depend on the extent to which the Philippine government
can win the hearts and minds of the people, particularly those in areas vulnerable to terrorist agitation and propaganda.
The Philippine government cannot address this growing threat alone. It
needs the cooperation of other sectors from the civil society and nongovernmental organizations. It also needs the cooperation of like-minded regional states. Only sustained interagency, intersociety, and interstate
cooperation can effectively address the maritime terrorist threat posed by Abu
Sayyaf.
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RAEDER VERSUS WEGENER
Conflict in German Naval Strategy
Commander Kenneth P. Hansen, Canadian Forces Maritime Command

T

wo of the most historically significant German naval officers of the interwar
period began their careers together. Erich Raeder and Wolfgang Wegener
both joined the navy in 1894, and both eventually attained flag rank. Their careers followed remarkably similar paths as they advanced up the ladder of naval
1
power. Serving together in East Asia as ensigns aboard the cruiser Deutschland,
they formed a friendship that surpassed mere professional acquaintance—
2
Raeder would be the godfather of one of Wegener’s children. In his memoirs,
Raeder would describe Wegener and two other officers training with him as “my
3
intimate friends.” By the end of their naval careers, however, the two admirals
were to become inveterate enemies. So great would be
Commander Hansen is a surface warfare officer serving
their enmity that upon Admiral Wegener’s death in
on the staff of the Canadian Forces College, Toronto,
1956, Raeder, who was the senior surviving member
where he is currently Senior Staff Officer for Joint and
Combined Plans and head of the Maritime Studies
of their enlistment “crew,” refused to deliver his euProgramme. He has a master of arts degree in war stud4
logy, as was the normal tradition of their service.
ies from the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario.
It has been suggested that Raeder’s resentment of
He has published in the Canadian Military Journal,
The Northern Mariner, and Maritime Affairs. He is
Wegener was due to personal jealousy and the obalso a book reviewer for The Northern Mariner, Interstruction that Wegener’s theories represented to
national Journal of Maritime History, and Maritime
Affairs.
Raeder’s plans for recreating between the wars a GerThe views presented in this paper are attributable solely
man world-power fleet (Weltmachtflotte). A number
to the author and are not to be construed in any way as
of naval historians have been critical of Raeder’s leaddeclarations of policy by the government of Canada, the
ership, supporting the general view that the German
Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces,
the Canadian Forces College, or any member of the Canaval leadership was striving to recreate a “Tirpitzian”
nadian Forces other than the author.
battle fleet.5 Specifically, many prominent German
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4
historians have also criticized Raeder’s leadership.
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Their collective assessment implies that interwar German naval leaders learned
nothing from the experiences of the First World War and that they directed all of
their energy toward preparing for another major fleet engagement against the
Royal Navy. Raeder has been accused of attempting “to formulate strategy . . .
like his predecessor Tirpitz, . . . without weighing national goals, interests,
threats, or strategies, seeing the fleet largely as an isolated entity, detached from
6
grand strategic planning.” An American historian writing in 1940 felt that
7
Raeder and his subordinates suffered from “an atrophy of strategic thought.”
Severe criticism has also extended to the capital acquisition plans and operational concepts employed by the Kriegsmarine during the Second World War.
One of the most damaging such attacks accuses the Germans of having no coherent concept of operations: “The important decisions on warship construction
were changed several times and were not based on a detailed, structurally wellthought-out plan.”8 In this view, the German admiralty had not “even a modicum of strategic sense in the handling of capital ships”; for instance, Bismarck
should have been held in reserve until Tirpitz was operational, at which point
these two battleships should have been used together with the battle cruisers
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and an aircraft carrier. This “might have put an incalculable strain on British resources” and encouraged the Italian navy to more
aggressive action. On this view, the Germans resigned themselves to their status
as an inferior naval power and as a consequence “wasted their great ships singly
9
as mere commerce raiders.”
Notwithstanding such strenuous, authoritative condemnation, the case is not
closed; another interpretation is possible. These critical scholarly assessments
are significantly out of step with the opinions of the senior members of the German naval staff of the time, whose postwar writings have been largely ignored.
Their collective assessment was that German strategy and operations were consistent with the tasks of the navy and its resources. They refute repeatedly the notion that the German navy was designed or organized for a classic Mahanian
naval confrontation with the Royal Navy.
Indeed, only a few postwar scholars have entered the debate with an alternative view to the standard Weltmachtflotte argument, arguing that Admiral
Raeder was correct to advocate a balanced fleet and not to concentrate solely on
10
U-boats, as Admiral Dönitz wished, or on a fleet optimized for cruiser warfare.
They suggest that the naval treaties of the interwar period had a profound influence on German naval strategy, force structure, and operational planning. Further, they point out that contemporary British intelligence assessments of
German operating concepts ascribed to them an originality and potential
lethality that caused great concern inside the Royal Navy.11 That consternation is
in itself an indication that the German naval planners had produced something
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1
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more imaginative and innovative than a conventional fleet structure for a hopeless force-on-force engagement.
The British concern over German naval combat potential is even more noteworthy in view of the broad range of naval tasks that the Kriegsmarine had to accomplish. The German navy of the 1930s was confronted by what has been
described as a classic “medium-power naval dilemma.” The Kriegsmarine was
caught perilously between its own limited capabilities, national maritime tasks,
12
and a limited budget. General Admiral Otto Schniewind, Commander in Chief
Fleet, 1941–44, and Admiral Karlgeorg Schuster, Commander in Chief South
Group, 1942–43, enumerated the three tasks of the German navy at the outbreak
of the Second World War: first, to defend the German coast and coastal waters
from enemy naval activity; second, to protect German shipping in territorial waters and prevent the interruption of seaborne trade with neighboring states; and
third, “to attack with all forces at their disposal the enemy shipping and lines of
communication of the Western Allies, to damage them and if possible to para13
lyze them.”
These were fundamentally dissimilar and seemingly incompatible missions.
Admirals Schniewind and Schuster categorized the third task as “the biggest and
most difficult” but clearly gave it the lowest place in their hierarchy. The first and
third tasks amounted to different aspects of sea denial; a force optimized for a
long-term anti-mercantile campaign would be inadequate for homeland de14
fense. The second task called for the exercise of sea control. Moreover, the
“reach” implied by the first and second tasks was substantially different from
that required by the third. Satisfying such diverse tasks and reconciling the radically different capabilities they respectively mandated would indeed be a tall order. Admiral Raeder, when he became the navy service chief, would be
compelled to adopt a flexible approach to the development and employment of
naval power.
Such considerations, alongside examination of the theoretical bases of each
admiral’s position and comparison to the writings of the American admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan and the French admiral Raoul Castex, begin to make sense
of the great dispute between the two former friends. More importantly, such a
process sheds new light on German naval policy and force developments before
the Second World War. The strategic requirements of Germany in a global war in
conjunction with resource constraints, it will be seen, compelled the naval leadership to be innovative, flexible, and pragmatic.
“MEN OF PRINCIPLES”
Erich Raeder, who was to be head of the German navy for an extraordinary fourteen years and four months, would later be described by Vice Admiral Helmuth
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Heye (who, as a commander in 1938, served as First Operations Officer on the
German naval staff and during 1943–44 would be chief of staff for Naval Command North) as a leader who set an example that his staff officers found both
admirable and practical. Heye found Raeder impartial, apolitical, and task oriented: “His leadership of the navy was very centralized and unified. . . . He at15
tempted to keep the navy clear of all internal political difficulties.” One
historian describes Raeder as “a man of principles[,] . . . [one who] rarely inspired enthusiasm but instilled solid respect in those
16
who ser ved under him, . . . a schoolmaster.”
Another goes farther, asserting that Raeder was
strongly in favor of intellectual development and
wanted “to ensure that the naval officer corps drew
upon the best and brightest youth that Germany had
17
to offer.” On this view, Raeder genuinely regarded
the entire German navy as one “naval family,” a
sense that he expended considerable personal effort
to nurture. However, there were limits to the
grandfatherly schoolmaster’s familial inclusiveness
and intellectual latitude. It has been claimed that because of Raeder’s philosophy of strict professional
excellence (Ressortdenke), “intellectual challenges
[were] . . . carefully omitted from the Naval Academy’s (Marineschule) curriculum and [from] later
18
training.” It has even been argued that all German
naval training encouraged mental and behavioral
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder
conformity, presumably with the views and conduct
© AP/Wide World, used by permission
of the service chief, who “supported the [Nazi] regime unflinchingly and proved merciless against malingerers, deserters, and
those who questioned the authority of the Führer.” If that is true, Raeder’s strictness and intolerance of independent thought might have been strong enough to
break the bonds of early friendship with Wegener and their common “crew”
membership. However, that Raeder was a “man of principles” makes jealousy
unlikely as the main motivation behind the feud.
The falling-out between Grand Admiral Raeder and Vice Admiral Wegener
appears instead to have been ideologically based and directly related to
Wegener’s professional writing. As Raeder began to exceed Wegener in rank, he
would use his position and influence openly to suppress the strategic theories of
his classmate and to isolate his former friend. Wegener was promoted to rear admiral on 1 March 1923, serving as inspector of naval artillery. With only four
vice admirals’ positions, the competition for advancement was stiff, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/1
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Wegener was directed to retire in 1926 by Admiral Zenker, the naval chief.
Raeder, eventually head of the German navy, would direct officers under his
command to write articles discrediting Wegener’s work. He would also endeavor, unsuccessfully, to stop the publication of Wegener’s book The Naval
19
Strategy of the World War (Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges). The importance of
the point is not merely biographical; the differences between the two admirals’
philosophies were emblematic of a fundamental divergence at the highest levels
of German naval strategy development during the interwar era.
THE WEGENERIAN TREATISE
Wegener’s book, which was published in 1929 and reissued in a second edition
in 1941, was actually a compilation of three staff papers that he had written during 1915, while serving as a fleet staff officer in the rank of lieutenant commander. Indeed, since his earliest days in the navy, Wegener had demonstrated
considerable literary and intellectual ability. Between 1902 and 1907, he wrote
no less than seven noteworthy papers, most of which while on the staffs of the
Naval Education Department and the Naval Academy. After three years of sea
duty between 1908 and 1911, during which he served as a gunnery officer in the
battleships Preussen and Kaiser Barbarrosa and finally in the heavy cruiser
Blücher, Wegener’s evident staff skills resulted in his promotion and posting as a
fleet staff officer. His first assignment in this capacity was under Rear Admiral
Gustav Bachmann as his Second Staff Officer, but his billet was quickly changed
in 1912 to the First Staff Officer of the First Battle Squadron, commanded by
Vice Admiral Wilhelm von Lans. The significance of this assignment should not
be missed—the First Battle Squadron was one of the premier formations in the
fleet, composed of eight powerful battleships of the Nassau and Helgoland
classes. Wegener’s abilities had landed him a high-visibility operational post under the direct supervision of a very senior flag officer.
By February 1915, when the first of Wegener’s controversial papers was issued
under the signature of Admiral Lans, the reality of the German naval situation
was becoming apparent to most observers. The enormous cost of building,
supplying, and crewing the fleet had been borne only grudgingly by both the
20
German army and the public. After the loss of Blücher at the Battle of the
Dogger Bank (see map 1), Admiral Tirpitz and his Risk Theory (Risikogedanke)
21
became the object of increasing criticism from many quarters. The inactivity
of the High Seas Fleet and the mounting effect of the British “hunger blockade”
were having disquieting effects. Wegener’s questions about the navy’s employment came at a time when the German army was increasingly resentful that the
navy had suffered relatively little when its own casualties were heavy; the German public, for its part, was generally skeptical about the navy’s performance;
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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and the service itself was suffering a crisis of confidence. When the first of Wegener’s papers was circulated, Admiral Tirpitz became enraged. That it
was possible for Wegener to write two further
papers and release them under his own signature
is truly remarkable, with regard not only to his
junior position and Tirpitz’s ire but to the obvious
fracture it represented in the strategic thinking of
22
the German naval officer corps.

MAP 1

“A Dead Angle in a Dead Sea”
Collectively, Wegener’s three papers argued that
the strategic-defensive orientation of the Risk
Theory was invalid, in that it did not threaten the
principal British vulnerability, maritime trade.
The complete dependence of British industry
upon imported resources and the inability of agriculture to feed the nation had
been well known long before the First World War. The obvious way to bring the
imperial giant to its knees was to sever the maritime jugular: “In quintessentially
Mahanian terms, the [Wegenerian] treatise stated that sea power consisted of
control of maritime communications, particularly the protection of vital sea
lanes.” Writing in an abrupt and forceful style, highlighting conclusions in terse,
one-sentence paragraphs, Wegener charged the wartime leadership with misunderstanding the fundamental uses of the sea. Moreover, he accused it of committing the fleet to battle in pursuit of tactical victories that, having no strategic
consequence, were purposeless. Wegener combined classically Clausewitzian
logic, which dictated that battle must be accepted only in support of a political
aim, with an astute assessment of the German military situation and a clear appreciation of European geography. From all this he concluded, “Our defensive
operations plan lacked an object of defense. Therefore, there was no battle for
command of the sea in the North Sea. The Helgoland Bight was, is, and remains
a dead angle in a dead sea.” Wegener asserted that geographic position was just as
vital as the possession of a fleet of ships and that such position should relate directly to the willingness of one’s forces to engage the enemy: “The tactical will to
23
battle is a correlate of geography.”
Having argued that the current strategy was ineffective, Wegener set out his
own vision of how the British could be attacked effectively: “Naval strategy is the
science of geographic position . . . with regard to trade routes.” He declared that
the only British traffic vulnerable to German interference was the Norway–
Shetland Islands–Scotland route through the North Sea. In order to attain a
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geographic position of strategic relevance with respect to British mercantile
shipping, he argued, it was necessary to mount a “northward strategic-offensive
operation” that would change the geographic setting. He proposed expansion
through Denmark and southwestern Norway and then over to the Shetland
Islands, “the Gate to the Atlantic.” Wegener insisted that by positioning itself to
threaten a trade route the German fleet could overcome the British disinclination to tactical engagement in favor of distant blockade. The British would then
be obliged to commit to battle, during which “the compulsion that we would
have exerted would have increased with our every success.”
Wegener felt, writing soon after the First World War, that had the German
navy been in a position to threaten a trade route, “every battle, every skirmish
would have contributed towards a decision. Only battles with the greatest possible strategic exploitation would have existed—no battle ‘in itself,’ whose effect
would have paled without any resulting strategic exploitation.” In addition,
Wegener envisioned for a future war another, larger operation, taking the strategic offensive to seize French ports on the English Channel and on the Atlantic so
24
that an even greater campaign against British trade routes could be conducted.
Possession of such ports would impel both sides toward a final and decisive naval confrontation. Ultimately, German ability to control lines of communication would arise not from operations designed to exert such control, however,
but as a natural consequence of that conclusive battle. Wegener’s logic, then, was
pure Mahan—he sought to imperil British trade as a means of forcing the Royal
Navy into a fight to the death.
The influence of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writing upon Kaiser
Wilhelm II and the entire German navy has been extensively documented. It is
claimed that there was in that service an “almost slavish devotion” to the
Mahanian doctrine, to which Admiral Raeder did not need to refer, as it had
25
been accepted “as an article of faith” by the German naval officer corps;
26
“Mahan was the Bible for the German Navy.” The copious marginal notes in
Wegener’s copy of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History show how
marked was the similarity between the Wegenerian and Mahanian philosophies.
Wegener tried to orchestrate a geographic setting for “strategic exploitation,” a
major, decisive battle that would take place in circumstances favorable to Germany; “A strategic offensive would have altered the course of the war” just
27
ended. Tirpitz, instead, had expected the historically aggressive British to bring
28
the battle to him somewhere in the southern or central North Sea.
Wegener’s interest in securing bases with better access to the North Sea, particularly those with good deep-water access (which would be less vulnerable to
29
mining) had very strong Mahanian overtones. Wegener came logically to the
same sort of conclusion that Mahan would have advocated—that a decisive
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conflict could be achieved under circumstances that implicated the security of
British merchant shipping.
The Strategic Debate
Wegener’s staff papers, when they originally appeared, were bound to attract attention that had both positive and negative consequences. The upper echelons
of the German naval staff gave them a mixed reception. Some flag officers, such
as Admiral Hugo von Pohl, Commander in Chief Fleet, were very positive about
his work, while others, such as Captain Adolf von Trotha, who would become
30
head of the service during 1919–20, thought that “it lacked aggressive spirit.”
Before 1914 such professional critiques of naval strategy could have been construed as constructive or academic, but in the midst of war against Britain, overt
and strident criticism by a middle-ranking staff officer was risky, to say the least.
While Wegener enjoyed a certain amount of protection through a distant relationship to Fleet Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, chief of the Admiralty
Staff after September 1915 and a man he referred to as his “uncle,” he could not
have counted on it forever. In 1916, Fleet Admiral Reinhard Scheer (the new
commander of the First Battle Squadron), Vice Admiral Eberhard Schmidt, and
Captain Magnus von Levetzow (the Deputy Chief of the Operations Division)
paid a personal visit to Wegener and ordered him to cease writing for the remainder of the war.31 He complied; promotion and command of the light
cruiser Regensburg followed soon afterward, in 1917. The return to sea duty
helped to still Wegener’s pen, although informally he remained very outspoken
throughout the war.
After the war, Wegener reentered the strategic debate with his characteristic
vigor. In 1926, he submitted a staff memorandum that reprised his earlier writing. The thrust of Wegener’s work remained that Germany must formulate a
mature concept of seapower if it aspired to improve its national status; further,
Britain was Germany’s “natural enemy,” the British fleet a deadly obstacle that
could not be overcome without a fundamental restructuring of the geographic
realities of the German situation. That restructuring, attained by fleet engagement, would further German “world-political strategic aims.” By the time his
book appeared in 1929 the stridency of Wegener’s anti-English tone had moder32
ated, but the essentials were the same.
Reviews of the book outside Germany, when it appeared, were as mixed as
they had been of the original papers. It was translated into Russian and republished in the Soviet Union in 1941. There Wegener was viewed as the leader of a
“new German school” that had realized the geographic importance of Scandinavia to Germany—a factor the Russians felt had been missed during the First
World War. Wegener’s theories were even taken by Russian specialists as the
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33

“official” view of contemporary German naval strategy. The Soviet historian V. A.
Belli, writing in the July 1940 issue of Morskoi sbornik (the preeminent Soviet
naval journal), declared that “the struggle for Scandinavia [was] above all [a
German campaign] to gain a favorable strategic position,” concluding with the
observation that “a favorable strategic position [was an essential] element of
34
command of the sea.” The similarities to Wegener are unmistakable.
As for the Royal Navy, a 1929 article in The Naval Review by Alfred Dewar
took a far less favorable view of the importance of geographic position to naval
strategy. Dewar felt that the crux of naval flexibility had been best summed up by
Admiral John Fisher in 1910: “To be free to go anywhere with every d——d
thing the Navy possesses.” The British reviewer opined: “Wegener drives geogra35
phy too hard.” Similarly, an American analyst thought Wegener’s theories were
both dangerous and misleading:
The result [of his study] was a courageous attempt to lead the German Navy out of
the maze in which Tirpitz had left it, was in the end, merely to plunge it into another
confusion, nearer to the truth, more subtle, and hence in a way more dangerous. By
shift[ing] from the “command” to the struggle for it, and again from “command”
over an opponent to “command” over a geographic area or trade route, Wegener was
led to regard “command” as something that could be localized, and hence divided,
until he finally arrived at that most dangerous and misleading identification of “command” with the “control of sea-communications.”36

Reversals and Weaknesses
One of the German naval officers who could not support Wegener’s ideas was
his crewmate Erich Raeder. When Wegener was First Staff Officer in the First
Battle Squadron, Raeder was serving in the same capacity under Vice Admiral
Franz von Hipper, Commander of the Scouting Forces. Raeder’s potential too
had evidently been recognized, and it had been rewarded with an equally prominent posting under one of the brightest and, after the Battle of Jutland, most famous of all German admirals. But if Wegener’s and Raeder’s career paths were so
far parallel, their professional outlooks were diverging. Hipper “[was] highly
impressed with the Wegener trilogy and sought to submit it to Admiral
Bachmann of the Admiralty Staff for evaluation—until his First Admiralty Staff
37
Officer, . . . Erich Raeder persuaded him otherwise.” Plainly, Raeder had found
something in the work to which he objected strongly. What was it? To understand, let us return to Wegener’s thesis.
When Wegener’s wartime papers first appeared, Tirpitz had assigned two
senior captains to draft counterposition papers; these replies attacked the
details of Wegener’s work but did not “come to grips with its strategic in38
sights.” Actually, Wegener’s thesis had enough inconsistencies of detail and
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contradictions in terms to be vulnerable on the level of technicalities alone. Despite the accuracy of the basic geostrategic assessment and the remarkable clarity of Wegener’s style, many reversals of position are apparent both within and
between the three papers. Ever meticulous, Raeder would certainly have latched
onto these glaring weaknesses and on that basis questioned the entire work.
As an example, immediately after his statement
(which became famous) belittling the Helgoland
Bight battle as a fight for “a dead angle,” Wegener declares, “And yet, we once did exercise command of the
sea from the Helgoland Bight—namely, with the
U-boats, which even at great distances from their base
have the ability to exert lasting pressure upon enemy
39
trade routes.” In this short sentence Wegener betrayed a misunderstanding of the term “command of
the sea” and so undercut his thesis that fleets require
favorable geographic position to effect such command. U-boats were in fact instruments of sea denial
and trade interdiction, not sea control. The distant
blockade of German ports by the Royal Navy was
never broken by the German submarine offensive;
British command of the sea, though challenged, remained intact. In another place, Wegener effectively
countered his own “Gate to the Atlantic” thesis by
Admiral Wolfgang Wegener
© Koehler-Mittler Publishing Group
openly doubting that the British would really contest
Reproduced by permission
a challenge in the Shetland Islands and suggesting
40
they would likely relocate the trade route.
Further, Wegener, having clearly identified the importance of British maritime commerce, failed to recognize that the converse was also true. That is, the
Baltic was vital to the Germans during the First World War for the shipment of
strategic materials and commercial goods. Again, Wegener in one place complains bitterly, “Our defensive operations plan lacked an objective of defense”
and that “the position of the Helgoland Bight commanded nothing.” Very soon
afterward he contradicts himself: “Imagine that our fleet had been totally defeated [there]; what consequences this would soon have entailed for our economic and military situation. We could not have maintained our east and west
41
front with an indented or even strongly threatened northern front.” In such
passages his appreciation of the German position seems as weak as his assessment of Britain’s position is accurate.
The greatest weakness in Wegener’s proposal for an offensive campaign in the
North Sea is his complete failure to suggest how it could be accomplished.
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Knowing full well the Risikogedanke assumption that an attacking force needed
a one-third superiority, he does not even hint how an inferior German force
42
could seize the Shetland Islands. Helmuth Heye, at the time a Plans Division
staff officer, was later to write that the Washington Conference tended to keep
small fleets inferior despite technological innovation; accordingly, Heye felt,
43
qualitative differences could never make up for inferiority in numbers.
Wegener’s writing never addressed this major issue. His theoretical foundation made set-piece battle the object of his proposal for aggressive action, although as a gunnery officer of considerable experience he should have been well
aware of the overwhelming disadvantage under which his own inferior fleet
44
would labor; Wegener himself complained bitterly of the attitude of inferior45
ity that their smaller ships and guns inculcated among German crews. Once
again, Mahan’s “big-ship mentality” and emphasis on concentration of force for
46
decisive engagements is clearly evident in his thesis. Wegener, like Mahan (and
despite his geopolitical orientation), ignored the economic realities of his theo47
ries. German naval force structure was dictated by systemic factors; Germany
simply did not possess the resources necessary to produce the naval capability
Wegener’s vision seemed to require.
RAEDER AND THE REALITIES
The limitations of German naval capability were set by national defense policy,
which was focused on priorities dictated by the military situation on land. The
naval policy that resulted reflected the pragmatic convictions of Erich Raeder.
Decades later, General Admiral Herman Boehm, who was to be Commander in
Chief Norway in 1943, outlined post–First World War German naval policy
prior to the rise to power of Adolf Hitler. In those years it was strictly limited to
the prospect of a war with Poland, which would likely draw in France against
Germany. According to Boehm, the German navy was tasked with the protection
of East Prussia against French naval intervention: “At that time the basic idea of
the Naval High Command was to prepare for a short counteraction against any
Polish aggression and, by securing of supplies from overseas, also against
France.”48 The threat to East Prussia in the event of French naval intervention
was clear; as Rahn has observed, “without naval protection, Poland could cut the
49
sea route across the Baltic, the only reliable line of supply for East Prussia.”
Raeder, as service chief, well understood the German navy’s vital defensive role,
and early ship designs in his tenure were defensive, not offensive, in nature. Contrary to popular opinion, for instance, the armored ships (panzerschiffe) of the
Deutschland class were designed specifically for this two-front French-Polish
scenario.
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It is the high endurance and relatively heavy armament of the Deutschlandclass that has erroneously attracted attention to the German panzerschiffe as
commerce raiders, designed from the outset for “both large-area warfare in the
50
North Sea and offensive operations in the Atlantic.” Instead, their extended
cruising range was meant to facilitate “tip-and-run tactics” in the North Sea
against an opponent who was superior but not overwhelming. (The diesel engines that gave them such endurance had “teething problems” that brought
51
strong criticism at the time.) Their “long legs” were valuable because they permitted the sustained use of speed for tactical advantage. The potential French
naval threat was a blockade of German ports by a cruiser squadron, reinforced
by a modernized but old battleship: the Deutschland-class ships were intended
to break it. Optimized for North Sea operations, they proved “wet” ships when
later committed to trade warfare on the open ocean, and the poor performance
of their diesel engines became a major limitation; altogether, they were far less
52
imposing ships than has been portrayed.
ERMLAND (1940), FRANKEN, UCKERMARK, HAVELLAND

Original © Erich Groner
© Warship International
Reproduced by permission

Another point of divergence between Raeder and Wegener was the relationship of Scandinavia to German naval aims. If for Wegener it bounded on the east
the “Gate to the Atlantic,” for Raeder as a fleet staff officer it related primarily to
the absolute necessity to the German war effort of Swedish iron ore, shipments
that could be denied by an enemy in Norway. Germany’s self-sufficiency in iron
53
ore was significantly less in 1939 than in 1914. One result in the Second World
War was to be a division of effort between the interdiction of Allied shipping on
the open ocean and the protection of German shipping. A second would be
Raeder’s recommendation to invade Norway, although he believed doing so “violated a fundamental rule of war by operating at a considerable distance from its
home bases and across waters at that time more or less dominated by the enemy,”
54
and heavy losses were probable. Both Admirals Wegener, in his earlier writings,
and Raeder concluded that moving into Norway was essential; Raeder, however,
in 1940 would actually seek permission to do so only when convinced that Norwegian neutrality could not be relied upon to secure the iron ore supply—not in
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order to provoke a decisive battle, from which, Wegener assumed, the critical
commodities would flow as a consequence of victory.
The reputation of Raeder as a naval officer of Tirpitzian (and thus Mahanian)
lineage persists, and the Norwegian campaign (along with the “Z” shipbuilding
plan, discussed below) is frequently offered in evidence. Raeder, however, had
quite different theoretical foundations and upbringing. One of the earliest and
most profound influences on Raeder was Admiral Franz von Hipper. As his First
Staff Officer, Raeder would have been involved in Hipper’s remarkable plan to
employ the entire German battle cruiser force in the North Atlantic. The aim
was to draw away, by large-scale commerce raiding, British surface forces from
55
the blockade of Germany. Hipper was endeavoring to generate opportunities
for portions of the German fleet to engage the Royal Navy on more favorable
terms and, at the same time, to conduct a dynamic form of anticommerce warfare (Kleinkreig) against the British sea lines of communication. In the end,
Hipper’s plan was dismissed by the high command because it did not conform
to the Tirpitzian strategy of decisive battle in the North Sea.
Hipper’s departure from Tirpitzian thinking was also evident in his advocacy
of ships with increased weaponry, speed, and endurance. The armor-versusspeed argument went on endlessly in all naval headquarters; it is the notion of
increased range that has particular significance here. Successive classes of Ger56
man capital ships showed only negligible improvements in range; the endurance of German battleships tended to be between four and five thousand
nautical miles at an operational speed of approximately fourteen knots, as befitted Tirpitz’s vision of the theater of operations limited to the North Sea. Hipper’s
theories on naval warfare were decidedly neither Tirpitzian nor Mahanian; Raeder,
then, was exposed to innovative thinking in his early days as a fleet staff officer.
Soon after the Great War, Raeder was posted to the Naval Archives (Marinearchiv), where he wrote two of the three official volumes on German cruiser
warfare. His work, which earned him an honorary doctorate from the University
of Kiel, pointed to the lack of effort in this aspect of the war; in particular, it
“criticized the High Seas Fleet Commander for not undertaking operations
which would support the cruiser squadron under Count von Spee fighting its
57
way home from the Far East.” Raeder’s divergence from the Mahanian conception of naval warfare thus continued.
Raeder’s elevation in 1928 to Chief of the Admiralty, relieving Admiral
Zenker, was a further indication that his ideological heritage was not Tirpitzian.
The defense minister at the time was a retired lieutenant general, Wilhelm
Groener. Groener, who had been in charge of logistic support to the army during
the Great War, was not a fleet enthusiast. He considered that the imperial navy
had been a luxury and an unnecessary drain on funds, one that the army could
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not now afford. Had Raeder espoused the Tirpitzian doctrine strongly,
Groener would not have appointed him.
In the late 1920s the German navy was being publicly accused of having provoked, prolonged, and, eventually, lost the war. The naval officer corps itself was
divided by a storm of controversy over Tirpitz’s memoirs, which had been published in 1919, and over Wegener’s writings, now in book form. Raeder responded by suppressing all critical publications—not out of envy over
Wegener’s growing reputation as a strategic thinker or to defend the image of
Tirpitz but to reestablish the German navy as a unified, viable, and reliable arm
of the government. In view of the ruthless interservice rivalry between the army
and navy (and later the air force), Raeder felt it was essential that the navy preserve and enhance its professional standing if it was to have a practical naval role
in foreign and domestic policy.
Elements of a New Naval Strategy
On what theoretical basis could such a role be based? The Tirpitzian dream of a
Weltmachtflotte was now neither politically nor economically feasible, and a
fleet based on cruisers and submarines and designed for Kleinkreig had been
prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles. Another approach to maritime strategy
would be required. Raeder found it in the writings of a recognized and respected
naval theorist, one who specialized in middle-power navies—Vice Admiral
59
Raoul Castex of France.
Castex and the “Middle Ground.” The theories of Castex, which were developed
during the interwar period, were ideally suited to the German position as an inferior continental naval power. Castex, like Raeder, had “had to conceive a naval
60
strategy by which a land power might deal with British naval superiority.” The
key was to find a middle-ground strategy, between the fleet-action theory of
Mahan and the Jeune École theory of Theophile Aube, which employed opera61
tional maneuver to create favorable tactical situations. Castex believed that it
was not necessary to seek a Mahanian fleet action, rather that a limited tactical
victory in a critical situation could “upset the balance” and win opportunities
for maneuver. The benefits of winning even secondary objectives in secondary
theaters “may exceed expectations and bring a success having major repercussions upon the principal theater, where all remains in doubt, even though the
62
plan of maneuver has foreseen exactly the opposite.” On this basis Raeder envisioned a useful role for the navy that the German government might be persuaded to accept. German defensive requirements for seapower had to be
balanced against the undeniable need to go on the offensive against Great Britain. To resolve this seeming conundrum, as will be seen, Raeder would resort to
an innovation not seen before in naval history.
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Breadth and Scope. If Wegener focused almost exclusively on the North Sea,
Raeder had an expansive view of naval warfare and the area over which it should
be conducted. His conception of seapower was in fact global:
All naval theatres of war formed a homogenous whole and that consequently any operation must be viewed in its correlation with other sea areas. Accordingly, cruiser
warfare overseas and operations by the battle fleet in home waters were integral components of a single naval strategy which, by exploiting the diversionary effect, sought
to weaken the enemy’s forces and to disrupt supplies.63

That is, Raeder envisioned improving the odds locally through actions half the
world away—an impressive grasp of the potential for the long reach of seapower.
Raeder’s frame of reference dwarfed Wegener’s; this frame of reference underlay
a chain of reasoning by which Raeder attempted to answer the fundamental
question of how an inferior naval power could engage a superior opponent,
something Wegener had not been able to do.
Range and Endurance. An active approach is necessary if maneuver opportunities are to be generated; the strategic-defensive of the Tirpitzian Risikogedanke
could not produce them. Further, the geographical restrictions that Wegener
perceived in the Great War and 1920s persisted in the 1930s; maneuver would require sea room and the endurance to exploit it. For Germany, then, endurance
was a fundamentally limiting factor on the effectiveness of fleet forces. From the
moment Raeder assumed command of the German navy, high endurance became a design goal for new Kriegsmarine warships.
During the interwar period, before underway refueling was perfected, the
limiting factor of onboard fuel capacity caused naval influence to be regarded as
regionally isolated, centered upon major bases with fuel bunkers: “While machine propulsion gave a new vigor and celerity to maneuver, the necessity of
64
keeping the fleet supplied with fuel acted as a tether upon it.” It was accepted as
a general principle that “a battle fleet lost efficiency in direct proportion to its
65
distance from its base.” Moreover, for any nation considering cruiser warfare
against Great Britain, the lack of a supporting network of bases was a crippling
66
deficiency. In the First World War, Germany’s overseas possession had been insecure and could not be counted upon as naval bases. In response, the endurance
of German warships was now substantially increased by the use of efficient diesel and high-pressure steam propulsion systems.
The Anglo-German Naval Treaty imposed Washington Treaty standards and
excluded the innovative Deutschland-class panzerschiffe. Nonetheless, the exceptional endurance designed into that class was carried over into all subsequent
warships, in part through large bunker capacity, an approach adopted from U.S.
practice. Endurance would no longer dictate the functional roles that a
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particular type of German warship could undertake. From destroyers to battleships, all warships would have the “legs” necessary to range widely and employ
sustained high speed to tactical advantage.
German warship endurance during the early interwar period was double that
of the First World War. Warships designed after 1938, when planning centered
on action against Great Britain, had even greater endurance. The figures (detailed in table 1) point to an impressive and unmistakable increase in German
naval capabilities. In part, they represent one of Raeder’s answers to Wegener’s
“dead angle”—that is, to give warships the freedom to operate at high speed and
still reach areas inaccessible to the old “short-legged” German navy. “With a fleet
of this kind,” Heye was to agree, “we could indeed cause damage to the enemy,”
even while defensive operations were limited to the Baltic Sea and coastal waters
67
close to German-controlled territory.
TABLE 1
GERMAN WARSHIP ENDURANCE
Pre-1938

Post-1938

Type

Class

Endurance (nm)/
Speed (kts.)

Aircraft Carrier

Graf Zeppelin

Battleship

Bismarck

8,100/19

H

16,000/19

Battle Cruiser

Scharnhorst

10,000/17

O

14,000/19
15,000/19

8,000/19

Class
—

Endurance (nm)/
Speed (kts.)
—

Armored Ship

Deutschland

10,000/19

P

Heavy Cruiser

Hipper

6,800/19

—

—

Light Cruiser

Leipzig

5,700/19

Scout Cruiser

12,000/19

Destroyer

Z-17

4,800/19

Z-52

16,000/19

Torpedo Boat

1924

3,100/17

1939

5,000/19

Submarine

VIIA type

4,300/12*

IXA type

8,100/12**

* Increased to 6,500 nm in later versions of the class.
** Increased to 11,000 nm in later versions of the class.
Source: H. T. Lenton, German Warships of the Second World War (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1975).

ESCAPING THE “DEAD ANGLE”
German naval operations, then, were not to focus solely on either the offensive
or defensive. Prewar British naval intelligence “credited German naval strategists with sufficient imagination to envisage an alternative to Tirpitz’s defunct
programme of a symmetrical armaments competition.”68 Royal Navy studies
concluded that the greatest threat from the German surface fleet would be employment as single ships in a merchant-raider role to complement the efforts of
69
the U-boats. That no such concerted effort in fact developed early in the war was
only because the resources of the Kriegsmarine were overburdened by that time.
The requirement for operational flexibility gave rise to what became known
as the German “double-pole” strategy and also to the “Z Plan,” a shipbuilding
program approved in the mid-1930s for the period 1939–48. The Z Plan
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envisioned an eventual force of thirteen battleships and battle cruisers, four aircraft carriers, fifteen panzerschiffe, twenty-three cruisers, and twenty-two large
70
destroyers. Under the double-pole approach, single high-endurance warships
would engage in distant operations against British commerce while two small
but powerful battle groups, each formed around battleships plus a single aircraft
carrier and screened by diesel-powered light cruisers and destroyers, maintained
71
local sea control in the North and Norwegian seas. These proposed battle groups
represented a major departure from conventional naval organization and operational concepts.
To address the material inferiority of the German fleet, Raeder drew upon the
First World War initiatives of Hipper (in his battle-cruiser plan for the North Atlantic) and Admiral Reinhard Scheer to frame a modern, coordinated, functional organization. Scheer, who had commanded the High Seas Fleet at Jutland
and died in 1928, had believed (as Castex was to observe) that naval operations
should be “closely interrelated[,] . . . combined within a framework of coordi72
nated operations” to heighten their chances of success. Specifically, Scheer’s attempts to coordinate mine, submarine, and zeppelin operations with surface
fleet action now became the basis of Raeder’s approach. Raeder’s own analysis
convinced him that along with coordination, the elements of speed and maneuver represented the future of naval warfare. However, he envisioned mixed task
groups, not the single-type formations of the First World War, which he consid73
ered too inflexible to meet rapidly changing circumstances. Germany began
experimenting with small task forces of mixed ship types several years before the
74
second war began.
These new mixed-type formations could fulfill several purposes. They could
secure the local sea control needed to ensure the safe movement of Swedish iron ore
through the Baltic and along the Norwegian coast. They could, by diversionary
actions in the North Sea, facilitate movement of raiders in and out of Germancontrolled waters. In the same way, as dynamic “fleets-in-being,” they could divert Allied groups pursuing these raiders, or even make forays to hunt down the
forces tracking German raiders. They might also find opportunities to attack
convoys themselves. The Germans intended, through aggressive and wide-ranging
operations against shipping, to force the British to implement a global scheme of
convoys, in such numbers as to stretch Royal Navy escort and covering forces to
the absolute maximum, creating exploitable opportunities for German surface
75
forces. Under such stress, Raeder predicted, not every convoy would be protected, and ocean convoy escorts would frequently be limited to single armed
merchant cruisers that did little more than ensure navigational accuracy and
76
send position reports—which proved to be the case. Any such convoy encountered by a German mixed-type task force would be quickly destroyed.
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MAP 2

i

The operational concept behind the Z Plan and double-pole strategy was not
to seek set-piece engagements but to create secondary opportunities through
maneuver that would help rebalance the odds of the primary naval conflict, being fought in the Atlantic. Until the impressive combat power they envisioned
could be in service, the trap of the “dead angle” remained—that is, to engage the
enemy in an area of strategic consequence, the Germans had to find a way to
reach the Atlantic (see map 2). Mahan would have said that more bases were the
solution. Wegener’s position that bases had to be secured by conquest was well
77
known; he had advocated military expansion into Denmark and Norway.
Raeder set about trying to obtain the bases by diplomacy.
Forward Basing
Through the German naval attaché in Moscow, Raeder requested from the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in return for technology to support its own ambitious fleet expansion plans, permission to establish a German naval base in the
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Motovskiy Gulf, on the Barents Sea nearly adjacent to the Norwegian border. On
17 October 1939, the Soviets offered the use of Zapadnaya Bay, which empties
into the Motovskiy Gulf: “In this bay, Germany may do whatever she wishes: she
may carry out whatever projects she could consider necessary. Any type of vessel
78
may be permitted to call there (heavy cruisers, submarines, supply ships).”
German ships could enter in any season and, as the bay was wholly surrounded
by Soviet territory and closed to shipping, in complete secrecy. In this way
Raeder devised a partial solution to the problem of geostrategic isolation that
Wegener did not envision.
Understanding fully that the security of the leased Russian base, in a remote
and undeveloped area, was tenuous at best, the Germans planned to sustain it by
“afloat logistical support.” Several merchant ships were taken up from trade and
made suitable for repair, supply, accommodation, and command support tasks.
Ultimately, three vessels were modified and assigned to the new base, which was
79
given the code name BASIS NORD.
Clearly, in this a Mahanian battle-fleet action was not the object of
Kriegsmarine planning; something more sophisticated and deadly was being
contemplated. The concept of afloat logistics support was exploited to provide a
freedom of action on a scale unprecedented in German naval history. It soon
produced a revolutionary design for a fleet support ship that was decades in advance of every other navy in the world.
Underway Replenishment
Trials with underway replenishment began in 1928 with the chartered tanker
Hansa from Atlantik Tank Reederei, of which two members of the Board of Directors were former naval officers. In spring and fall of both 1934 and 1935, fleet
exercises experimented with refueling techniques. The British “stirrup method”
of astern refueling with fueling hoses suspended from a towing hawser was
trialed; the Germans concluded that it was impractical. In fall 1935, experiments
with alongside refueling while under way were conducted between tankers and
torpedo boats as well as between cruisers and torpedo boats. The trials used a
system of towing alongside, reminiscent of the American Dinger-Nimitz system
developed during the First World War, passing fuel oil, diesel fuel, and water
hoses with booms and cranes. Although it was a demanding seamanship evolution, with practice the Germans found they were able to begin pumping about
twenty minutes after the ship wishing to refuel began its approach alongside.
During the Spanish Civil War, German ships frequently replenished at sea from
auxiliary support ships, achieving fuel transfer rates of 120 tons per hour under
80
operational conditions.
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Having mastered the techniques, the German navy turned its attention to the
characteristics of its auxiliary tankers, applying lessons from the fleet exercises
and the Spanish Civil War. After testing two vessels of an intermediate type, the
Germans produced a mature fleet supply ship (trosschiff )—the six-ship
81
Dithmarschen-class, launched between 1937 and 1940. Five were commissioned; two of them, Altmark (later renamed Uckermark) and Westerwald (later
82
Nordmark), were operational at the start of the war. (The sixth unit, Havelland,
was launched in 1940 but was never completed.) They were innovative and
effective ships that would play a major part in the subsequent development of
83
replenishment at sea.
The Dithmarschens could each carry nearly nine thousand tons of fuel oil and
four hundred tons of lubricating oil, as well as ammunition, spare parts, provisions, and water. They were equipped with repair shops, hospital facilities, and
large boats used to transfer stores. They were also quite well armed, with three
150 mm deck guns, two 37 mm and four 20 mm antiaircraft guns, plus eight machine guns. These extra features reduced the liquid cargo that could be carried
but added significantly to the diversity of support that could be provided. Twin
shafts produced a top speed of twenty-two knots, enabling the trosschiffe to ac84
company warships in high-speed transits or outrun small patrol craft. These
flexible and capable multicargo supply vessels brought an ability to exploit the
sea through the local use of naval power substantially closer to realization. A
comparison between contemporary American and British oilers, and German
trosschiffe is given in table 2.
The Dithmarschens were the longest and fastest tankers then in service with
any navy. This length was necessary to achieve high speed. A coincident benefit
of their streamlined hull form was exceptional fuel economy; 12,500 miles at fifteen knots, without expending cargo fuel. All this was necessary to support
long-range commerce raiding operations that, as was known from the outset,
85
would be furtive, gauntlet-running enterprises. Most importantly, the
Dithmarschens were equipped with an ingenious system of light but durable
buoyant rubber hoses that could either be floated aft to a receiving ship for
TABLE 2
CLASS DATA FOR AMERICAN CIMARRON-CLASS, BRITISH DALE-CLASS, AND
GERMAN DITHMARSCHEN-CLASS OILERS
Class

Length

Beam

Draft

Speed

Deadweight

Cargo

Cimarron

553 ft.

75 ft.

32 ft.

18 kts.

24,683 tons

19,725 tons

Dale

483 ft.

62 ft.

34 ft.

11.5 kts.

17,000 tons

12,000 tons

Dithmarschen

582 ft.

40.5 ft.

33.5 ft.

22 kts.

20,850 tons

8,980 tons

Source: Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1995 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1996), p. 275; Hans E. Nauck, “German WW II Naval Oilers,” Warship International 33, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 208–10; and Richard
M. Anderson, “German Naval Oilers,” Warship International 32, no. 1 (March 1995), p. 89.
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astern refueling or “boomed out” to a ship alongside. Operational records and
photographic evidence show that these and other classes of German support
ships did in fact transfer all manner of liquid products and solid stores while
86
making way at sea.
The Kriegsmarine employed supply ships from the first days of the war, ulti87
mately using seven types. Altmark departed Wilhelmshaven on 5 August 1939
for Port Arthur, Texas, loaded diesel fuel, and then supported the panzerschiffe
Admiral Graf Spee and other German warships until 21 January 1940.
Westerwald supported operations of the panzerschiffe Deutschland in the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean between 22 August and 12 November 1939. It also
refueled the disguised merchant raider Widder twice before departing for the
central Atlantic.
The most remarkable example of the effectiveness of German operational logistics was the sortie by the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, supported by six supply ships, for Operation BERLIN, which took place between 25
January and 22 March 1941. The patrol lasted sixty days and covered over 17,800
miles. The raiders were resupplied on six occasions, receiving 30,355 tons of
88
fuel. In that cruise the German battle cruisers used radar to good advantage,
managing to evade in heavy weather British ships that were not similarly
equipped, but they also used two Dithmarschen-class trosschiffe, Ermland and
Uckermark (formerly Altmark), to widen their search front. In fact, Uckermark
made the majority of sightings on 15 March that led to the capture or destruction of sixteen merchant ships, mostly tankers, totaling eighty-two thousand
89
tons. In total, twenty-two Allied cargo ships, amounting to 115,622 tons, were
lost, and transatlantic shipping cycles were disrupted—Allied losses that exceeded those from any of the great wolf-pack convoy battles or cruises by single
90
U-boats. Admiral Raeder had achieved the aim of dispersing enemy escort
forces, creating opportunities for other raider sorties, and disrupting the British
war economy—at least this once. Without doubt, Operation BERLIN was the
91
crowning moment of German surface naval operations.
Advanced Steam Propulsion
To reduce dependence on fuel generally, German experience with diesel propulsion in high-performance hulls having been frustrating, German warship designers late in the interwar years attempted to follow an American movement to
high-pressure steam. Admiral Kurt Assmann and Admiral Walter Gladisch, who
both worked for many years in the historical section of the German Admiralty,
would later recall that German naval architects were enthusiastic about the po92
tential of the new high-pressure, superheated-steam systems. In the United
States, the Secretary of the Navy in 1936 stated that the economical fuel
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consumption achieved in the new Mahan (DD 364) class (with boilers that operated at four hundred pounds per square inch and 700°F), represented “the
93
greatest progress the Navy had made in engineering in a generation.” Despite
its complexity, American marine propulsion machinery demonstrated extraor94
dinary reliability under arduous conditions. Meanwhile, British ships were
plagued by steam leaks and oil leaks to a degree almost unknown in the U.S.
95
Navy. The German response was the Z17-class destroyer, which could in theory
96
steam 4,800 miles at nineteen knots, carrying a bunkerage of 760 tons.
In practice, however, the high-pressure steam propulsion systems in German
destroyers and heavy cruisers did not prove as reliable as the leading-edge American technology. Prone to frequent breakdowns, the German high-pressure
superheated systems never achieved design specifications and frequently deliv97
ered less than half the intended endurance. This weakness eliminated German
heavy cruisers and destroyers from Atlantic operations and made mobile logisti98
cal support all the more critical for the Kriegsmarine’s operational planners.
The Z-Plan ships necessarily fell back on diesel propulsion. However, that the
Germans took the technical risk in even attempting to adopt the new, complex,
and expensive steam systems reflects the seriousness of the Kriegsmarine’s attempt to achieve superior speed and endurance that could be exploited tactically
for either offensive or defensive purposes.
“INDEED, IT WAS THE ONLY WAY”
The concept of “force multiplication” for a medium-power navy, in part by establishing forward bases of operation but more importantly by reducing its dependence on bases at all, represented a significant new departure in naval
thought. The Wegenerian notion that naval power is tied to bases and position
was weakened significantly by this development in mobile logistical support of
sea warfare. The U.S. Navy would bring the “Fleet Train” to maturity in the Pacific theater, using oilers and supply vessels to achieve extraordinary reach and
endurance, but part of the credit properly belongs to the German navy and to
Erich Raeder.
The force structure goals of the Z Plan, to have been reached in the
mid-1940s, were preempted by the outbreak of war, and the Germans were accordingly unable to implement fully the double-pole strategy. Nevertheless, the
German navy was “perfectly clear” that its basic purposes were, first, to protect
99
its own sea-lanes and, second, to attack the enemy’s. Extensive defensive measures were implemented from the first days of the war to deny coastal waters to
enemy forces and assert local control to protect strategic shipping. These commitments made the “knockout blow” anticipated by British naval intelligence a
complete impossibility. Nonetheless, the Kriegsmarine set about a dynamic
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program of dispersal in the hope of creating maneuver opportunities needed to
exploit German material superiority at the unit level. This unconventional approach made capital ships, by virtue of their high endurance, into “supercruisers” capable of conducting open-ocean trade warfare.
The result was an employment of German naval surface forces that ran counter to “traditional ideas on the subject,” one that “may well appear as a splitting
up of forces—perhaps even ‘squandering’ of them.” But even after the war, German naval leaders were to be practically unanimous in the opinion that, given
the circumstances, the approach was correct and reasonably successful—even,
in specific cases, “very good.”
Indeed it was the only way of disposing these forces which could have had any
chance at all of any successful and damaging attacks on the enemy. By this means
they lent support to the U-boat warfare on enemy communications, forced the enemy to split up his forces, hampered or prevented him from concentrating his forces
for major naval engagements, forced the enemy to confine his merchant shipping
lines within very rigid limits, thereby causing frequent delays and difficulties in the
transport of supplies, and in the case of U-boats tracking down convoys presented
them with valuable and easy targets.100

With limited resources, Raeder had designed a capable fleet and formulated a
flexible naval strategy; given the spirit, intelligence, imagination, will, and
knowledge of the officer corps, results out of proportion to the national investment were a real possibility. Better could not have been hoped for without a substantial change in government policy.
The fundamental differences in naval strategy between Admirals Raeder and
Wegener corresponded, then, from their different perspectives from which they
looked at the problem. Raeder was bound by national strategy, policy, and government economic and budgetary priorities. Wegener’s theories were limited by
no such realities. Wegener steadfastly held to his notion that Great Britain and
its domination over the world’s oceans stood in the way of German national
greatness. In fact, however, as we have seen, German foreign and defense policy
during the Weimar and, at least initially, National Socialist regimes was oriented
not against Britain but against the threat of a combined Polish and French invasion. Naval issues were secondary, and Raeder had his minister’s instructions:
“Base [naval] operational ideas more on political and military [i.e., land] reali101
ties.” The new and flexible approach to seapower strategy, warship design, and
operational concepts that resulted would have been anathema to naval leaders of
the Tirpitz era.
While Raeder repeatedly sought and received assurances from Hitler that war
against Great Britain was not part of the grand plan, Wegener could see no other
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outcome. He had declared in his 1929 book, “As long as England acts as an out102
post of America, no European world can be established;” unrestrained by
practicalities, he continued to press his theories, and in so doing distanced himself from his former crewmate and friend. Ultimately, Wegener’s views left him
alone and bitter; if his operational doctrines were now unrealistic, he had accurately foreseen the future enemy, and soon he saw his country engaged in the war
that he had always maintained was unavoidable.
Raeder’s often-quoted fatalistic declaration that the German surface forces
were so weak that they could “do no more than show that they know how to die
gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction”
103
is overused and overplayed. His conception of naval power was born of a
philosophical construct other than the typical Anglo-American view, based on
the writings of Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, or even the German, Tirpitzian
view of preceding decades. Raeder’s innovative uses of seapower were actually
early examples of asymmetric warfare. His theory that a broadly based attack on
all the elements of maritime trade could be effective conforms to current views
104
on the subject. The use by the Kriegsmarine of operational logistics concepts
to solve the Wegenerian problem of the “dead angle” was a “world first,” one that
has not received adequate recognition. In this sense, Erich Raeder pointed the
way for all the middle-power navies that aspire to exercise seapower in distant
waters.
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NET-CENTRIC BEFORE ITS TIME
The Jeune École and Its Lessons for Today
Erik J. Dahl

T

he story is a familiar one to students of military technology and transformation: a visionary military officer—a vice admiral—offers a new concept of
how his navy, and his nation, will fight wars of the future. He suggests that smaller,
faster forces, networked by new technology and following the latest ideas of business and economics, could replace in part the large, expensive military forces
currently in use. His ideas resonate with many but generate opposition from others, and they are debated in military journals and even in the press. Finally the
country’s political leaders decide to support his ideas, and he is appointed to a
more senior post and given the opportunity to put his vision into practice.
This story applies to the U.S. military today, in conErik J. Dahl is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of
Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, from
nection with the concept of network-centric warfare
which he received a master of arts in law and diplomacy
(NCW). Originally developed by Vice Admiral Arthur
in May 2004. He holds master’s degrees from the London School of Economics and the Naval War College. A
K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy (President of the Naval War
retired U.S. Navy commander and intelligence officer,
College from 1998 to 2001), it remains one of the leadhe served on the Joint Military Operations Department
ing visions for the transformation of warfare. After refaculty at the Naval War College from 1999 to 2002. His
articles have appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Protirement, and until recently, Admiral Cebrowski
ceedings, Joint Force Quarterly, Defence Studies, and
served as Director, Office of Force Transformation for
the Journal of Strategic Studies.
the Department of Defense. But our story also applies
Mr. Dahl would like to thank Professors Milan Vego
to the French Navy in the late 1800s, when the revoluand Angus Ross for initially stimulating his thoughts on
the Jeune École and Professor Bill Martel for support
tionary ideas of Vice Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurentand encouragement (all three members of the Naval
Theophile Aube produced a school of thought known
War College faculty), as well as two anonymous referees
for their useful suggestions.
as the Jeune École, or “young school.” Aube was appointed Minister of Marine in 1886, and although
© 2005 by Erik J. Dahl
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4
his time in office was relatively short he left behind a
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legacy of innovation and controversy that changed the French Navy for decades
to come.
Network-centric warfare and the Jeune École represent innovative approaches toward the transformation of warfare, and both have been cited as examples of the type of thinking that can lead to revolutions in military affairs
(RMAs). Both have also been charged with many of the same failings, such as an
overemphasis on technology and excessive focus on tactical applications. Few
historians or analysts have drawn a comparison between the two schools of
thought, and although NCW advocates often cite historical parallels, they have
not attempted to compare their innovations today with those of the French Navy
more than a century ago. In fact they are unlikely to do so, because the Jeune
École is often described as an example of how not to conduct a military transformation—too much technology, some critics charge, and not enough
Clausewitz.
But this disparaging conventional view is overly simplified, and the Jeune
École deserves more attention than it has been given. This article argues that the
Jeune École can best be understood as a revolutionary concept of warfare that
was well ahead of its time. Its leaders were wrong about many things, yet when
we look closely at their ideas we see a remarkable resemblance to some of today’s
innovative visions of information-age warfare, and to network-centric warfare
in particular. It is not too much to say that the Jeune École was the network1
centric warfare of its time.
The story of the Jeune École’s rise and fall holds important lessons for military transformation today, and its swift decline in particular represents a cautionary tale for NCW advocates. Yet just as the reasons for the Jeune École’s
failure have been misunderstood, so have its implications. The Jeune École failed
for many reasons, but primarily because it attempted to do too much, was unwilling to accept criticism or allow dialogue, and misjudged the pace of change
in warfare. Today’s advocates of military transformation and revolution sometimes exhibit similar failings.
This article first reviews present-day thinking about the Jeune École among
military writers and strategists. It then examines the school’s origins, how it attempted to change the French Navy, and why it fell abruptly from power. Next it
describes how the reasons for the school’s fall have been misunderstood and why
those reasons are relevant today. We will then compare the Jeune École with the
concept of network-centric warfare and conclude by considering what lessons
this comparison holds for the concept of NCW and, more broadly, for American
defense transformation.
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TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
History has not been kind to the Jeune École; historians of the French Navy have
generally neglected it, while scholars of technology and military affairs typically
give it little credit for innovative thinking or positive influence. One historian,
for example, writes dismissively of Vice Admiral Aube that his mind “was run2
ning along a very old track.” Another scholar, assessing the impact of technology on naval operations in the latter half of the nineteenth century, has only this
to say: “The Jeune École in France deployed the most radical logic, but it was not
3
matched by performance.”
If commentators today agree that the Jeune École was a failed attempt at a
revolution in military affairs, they disagree over what caused that failure and
what lessons, if any, it holds for contemporary military planners. Two schools of
thought can be seen in the literature. The first, and predominant, view holds that
Aube and his followers were misguided in their overemphasis on technology; it
sees the movement as an anomaly, with nothing positive to teach today’s military. The second school of
thought is that the Jeune École offered truly valuable
and innovative ideas but that for technical, tactical,
and strategic reasons they could not be implemented—that it was, in effect, an RMA before its time.
Milan Vego, one of the few scholars to make an explicit comparison between the Jeune École and NCW,
has expressed the first view. For Dr. Vego, who is critical of network-centric warfare for placing too much
emphasis on tactics and technology, “NCW bears a
striking resemblance to various discarded theories of
4
war fashionable over the last two centuries.” Like
NCW, he writes, the Jeune École emerged as a response to rapid technological changes in warfare and
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.)
espoused the netting of naval forces (in its case,
through the telegraph and signal stations). Aube mistakenly felt that technology
made moral factors irrelevant; many of his ideas, such as about torpedo boats,
did not work; and he and his followers tried fruitlessly to make up for their mistakes with complex mathematical models. The result, in this view, was decades
of disarray for the French Navy.
James J. Tritten is also critical of the significance of the Jeune École: “The
Jeune École did not represent mainstream naval thought and should be interpreted as a temporary sidetrack resulting from the introduction of, and oppor5
tunities afforded by, new technologies in an austere fiscal environment.”
Michael Vlahos sees the Jeune École advocates as technocrats, unable to see the
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big picture while they pushed for their favorite project, the torpedo boat: “Aube’s
and Charmes’ promotion of the wrong weapons resulted in the utter stagnation
6
of the French navy.”
Stephen Biddle is the primary theorist to make the considerably less popular
case that the Jeune École was revolutionary but premature. Biddle has described
the Jeune École as an example of a military that attempted too much radical
7
change, too fast, and so failed to achieve a revolutionary effect. For him, the Jeune
École, European air-warfare visionaries before World War I, and the U.S. Army
pentomic division experimenters of the 1950s “all represent visionary, forward8
looking thinkers who decided a revolution was at hand when it was not.”
Biddle’s view is most definitely in the minority, however, and the consensus
among historians and strategists is clear—that the Jeune École placed its bets on
the wrong technology and tactics, primarily on the torpedo boat over the battleship, and neglected the moral, strategic, and human dimensions of warfare. Its
effect was to reduce French naval readiness dramatically, and its only legacies for
today are warnings against making the same mistakes again. But as the history of
the Jeune École will show, this consensus view is based on an insufficient understanding of Aube and the school he founded.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
The middle of the nineteenth century was a time of great change in naval warfare, driven largely by technological innovation.9 Not all of the military changes
of the period, of course, were specific to navies, and not all were driven by technology; new ideas in economics and politics, such as social Darwinism and imperialism, were making their marks in land warfare as well as naval theory. The
greatest driver of change was technology unleashed by the industrial revolution,
and those advances tended to affect navies more rapidly than armies. Every generation, it seemed, new technologies threatened to make obsolete all previous
10
ship designs.
Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Britain’s leading naval shipbuilder, wrote in 1876
about the technological uncertainty of the age: “The introduction of the screw
propeller into the Navy in 1844 made a magnificent Navy obsolete; the realization of the terrible effects of shell fire in 1854 again rendered our grand screw
11
line-of-battle ships and frigates things of the past.” The greatest technological
development was steam propulsion, which made ships independent of the wind
and gave them much greater speed—especially with the later addition of the
steam turbine. Other changes affected naval armor and ordnance. These developments led to confusion in naval tactics, with some strategists predicting that
future naval warfare would be chaotic, characterized by melees, but others
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believing that new tactical formations and weapons would actually make war at
12
sea more orderly than it had been.
But despite these dramatic changes, seapower played little part in the European wars of the mid-nineteenth century, and the general opinion was that the
next war would follow the same pattern. Many—not just in France, but throughout Europe—supported the traditional army view that “sea power was a matter
concerning trade and colonies and that, at best, it had only a secondary role to
13
play in the relations of the great European states.”
By the 1870s the French Navy, in particular, faced a problem. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which had ended in the downfall of the French
empire, the Navy had found itself unable to bring its power to bear. Although the
French Navy was much larger than the German fleet, a combination of poor
planning, lack of amphibious capability, and operational mistakes meant that
the French had been unable to achieve their wartime objectives of destroying the
German ironclads, blockading the German coast, and landing
an army corps. Instead the German fleet remained in port,
and the French were only able to mount an ineffective attempt
at a blockade. Despite its failures at sea, the Navy did contribute to the war: naval officers and men served on land to help
defend Paris. Thus the Navy emerged from the war in the
strange position of having failed in its primary duty but having
14
won the admiration of the French population. But popularity did not translate into large budgets, as much of the public
regarded the Navy as an expensive luxury compared to the
Army, leaving the service in a precarious financial situation.
Some French naval officers began to look toward new concepts of warfare and technology. They were inspired by the
success during the American Civil War of the Confederate
Vice Admiral Theophile Aube
raider Alabama. As a leading scholar in the field recounts, “in
a twenty-one-month cruise covering much of the globe, this
comparatively weak steamer with auxiliary sail power took more than sixty
15
prizes.” The Alabama and other raiders did not succeed in breaking the Union
blockade of the South or in significantly interrupting the sea communications
of the North, but they did have enormous influence on naval thinkers of the
time. Britain in particular appeared to be a prime target for such a strategy of
commercial warfare, having become, since the elimination of its Corn Laws
(protectionist measures restricting the import and export of grain), highly de16
pendent on maritime commerce for food and raw materials.
Another key factor in naval thought at the time was the development of the
independently running, or “automobile,” torpedo. Torpedoes until that time
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had been mostly fixed weapons, essentially what are today called naval mines.
Early automobile torpedoes began as small, petroleum-burning steamboats
guided by ropes from the shore. Robert Whitehead, an Englishman working in
Austria, greatly improved on the idea: he eliminated the ropes, replaced steam
with compressed air, and made the torpedo an underwater weapon by creating a
17
“balance chamber” that enabled it to stay at a constant depth. By 1871 most of
the European powers had begun to adopt his invention.
These developments attracted the attention of Captain Baron Louis-AntoineRichild Grivel, the ideological forefather of the Jeune École. Grivel wrote a book
in 1869 describing how new technology and inventions could help make commerce raiding (guerre de course) an effective anti-British strategy. The orthodox
view among French naval officers at that time was essentially Mahanian, holding that only the clash of arms at sea could be decisive; this, Grivel argued, was
18
not the right approach for France to take against England. These ideas were
taken up by Vice Admiral Aube, who would become the leader of a new school of
naval thought.
Aube had spent most of his career on overseas stations and as a result had developed an outlook focusing on the defense of overseas interests and commerce.
In a series of articles written in the 1870s, he began developing a naval strategy
based on a new concept of warfare—that the object of war was to do the greatest
possible harm to the enemy. This, wrote Aube, was to be accomplished by destroying the enemy’s national wealth; the destruction of the enemy’s battle fleet
was by itself unimportant. The real wealth of Britain, specifically, was in its commerce, much of which was carried by merchant ships, so the prime aim of naval
warfare against it was to destroy its merchant ships with commerce-raiding
cruisers and torpedo boats. As Aube later wrote, “To destroy England’s fleet
would be to humble her pride, but the way to make war on England is to sink the
ships that bring the English their bread, meat and cotton and enable their work19
ers to earn their living.”
Aube was strongly influenced by the many new scientific ideas that were being discussed throughout Europe in this period. His call for unrestricted torpedoboat warfare, for example, reflected a Darwinian contempt for the rule of law at
20
sea. Another new idea that appealed to Aube was the division of labor, which
suggested it was a bad idea to put too much of the fleet’s power into a relatively
small number of large battleships. He encouraged experimentation and the development of new ideas that ran counter to prevailing military doctrines. One
such promising idea, he believed, was that the key to success in a future war
would be a sudden, coordinated attack by a large number of small, torpedoequipped ships and larger cruisers against the enemy’s commercial shipping—a
blow that, along with bombardment of coastal cities, would create panic and
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social collapse. In a widely quoted passage, Aube described the actions of his
torpedo boats:
Tomorrow war breaks out; an autonomous torpedo boat—two officers, a dozen
men—meets one of these liners carrying a cargo richer than that of the richest galleons of Spain and a crew and passengers of many hundreds. . . . The torpedo boat will
follow from afar, invisible, the liner it has met; and, once night has fallen, perfectly silently and tranquilly it will send into the abyss liner, cargo, crew, passengers; and, his
soul not only at rest but fully satisfied, the captain of the torpedo boat will continue
his cruise.21

The Navy split in two over these radical ideas; Aube’s followers became
known as the new, or young, school, while old-school traditionalists—the Vielle
École, or to one German scholar, the Alte Schule—advocated continuing empha22
sis on sea battle and blockade. The traditionalists were not necessarily unreasoning reactionaries; the old school wanted to connect the new with the old;
“Continuity, evolution was its program, not revolution.”23 The admirals who opposed the Jeune École did not like publicity, which put them at a disadvantage,
because the struggle between the young and old schools was fought primarily in
the press and parliament. Politicians were attracted to Aube’s ideas because they
offered significant economies. A liberal deputy, Etienne Lamy, produced a
far-reaching report on the naval budget of 1879 in which he praised Aube’s ideas
and argued that battleships were too expensive:
The construction of battleships is so costly, their effectiveness so uncertain and of
such short duration, that the enterprise of creating an armored fleet seems to leave
fruitless the perseverance of a people. In renouncing warfare between battle fleets, a
nation does not abdicate if it can produce, after having ensured the defense of its
coasts, ships with powerful engines and strong artillery, able to remain at sea for an
extended time, and destined for commercial war.24

The Jeune École attracted support from politically minded journalists, as well
as from younger officers who had been embittered against their seniors by the
slow rates of advancement as the French Navy transitioned from a large fleet of
sailing ships to a smaller one dominated by ironclads. Most notable among the
journalists was Gabriel Charmes, a brilliant young writer and student of foreign
affairs. Charmes knew little of naval matters, but he and Aube became close
friends and colleagues—so close that “it is impossible to distinguish between the
25
ideas of the two men.” Charmes would eventually—before his early death—
develop tactical ideas of his own, most notably that of the bateau-canon, a gunboat built like a torpedo boat but armed with a single gun. He supported the idea
that the battleship violated the principle of division of labor: “The principal vice
of ironclads is the attempt to combine in them at one time all of the means of
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naval warfare: the ram, the gun, and the torpedo. The result is that they are not
26
really suited to use any of them.” Charmes was the primary advocate of the
Jeune École in the press, frequently stressing the political nature of its reforms:
“It will be the reign of justice succeeding that of favoritism, it will be equality re27
placing privilege.”
The debate between the reformers and traditionalists became heated and
extreme, with no compromise possible. Advocates for the Jeune École, for example, did not speak simply of torpedo boats but of “democratic torpedo
28
boats”; anyone opposing them was opposing democracy itself. Aube was
given his chance on 7 January 1886, when he became Minister of Marine—an
appointment made more for political reasons than on the perceived merits of
29
Aube’s naval ideas. Whatever the reasons, “for a short space of a year and a
half, the dream came true; the philosopher was king; ideas could really be put
30
into practice.”
THE JEUNE ÉCOLE IN POWER
Aube soon found that not all of his theories translated well into practice. The
first idea to be put to the test was that of the autonomous torpedo boat. In February 1886 he sent two torpedo boats from Cherbourg to Toulon, in order to test
their independent cruising endurance at sea. The crews were so shaken up by the
trip that they would have been unable to fight. One sailor later recalled that the
weather forced them to subsist largely on sardines:
As a rule, we lived on ham, sardines, and tinned soups; for most of the time the
weather was so rough that it was as much as we could do to get a little water boiled.
We had a table about eighteen inches wide, but there was no point in laying it, for
nothing would stay on it. The usual plan was for one man to hold the sardine tin
while the other picked out sardines by their tails and transferred them to his mouth.31

From then on it was agreed that torpedo boats would have to be used for coastal
defense. As has been pointed out, this should not have been a surprise to the
Jeune École: “Charmes should have been able to make for himself the astound32
ing discovery that a 33-meter boat was not yet an Atlantic liner.”
Other experiments, however, showed that the torpedo boat could fire a torpedo at a moving battleship, and in May and June 1886 Aube tested this concept
in the first French naval maneuvers of modern times. A Jeune École–style fleet of
some twenty torpedo boats, supported by three cruisers and a coastal-defense
battleship acting as mother ship, faced an “attacking” fleet that included eight
battleships. It was to be a battle of microbes against giants, wherein many
small, specialized boats would take on ironclads according to the divisionof-labor principle. The torpedo boats failed to prevent the battleships from
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“bombarding” the port of Toulon, but when the attackers established a blockade, the boats were judged to have “sunk” most of them—an important result, as
a fundamental part of Aube’s theory held that close blockade by a large fleet
33
could be made impossible. Overall, however, these exercises did not show torpedo boats to be as successful as the Jeune École had hoped. In December 1886
Aube settled on a revised, three-pronged strategy: offense in the Mediterranean,
with the entire battle fleet concentrated at Toulon against Italy; defense in the
34
Channel; and commercial warfare in the Atlantic.
Another idea that proved unsatisfactory was Charmes’s project of fast gunboats, the bateaux-canons. The first of these was launched in April 1886; it was
named for him after his death at thirty-six of tuberculosis, soon after Aube came
into power. It was equipped with a 5.5-inch gun, intended to support attacks by
torpedo boats. But its sea trials in 1887 presented the Jeune École with another
setback. The boat proved to be a very unstable platform; the Gabriel Charmes
could not hit anything. The planned construction of fifty additional bateauxcanons was scrapped, and the Charmes lost its gun, after which it was ignominiously redesignated simply Torpedo Boat 151.35
Aube’s work with torpedoes and torpedo boats is his best-known innovation,
but he also initiated a number of other projects, such as experiments with oil fuel
and the initial Navy trials
of the high-explosive
melinite shell, which had
b e en a dop te d i n t h e
French Army for bombardments and which
Aube proposed to use
against battleships and
Italian cities. One farsighted innovation that
Aube supported came to
fruition, but not in his
The Fast Gunboat Gabriel Charmes
lifetime—the submarine.
Source: Naval Historical Center
Two months after becoming minister, he opened an official competition for designs for a submarine,
a process that ultimately led to the construction of France’s first viable underwa36
ter craft, the Gymnote.
Many of his projects could not be completed, because Aube fell from office in
May 1887 in a political reshuffle. In poor health, he retired to the country and
ceased to be active in the movement he had founded. By this time most of
the other Jeune École creators had also disappeared from the scene: Charmes
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was dead, and Grivel had died as well, in 1882. With Aube gone, “there disappeared the last with the ability to keep it from degenerating into a mere naval
37
faction.” The debate between reformists and conservatives became instead one
between radicals and reactionaries; to the end of the century the French Navy
was torn by bitter debates among officers, in the press, and in parliament.
The result was a lack of strategy and vision for the Navy, the poor condition of
which was finally revealed in the Fashoda crisis of 1898, which arose after a colonial expedition raised the French flag at the town of Fashoda, on the Nile, despite
warnings from the British against such an act. Soon a British army under Lord
Kitchener arrived. France and Britain came close to war, but the French were
forced to back down when they realized that their navy—which was derisively
38
described as a “fleet of samples”—was no match for the British.
Even after the crisis, supporters of the Jeune École program continued to argue in favor of it; one journalist declared in 1900, for example, that if Aube’s
“ideas had been followed, if his plan had been executed, France would be at this
39
moment the greatest naval power in the world.” But after Fashoda a movement
for moderation began to gain strength among the Jeune École and the traditionalists. A coherent naval strategy emerged in 1900, under the ministry of
Jean-Louis de Lanessan, who was part of a cabinet intended to heal the wounds
of a much larger struggle, the Dreyfus Affair. This strategy represented “the beginning of an official realization that public (and parliamentary) opinion was
generally right in matters of administration and generally wrong in matters of
40
naval strategy and building programs.” A middle ground developed in terms of
both naval construction and strategy, as Vice Admiral François-Ernest Fournier
supported a fleet containing both battleships and cruisers, prepared to conduct
41
either a traditional war on the high seas or a campaign against commerce.
Naval stability would have to wait, because the Jeune École was destined to
come back to power one last time. In 1902, the radical politician Camille
Pelletan became Minister of Marine. Pelletan—who, attempting to stamp out all
vestiges of aristocracy in the Navy, suppressed dress uniforms for officers and
gave ships good “republican” names like Justice and Liberty—favored pet projects that frequently ran counter to common sense as well as the wishes of the naval establishment. “Pelletan faithfully based his administration on the worst of
the Jeune École ideas of the 1890s: that the welfare of the arsenal workers, the
common sailors, and the republican officers was more important than the welfare of the navy as a whole.”42 The Pelletan ministry came under widespread criticism and eventually was succeeded by a wider consensus and spirit of
compromise in naval affairs, but while it lasted his tenure solidified the negative
image of the Jeune École for posterity.
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In its wake, the Jeune École appears to have left behind little but discord and a
series of failed, if well intended, experiments. Many of its tactical and technological innovations were quickly overtaken by other developments in naval warfare.
The development of torpedo nets and electric searchlights made battleships less
vulnerable to torpedo attack, and improved propulsion and rapid-fire guns gave
larger ships the speed and firepower needed to counter the torpedo-boat threat.
Smokeless gunpowder eliminated the artificial “fog of war” upon which torpedo
43
boats depended to close in on larger warships. By 1890 most navies were building battleships again, and the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan became popular in
France as well as in much of the rest of the world. The enthusiasm for the latest
technology had been largely overtaken by a return to the older military princi44
ples of Clausewitz and Jomini. Just as important, the strategic environment
had changed. Britain was beginning to look more like an ally than an enemy,
whereas against any enemy but England, France would need a traditional navy,
45
able to engage enemy fleets at sea.
RETHINKING THE JEUNE ÉCOLE
There is no doubt that the school of thought begun by Aube failed in its attempt
to reform the French Navy and that the debate over the Jeune École sparked several decades of bitter debate that left the service far weaker than it been. But
many of the criticisms that have been directed against the school are misguided.
The Jeune École deserves another look from history and from military thinkers
today; advocates of network-centric warfare have as much to learn from its
strengths as from its weaknesses.
Historical Anomaly or Culmination of Innovative Tradition?
First, although it is frequently treated as if it were a historical anomaly—a simple
mistake sparked by misguided enthusiasts—the Jeune École actually represented the continuation and culmination of decades of French naval technological innovation in the early and middle 1800s. As early as the 1820s, French naval
officers had embraced the notion that technology would be the key to any successful challenge to Britain’s naval position. Andrew Krepinevich, a prominent
scholar in the field of military innovation, has described how the French Navy
led the way early in what he calls the “Naval Revolution,” pioneering the adoption of steam propulsion and screw propellers in 1846, launching the first
high-speed, steam-powered ship of the line in 1851 and the first seagoing iron46
clad fleet in the late 1850s. The government, rather than the private sector,
funded much of this early experimentation, and this pattern continued into the
Jeune École era with the torpedo boat in the 1880s and the submarine in the
47
1890s. The Jeune École, then, might be considered the ultimate expression of
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naval technological innovation, in the most innovative navy, in what was until
that point the most innovative period in naval warfare ever seen.
Who Was Responsible?
Second, the creators of the Jeune École should not bear full responsibility for the
poor state to which the French Navy fell by the turn of the century. The decline
was largely brought about by politicians and polemicists in the press who hijacked the naval reform movement, and it was also the result of problems in
French naval administration that preceded the Jeune École.
It does appear, however, that the collaboration between Aube and Charmes
was ultimately detrimental to the Jeune École’s reputation, for Charmes went
beyond what Aube had recommended. The historian Paul Halpern, citing contemporary sources, writes that it was Charmes who introduced the concept of
“division of labor” into the Jeune École argument and distorted the school’s doctrine in favor of an extreme advocacy of the torpedo boat and, especially, the
bateau-canon.48 Theodore Ropp, a leading scholar in the field, agrees with this
negative assessment of Charmes’s influence: “The incredibly doctrinaire—and
incredibly French—character of the debate was at least partly due to Charmes.
Like most French journalists, he believed that all things could be solved by argu49
ment, if only the polemic was violent enough.”
Nonetheless, and while Charmes can be considered more radical than Aube,
neither of the school’s founders took the debate to the extremes to which it degenerated later. One historian, Stephen Roberts, suggests that there existed in effect two Young Schools: the teachers who developed the theories, especially
Aube and Charmes, and the disciples who adopted and used them because they
found them useful in the political and social struggles of the day. After Aube fell
from office and Charmes died, Roberts wrote, “the Naval Young School of Aube
and Charmes soon died out, but the political Young School remained to plague
50
the Navy through the 1890s.” In the 1890s the political Young School took the
Jeune École to an illogical extreme, focusing entirely on the building of a fleet of
hundreds of torpedo boats for coastal defense and denying completely the need
51
for any high seas fleet—which Aube had never intended.
This distortion of Aube’s original ideas reached its peak (or nadir) under the
ministry of Camille Pelletan, whom Roberts describes as “the most violent
52
member of the political Young School.” If the commentators of the time are to
be believed, the Jeune École certainly did deserve the blame for the chaotic and
unready state of the French Navy at the beginning of the twentieth century. For
example, Theophile Delcasse, the French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to
53
1905, proclaimed, “Thanks to Camille Pelletan, we no longer have a fleet.” But
the policies of Pelletan were not the same as those of Aube, and it is important to
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separate the ideas of the true Jeune École from those of the individuals who later
took on its mantle.
Moreover, the poor condition of the French Navy cannot be blamed completely on either the original Jeune École or its later followers, for the service at
that time suffered from long-standing problems of poor administration and
meddling by government. It was chronically disorganized, often in the throes of
reorganization at the behest of politicians who may not have known much
about what they were doing. As one observer wrote in 1913, “The navy is a de54
partment of generally organized disorder.” Tritten puts it this way: “The history of the French navy is one of mismanagement by governments who could
have known better.”55
Halpern argues that although the French Navy had a good technological base,
it suffered from an administrative organization notorious for complexity and
red tape: “These organizational difficulties would by the turn of the century inflict great harm on the navy, offsetting the potential advantages that might have
been derived from the imaginative or technically daring constructors. The
French, in summary, did not manage technology well and the French Navy
56
would pay the price.” It may be that the failure of the Jeune École was at least in
part a result, and not a cause, of poor administration in the French Navy of that
57
period.
Foolish, Inflexible, and Fixated on Technology?
The Jeune École has often been charged with many of the same faults that critics
see in network-centric warfare, but the view we have today of the Jeune École
largely reflects the later interpretations of radical politicians and others. While
its leaders have been caricatured as extremist, inflexible, and even perhaps a bit
foolish, this was certainly not the perception among other navies at the time.
Aube, in particular, was a much more flexible and innovative thinker and leader,
often willing to compromise and experiment, than he is now often made out to be.
Despite its focus on technology, the Jeune École was actually as concerned
with the moral and social effects of military actions as on their immediate tactical outcome. Against Italy, for example, the reliance of which on foreign trade
was small, the Jeune École realized it could not succeed through commerce warfare. Accordingly it envisioned, in case of war with that nation, shore bombardment, not to do indiscriminate damage but to affect the morale of the
population. Writes Ropp: “The moral effects of bombardment were more important than the actual destruction, for the real economic strength of Italy, the
58
heavy industry in the northern plain, could not be touched by such means.”
The other major naval powers of the time took the Jeune École very seriously.
At the height of the influence of the Jeune École’s popularity, Austria, Russia,
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and Germany all abandoned their battleship construction plans. The British Admiralty may not have responded appropriately. At least one scholar, Angus Ross,
has argued that British naval planners failed to address this challenge sufficiently: “There is little doubt that British trade would have been vulnerable to a
properly organized and systematic attack of the type envisaged by the French in
59
the 1880s.”
Many Britons despaired, convinced that the country would be cut off from
food by commerce raiding; journalists and scaremongers encouraged this fear,
writing of what they called the “starvation” theory. The distinguished
mid-twentieth-century historian Arthur J. Marder referred to “the ‘guerre de
course’ nightmare.” The fear did not subside until a royal commission studied
the problem in 1903; it accepted the Admiralty’s claim that it could and must
maintain command of the seas, and that as long as it could do so, it would be able
60
to prevent commerce from being seriously interrupted. By 1905, the chance of
war with France had become remote, and the problem faded in Britain. But
Marder, writing his famous study of the Royal Navy during the early days of
World War II, would note that “for two decades the possible consequences of the
guerre de course on the outcome of a maritime war and upon England’s prosperity had been the same nightmare to the experts and those in authority as Lon61
don’s vulnerability to air-bombing in recent years.”
The ideas of the Jeune École strongly affected the Austro-Hungarian Navy,
through the close ties that existed between its navy’s staff and that of the French,
and in particular through the influence of Admiral Max von Sterneck, its commander. Sterneck was a close follower of Aube, and he had his navy test many of
62
Aube’s tactics while they were still being debated in France. Sterneck wrote of
his relationship with Aube: “It appears as if we have had the same ideas simulta63
neously, with the difference that I can put them into action immediately.”
The Jeune École may have had its greatest effect, however, through its influence
on a naval strategist who disagreed strongly with most of its program, Alfred
Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his major works at least in part to counter its influence, seeking specifically to disprove the view of the Jeune École (and many others at the time) that the days of great naval battles were past. The Jeune École
looked to the wars from 1854 to 1870 and saw in them lessons pointing to guerre
de course and coastal warfare; Mahan reached back farther in history to prove the
64
importance of command at sea and traditional naval battles.
Aube himself not only instituted naval maneuvers and exercises but took account of their results—such as in early 1886, when torpedo boats proved not
seaworthy enough for long independent voyages. From then on, Aube no longer advocated the use of autonomous torpedo boats, focusing instead on their
65
role in short-range operations along the coast. After the failure of the Gabriel
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Charmes in early 1887, fast gunboats disappeared from the building program.
As minister, Aube was even willing to compromise with the traditionalist admirals on the subject of battleships; the 1887 budget acknowledged that ironclads
67
would still form the nucleus of the French Navy.
Many of the Jeune École’s ideas—such as small boats operating independently—were clearly misguided, and even appear foolish today. Indeed, Ropp
writes that it was “neglect of the most elementary military principles” that
proved the undoing of the reformers. But he also points out that “in the ridicule
which now greeted their tactical proposals, many people had already forgotten
that Aube and his followers had been the first people to analyze many of the salient
68
features of modern naval war.” The positive influences of the Jeune École, often
forgotten, included the early development of a modern cruiser fleet, the idea of a
worldwide system of bases and coal stations, emphasis on coastal protection, and
69
administrative reforms, including the founding of the French naval academy.
Perhaps the most forward-looking concept promoted by Aube was the submarine. There is some question as to how much credit he deserves for helping to
advance this idea; Brodie sees Aube as an important factor in putting France
ahead of other navies in developing the submarine, while Ropp argues that this
advance was not the result of the Jeune École but of “patient experimentation by
a long series of naval officers,” especially Dupuy de Lome, who developed the
70
Gymnote, which Aube accepted for trials in 1886. However, even Ropp acknowledges that it was partly because the school had been so thoroughly discredited that its ideas concerning the submarine received so little attention, and
that “the competition which eventually produced the first successful French
71
submarine had been started by Aube himself.” Although more research might
prove useful here, it seems that the concept of submarine warfare is but one of
several areas in which Aube deserves more credit for flexibility and thoughtful
72
innovation than he often receives.
Ahead of Its Time?
To assert that many of the Jeune École’s innovations were well ahead of their
time is not at all the same as arguing that the Jeune École was “right”—clearly it
was wrong, in terms of many of its tactical concepts, its administrative methods,
and its political impact. It is one thing to be wrong because one’s ideas are fundamentally ill considered; it is another to be wrong because they appear too early.
In the first case, the lessons for posterity can only be negative, and this is the view
represented by Professor Vego’s interpretation of the Jeune École—that we must
take care not to do what it did. But perhaps the Jeune École was wrong largely because it was premature. If so, the lesson is quite different—we must take care not
to do things how and when the Jeune École did.
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Students of the Jeune École often make the point that Aube and his followers
were prophetic in their tactical understanding of future naval warfare. Theodore
Ropp has described the Jeune École as foreseeing that in a future war:

• The weaker fleet would stay at its bases and refuse combat.
• The stronger would be forced to do the same, for fear of the torpedo.
• The only significant naval activity would be commercial warfare.
• Warfare would be absolutely merciless, disregarding the laws of war.
As Ropp writes, “It is possible to view the events of the war of 1914–18 under ex73
actly those four points.” The historian Lawrence Sondhaus has argued that
“from the perspective of the First World War, Aube’s predictions seemed prophetic, especially his conviction that battleships ultimately would stay in port
while smaller vessels ventured out to fight. Indeed, Germany’s deadly campaign of
74
submarine warfare in the First World War seemed to vindicate the Jeune École.”
Sondhaus makes an even stronger argument, that “if the evolution of the submarine somehow had been advanced by a quarter-century, the Jeune École
would have survived to establish a new paradigm of naval warfare, making cruisers the capital ships of the world’s navies. In such a scenario, the battleship re75
naissance of the years 1890–1914 would never have occurred.” This may be
taking the point too far; we should not need to resort to counterfactual history
to see the significance of the Jeune École for today’s naval planners. The Jeune
École was not ahead of its time simply because it predicted many of the important features of future war—as significant as that accomplishment might have
been. It was also farsighted in that it analyzed its environment and used concepts
remarkably similar to those used by many of today’s forward-looking military
strategists. It saw changes taking place not only in military technology but also
in communications, business, and society, and it looked for a way to combine
those changes into a new way of warfare.
Yet despite its best efforts, the Jeune École could not enable the French to gain
and maintain the initiative against the British navy. If the British Admiralty was
slow to take up the challenge of naval reform, once it felt threatened it used the
nation’s economic strength to engage France in applying new technologies to
ship design. It turned the tables fairly quickly, developing the Dreadnought and
76
taking the lead in the naval revolution. What, from the French viewpoint, had
gone wrong?
The primary point is not the Jeune École’s emphasis on technology, for it was
never as obsessively focused on technical matters as its critics have argued. Nor
did it fail because of the extremes to which some of its adherents took its policies, although its cause was certainly harmed by the radicalism of Aube’s
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successors. Rather, Aube and his followers failed because they did not understand well enough the temper of their times—and the times were not yet ready
for the Jeune École. Its members foresaw many significant developments in naval technology and tactics, and they produced a strategy that might have worked.
But they misjudged the pace of change in warfare; the state of the art was not advancing as quickly as they seem to have felt. Many of their ideas would return
years later as key elements of naval warfare (such as the submarine) or as potentially transformational concepts more than a century later (networking many
small units), but in the 1880s the time was not yet at hand. The dominance of
capital ships and conventional war at sea would not have run its course until the
end of the Second World War, at least; other, potentially more effective technolo77
gies or strategies would have to wait.
THE PARALLEL WITH NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Network-centric warfare suggests that just as a network of computers is much
more capable than a number of stand-alone units, a network of military platforms will be more efficient, faster, and more capable than the same number of
unconnected platforms. But NCW advocates are quick to point out that the concept involves much more than just communications networks. As Vice Admiral
Cebrowski describes it, “NCW is not narrowly about technology, but broadly
about an emerging military response to the information age.”78 According to
him, this type of change “enables a shift from attrition-style warfare to a much
faster and more effective warfighting style characterized by the new concepts of
speed of command and the ability of a well-informed force to organize and co79
ordinate complex warfare activities from the ground up.”
More recently, its boosters have credited NCW with helping to produce military success in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, supporting peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations around the globe, and
“even aid[ing] in combating the outbreak of SARS [severe acute respiratory syn80
drome] in South East Asia.” Critics like Frederick W. Kagan have charged that
the underlying tenets of NCW are overdrawn and rely too much on technology,
but defenders reply that these critics do not understand the nature of military
transformation. Transformation, in their view, is much broader than just the use
of technology, such as airpower and precision guided munitions: “Instead,
transformation is an effort to provoke the military and civilian leaders of the nation to ask themselves tough questions and then to find the right, though challenging, answers.”81
At least one of those challenging answers does involve a great deal of technology. Notably, NCW has inspired a major Department of Defense (DoD) effort to
create a secure global information network called the Global Information Grid,
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or GIG—also referred to as the “war net.” Press reports indicate it may cost hundreds of billions of dollars and take two decades to build, and even Vint Cerf, one
of the fathers of the Internet and a consultant on the war net, worries that it may
not be realistic: “This is sort of like Star Wars, where the policy was, ‘Let’s go out
82
and build this system,’ and technology lagged far behind.” The Defense Department’s supporters argue the GIG will play a central role in transforming the U.S.
military into a net-centric force, but the Government Accountability Office argues that “while DoD’s vision of the GIG is compelling, the breadth and depth of
the GIG and DoD’s objectives for netcentric warfare, present enormous challenges and risks—many of which have not been successfully overcome in
smaller-scale efforts and many of which require significant changes in DoD’s
culture.”83
A full evaluation of NCW or of specific programs, such as the GIG, would be
beyond the scope of this article, but we can already recognize several aspects of
the Jeune École experience. Of course, the strategic circumstances facing France
in the 1880s were quite different from those facing the United States and its navy
today, but the theories of the Jeune École and NCW appear to be inspired by
some of the same dynamics. At the broadest level, both ideas represent an effort
to develop new strategic concepts that depart from the traditional emphasis on
command of the sea. Command of the sea is no longer as contentious today as it
was during the Cold War, whereas new threats require the application of naval
power ashore; in their time the Jeune École enthusiasts realized that they simply
could not afford to contest command of the sea with the British and sought an
alternative approach. The approach they chose resembles network-centric warfare in a number of specific ways.
Emphasis on Technological Innovation. This may be the most obvious parallel.
Even if, as NCW advocates argue, their concept involves much more than new
technology and connectivity, modern weaponry and innovative technology are
still fundamental parts of their proposed transformation. Technology was also a
key factor for the Jeune École, with the torpedo only the most prominent of the
new inventions incorporated into their strategies and tactics; under Vice Admiral Aube the French Navy experimented also with the use of oil fuel instead of
coal, new types of high-explosive shells, and the submarine.
But even more significant is that in both schools of thought we see a strong
faith not just in the latest technical fads but in technological progress writ large.
Innovation, experimentation, and change were watchwords for the Jeune École,
much as they are today for advocates of network-centric warfare. One supporter
of the Jeune École wrote, “Let us be better, if that be possible, but in any case we
must be different, in the adaptation to rejuvenated methods of war, of new engines,
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84

judiciously conceived and rapidly executed.” The enthusiasm for change is no
less evident among NCW advocates: “The objective,” declares Vice Admiral
Cebrowski, “is to create an ethos for experimentation, innovation, and a willing85
ness to risk across the entire force.”
A Scientific Approach to War. NCW supporters often draw upon physics, biology, and computer science, and they avidly apply concepts like chaos and complexity theory to military operations. The Jeune École took a similarly sweeping
and yet eclectic approach toward a scientific approach to war; while military
theorists had long attempted to apply mathematical formulas to warfare, the
French naval reformers looked to many other fields of science for ideas and principles they could apply. For example, they advocated the concept of many small
craft attacking a larger ship not just because they believed it effective but because
it was scientific in itself—the Jeune École saw the battleship as a complex organism that could be destroyed by the “microbes” of torpedo boats.86
Speed and Precision. NCW relies on speed both in the relatively simple, tactical
sense of weapons and forces operating quickly, but also at higher levels, at which
speed of command and decision making become vital. The Jeune École did not
address speed of command as such, but it proposed to use the technology and
tactics of its time to gain speed and precision. It emphasized speed over mass,
made full use of steam propulsion, and employed many small, fast, swarming
87
platforms rather than a few big, slower ones. Its stress on the torpedo can be
seen as a parallel to today’s focus on cruise missiles and other precision weapons.
Networked Forces. The most fundamental concept underlying NCW may be
that networked forces are intrinsically more capable than so many individual
platforms. The modern concept of a network did not exist in Aube’s time, but he
clearly saw the importance of using the latest communications systems to coordinate attacks by geographically dispersed units. The telegraph, in particular,
was to be used to synchronize the attacks of torpedo boats, a capability Aube saw
as crucial in defending a coast against an enemy landing: “With the extreme mobility that steam gives to all warships . . . with the speed and sureness of information permitted by the electric telegraph, with the ability to concentrate forces
provided by the railroad, though no point on the coast is safe from attack, there
88
is none that cannot be strongly and rapidly defended.”
Focus on Effects. Network-centric warfare embraces the concept of “effectsbased operations”; Vice Admiral Cebrowski has described NCW as incorporat89
ing a “new mental model of warfare that emphasizes outcomes, or effects.” The
Jeune École’s similar emphasis on the ultimate effects of military actions rather
than on immediate destruction achieved is implied clearly in its contingency
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plans to strike Italy “from the sea,” using shore bombardment against forts and
cities to destroy the morale of the populace.
Shock and Awe. Here we see another modern term that has been adopted by NCW
theorists but has a clear parallel in the thinking of the Jeune École. A networkcentric force will, advocates argue, “for the first time . . . provide us with the possibility of moving beyond a strategy based on attrition, to one based upon shock
90
and awe.” Terminology aside, this is what the Jeune École was thinking of when
it argued that sudden massed attacks would create panic among the populations
of enemy states. This effect was to be the purpose of shore bombardment against
Italy, and also of a commercial war against England, which was intended “to pro91
duce an economic panic that would bring about social collapse.”
Modern Business and Economic Concepts. NCW draws heavily from the business world: “The organizing principle of network-centric warfare has its antecedent in the dynamics of growth and competition that have emerged in the
92
modern economy.” Economic ideas were just as important for the Jeune École.
Gabriel Charmes explicitly argued that the concept of division of labor could be
93
extended from political economy to warfare. Aube was concerned about the
social problems of capitalism, arguing that France had to expand its colonial
94
empire to open new markets, encourage production, and eliminate poverty.
What have we proved? To point out these comparisons between network-centric
warfare and the Jeune École tells us little about whether the concepts they share
are valid or not. Both schools are criticized—often rightly—but the association
between them is strengthened by the fact that they are often criticized for the
same things. For example, although neither school focuses as exclusively on
technology as their detractors believe, both seem to trust too much in overly
95
complex and esoteric mathematical calculations and scientific theorizing.
On the other hand, we should be careful not to draw too much from this parallel. Not only was France’s strategic situation in the late 1800s very different
from America’s today but, and more significantly, several areas of critical importance to the Jeune École have no direct analogue today—such as emphasis on
commercial warfare, and colonial naval presence.96 Nonetheless the similarities
are striking enough that the experience of the Jeune École surely offers lessons
for military and naval strategists today. The question is, then, what are they?
THE TEMPER OF THE AGE
Might network-centric warfare suffer the same fate as the Jeune École? Naval
theorists today need not worry about some of the defects of the earlier school.
For instance, Aube’s “three greatest faults were his technical incompetence, his
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97

optimism, and his taste for resorting to the public press.” While one can certainly disagree with the tactical and technological prescriptions of NCW enthusiasts, these advocates are hardly unqualified. They might be overoptimistic, but
that is unlikely to be a fatal flaw unless—and this is a real risk—it turns to arrogance. Also, although the debate over NCW has occasionally become heated
within the Navy and in the press, it shows little inclination to spill over into
politics.
But our review has shown that the principal lessons of the Jeune École arise
from how and when it attempted its naval revolution. Network-centric warfare
proponents have much to learn from the Jeune École’s methods; they lack a key
virtue of, and share a major failing with, Aube and his supporters of more than a
century ago. The most important point of all may be the timing of military
transformation; it is not at all clear that NCW has measured the temper of its age
any better than the Jeune École did that of the late nineteenth century.
The key virtue that NCW lacks is flexibility, the willingness to admit a mistake. Admiral Aube—although not always his followers—demonstrated that
virtue on several occasions. “Clearly,” observes one historian, “the very [torpedo
boat] experiments designed to justify its theories had gone far to discredit the
98
Jeune École.” But as we have seen above, Aube admitted the mistake and abandoned his plans for small, long-range, independently operating combatants.
It is not clear that advocates of NCW and force transformation today are so
flexible. Their inability to admit error can be seen in relatively small things, such
as in the bland official responses to such complaints as that by retired Marine
lieutenant general Paul Van Riper that the results of a large war game, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ’02, were rigged to support the Pentagon’s goals for force
transformation. Senior officers at U.S. Joint Forces Command, which sponsored
the war game, insist it was fair and that it validated future war-fighting concepts
99
such as effects-based operations. Frederick Kagan charges, however, that NCW
boosters are inflexible concerning such fundamental issues as the transformation of warfare itself: “The U.S. is now attempting to transform its military in
ways that hinder the conduct of current operations, even as those operations lit100
erally rip it apart.”
If so, the key failing that network-centric warfare shares with the Jeune École
is the opposite of Aube’s personal flexibility—that supporters of both schools
have frequently claimed too much for their ideas and dismissed criticism with
an assurance bordering on arrogance. In the case of the Jeune École, its advocates tried to do too much and were unwilling to accept criticism or allow dia101
logue: “Whoever attacked them, attacked progress, logic, and science.” This
single-mindedness can be seen in Charmes’s statement that “a war of pursuit
will, therefore, necessarily, fatally, definitely, replace squadron warfare in future
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102

conflicts between maritime nations.” It seems only a short step from
Charmes’s confident pronouncement to declarations that network-centric war103
fare “will prove to be the most important RMA in the past 200 years.” Today’s
reformers may feel that sure of themselves, but history shows they can hurt their
cause by trumpeting the fact too loudly.
The main caution that the story of the Jeune École offers for advocates of
NCW and American defense transformation, then, is not that they may be
wrong in their assessments of the trends influencing military force in the
twenty-first century but that they may be right, too early. They may be ahead of
their time technologically; critics have often charged that network-centric war104
fare relies on untested technical and engineering concepts. But the comparison with the Jeune École shows that it may be even more dangerous to be ahead
of one’s time strategically. In France in the 1880s not even the combination of a
brilliant innovator and the latest technical advances was able to challenge successfully the traditional school of naval warfare. Critics today charge that NCW
has also misjudged the changing nature of war. Loren B. Thompson, for example, believes that it is “time to set aside the network-centric ideology and recog105
nize the many ways in which war has not changed.”
Advocates of network-centric warfare explicitly tie their revolution to the information age; the Department of Defense report to Congress on NCW, for example, states, “Warfare takes on the characteristic of its age. NCW continues this
trend—it is the military response to both the challenges and the opportunities
106
created by the Information Age.” But just as the Jeune École misjudged the
speed at which naval warfare was changing in the late 1800s, today’s transformation advocates may find they have invested too much in expensive and complex
systems like the Global Information Grid, to the detriment of traditional military systems and capabilities. The Jeune École found that its confidence in the
revolutionary nature of submarines and torpedoes was premature, and in the
same way today’s military transformation supporters may find that information
networks and precision guided munitions will not change warfare as quickly as
they would hope. The history of the Jeune École reminds us that no new idea or
innovative technology, no matter how prophetic, can change the nature of warfare on its own. It also suggests that if network-centric warfare fails, it is not
likely to do so because it mimicked the Jeune École too closely but because it too
could not judge the temper of its times.
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1. This is not to argue that the Jeune École was
the only naval revolution to adopt networkcentric principles. Admiral Sir John Fisher’s
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things as today’s transformation advocates,
including aggressive exploitation of new technologies and innovation, an emphasis on
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Jeune École are less well known, they may in
fact apply more directly to today. On Fisher,
see for example Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John
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3. J. R. Hill, “Accelerator and Brake: The Impact
of Technology on Naval Operations, 1855–
1905,” Journal for Maritime Research (December 1999), available at www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk.
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Martin van Creveld, Technology and War:
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Several other works, however, also deserve
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Franzosischen Marine: Strategie Und Politik
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IN MY VIEW

COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT

Sir:
While I agree with Thomas Wildenberg’s description of doctrine in his article
“Midway: Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?” [Winter 2005, pp. 121–35] as “comprising the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions,”
I think it should be pointed out that doctrine does not micromanage military
operations, nor does it completely dispel the “fog of war” which limits information about an enemy, nor does doctrine eliminate the significant role of chance
in war. There is also considerable leeway in how individuals may interpret doctrine, in how much significance they may give to any aspect of doctrine, and in
how they may apply doctrine. And many military decisions do not come within
the purview of doctrine.
When considering the role of doctrine in influencing Japanese and American
conduct in the Battle of Midway, it must not be forgotten how close the Japanese
Navy came to inflicting severe damage on the U.S. Navy’s carrier force.
No doubt, as Wildenberg says, Japanese naval doctrine did not emphasize reconnaissance. And Admiral Nagumo’s operations officer, Commander Minoru
Genda, was personally disinclined to allot resources to reconnaissance, believing
that resources were better spent on attacking the enemy. Genda’s personal disinclination did reflect doctrine, but a commander in Genda’s position with greater
appreciation of the use of reconnaissance would have been free to allot more resources to locating the Americans’ aircraft carriers.
Japanese doctrinal disparagement of reconnaissance did not prevent Captain
Kameto Kuroshima, Admiral Yamamoto’s senior operations officer aboard the
battleship Yamato, from arranging for two cordons of submarines to be placed
between Hawaii and Midway to report on U.S. fleet movements.
On the day of battle, one Japanese recon aircraft was half an hour late in
launching because of a catapult problem. Later, a sighting of the American force
was inaccurately conveyed as having no aircraft carriers, an error which was not
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corrected for some time, thereby delaying the decision to attack the American
ship rather than hit Midway again. Therefore, even given the Japanese doctrinal
downplaying of reconnaissance, the U.S. aircraft carriers could have been located in a timely manner except for a mechanical difficulty and a reporting error,
which both could have happened regardless of doctrine. Without the two
non-doctrine-caused delays, Admiral Nagumo could have launched the grand
assault on the U.S. carriers he intended to.
Admiral Nagumo’s great error was not launching an immediate partial attack
against the U.S. carriers with available aircraft followed by a later attack with remaining aircraft. The Second Carrier Division leader, Rear Admiral Tamon
Yamaguchi, wanted to attack the U.S. carriers immediately with all available aircraft, whether they carried bombs better suited to hit Midway Island or not, and
whether or not they had fighter support.
Striking the first blow was key to Japanese doctrine. But what sort of first
blow does one conduct? Japanese doctrine didn’t provide an answer. The decision was up to the commanders on the spot. In contrast to Yamaguchi’s advocacy
of an immediate first blow, Nagumo’s chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke
Kusaka, recommended a delayed, well-coordinated, all-out grand assault. He
wanted all airborne aircraft recovered, refueled, and armed with torpedoes and
armor-piercing bombs, and the planes already armed to attack Midway rearmed
also with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs.
Japanese doctrine did not provide a solution to the question of what should
be done in that specific situation. Admiral Nagumo asked Commander Genda
for his advice, and Genda sided with Kusaka. Nagumo agreed. The opportunity
to disrupt the U.S. attack was lost. And the U.S. dive-bombers found the Japanese carriers with bombs, torpedoes, and gasoline covering their hangar decks.
In six minutes, three Japanese carriers were lost.
Wildenberg faults U.S. Navy doctrine for failing to have devised a workable
doctrine for coordinating air attacks by different types of carrier-based aircraft.
However, this failure was fortuitous at Midway. First the American torpedo
planes attacked. The Japanese fighter cover was dispersed at sea level, chasing the
remaining torpedo planes when the U.S. dive-bombers attacked. Denuded of
fighter cover, the Japanese carriers were easy targets. If the torpedo planes and
dive-bombers had attacked together, both would have been the targets of the
Japanese fighters. In practice the torpedo planes acted as an unintended feint to
draw off the Japanese fighters. This happened by chance, but in no human endeavor does chance play such a significant role as it does in war.
Another aspect of the battle, one which could have been disastrous for the
United States, was the possibility of pursuing and engaging the retiring Japanese
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forces, which Spruance refused to do and which no doubt Halsey would have
done if he had been in command.
Spruance, in his second most important decision of the engagement, decided
to pull away. If he had continued, the U.S. forces would have blundered into a
night battle with the follow-up Japanese cruisers and battleships, and our remaining two aircraft carriers would probably have been sunk. There was no doctrinal guidance or imperative to turn to for deciding to continue or not to
continue after the retiring Japanese.

JOSEPH FORBES

Pittsburgh, Penna.

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: QUO VADIS?

Sir:
Philip G. Cerny’s “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma” (Winter 2005, pp.
11–33) makes a fundamental contribution to the study of the new (post-9/11)
conflicts of the world. The key to Cerny’s notion of “war on terror” is the progressing diffusion of nation-states into “crystallization of a globalizing world
order,” namely, “a durable disorder”—that is, “the basic security gap that results
from the multilayered, crosscutting, and asymmetric global and transnational
structures.” He posits: “A war on terror cannot be a simple war of armed forces
but must be a sociopolitical process.” That explains the ongoing dilemma among
concerned policy makers, military leaders, and members of the public who try to
understand, let alone do something about, terrorism.
In one of the few serious public policy debates on the defense posture of the
nation, the Naval War College’s 2005 Current Strategy Forum addressed the
theme of “Shaping the Global Maritime Security Environment.” The discussions
credibly included presentations by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary
of the Navy (the latter stood in for by Admiral John B. Nathman, Commander,
U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Deputy CNO). It became clear immediately
that the Navy—or the military as a whole, under the “jointness” construct since
the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)—has “transformed” its doctrinal thinking
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and concept of operations to respond to what it sees as the new global conflict
situations. In the meantime, the George W. Bush administration has indiscreetly
aggregated the “situations” into a simple and single term: the “global war on terror.” The military has shortened the term to an operative acronym, “GWOT,” but
as an element of the military strategy for the new era. The “three-and-one construct” of shaping the Navy for the future strategic environment provides for
readiness for the services’ intrinsic defense mission of major conflict operations
(MCO) while engaging in the GWOT, stability (aka peacekeeping) operations,
and homeland security. Sea basing—in legal international waters—for forward
presence and strategic deterrence, and consequential speed and flexibility in responding to various and varying threats, is the key to this strategy of the now de
facto single-superpower U.S. military.
The earnest discourses and ensuing questions, however, seemed inevitably to
lead to the realization of the difficulty in shaping the future military posture to
the administration’s undefined and reactive foreign policy, as exemplified in the
Iraqi war muddle. Answers often echoed, “It is a ‘complex’ and admittedly ‘confusing’ environment,” or even outright admission of the issues being “above my
pay grade.” Granted, the future is always a contingency and indeed unpredictable, especially in times of troubled waters. But, true to the Clausewitzian dictum
of “war as [only] an instrument of policy,” the defense posture should be
“shaped” to serve, enhance, and uphold the defense, foreign, geopolitical, or
even (in the modern notion of “globalization”) global economic policies and design of the nation. I submit, then, that the policy of the nation must be projected
intrinsically and must be comprehensively rigorous enough if it is to define,
guide, and apply military power to advantage in the nation’s course.
The current sole “official” U.S. foreign policy of “global war on terror”—in its
resolute simplicity—belies the complex and dynamic reality of the new world
conflicts. OEF (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM), the only direct and perhaps
rational response to the 9/11 terror attack, is still in search of Osama bin Laden,
the claiming perpetrator—but with an increasing doubt that “killing” Osama
will end the “global terrorism.” The capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq has not
changed the strait in Iraq, for instance. OIF (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) started
with the U.S. invasion, ostensibly to check Saddam’s “proliferation of WMD”;
later precipitated to enforcing a “regime change” among the multiethnic, historically internecine-warfare-poised, and understandably anti-American (read
foreign)-occupation populace; and now is in an intractable struggle to “kill” the
“insurgents.” As this writer noted in the Winter 2004 issue of this journal (pp.
125–26), the miry demise of the Bush administration’s unilateral Iraq invasion
policy had been concernedly and accurately foreboded in Dr. Phebe Marr’s
“Iraq ‘the Day After’ ” (Winter 2003, pp. 12–29). Items of advice ignored in the
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unilateral war action included some significant ones of the military leaders,
e.g., on the troop strength needed—another case of policy and warfare strategy
disconnect.
With the MCO-level ground-force deployment and daily mounting war casualties, “Iraq” preoccupies the current U.S. foreign policy. Simultaneously,
however, the United States, in its Cold War–defaulted superpower leadership
role in the world’s balance of power (though Cerny argues this role is no longer a
“reliable base” for “national or collective security”), faces bubbling potential
rogue-nation threats to peace. Suspected Iranian nuclear weapon development
looms alongside the problematic rise of Islamic hard-liners in the state’s “free”
election. The North Korean despot toting the “rogue state special” nuclear threat
in his inarticulate and precarious demand for “respect,” nonetheless would call
for Washington’s skillful “psychological” diplomacy (or “sociopolitical process,”
à la Cerny). The proverbial “big stick” and “soft power” (Joseph Nye, Jr., Harvard) should be delicately orchestrated together with the concerned nations in
the region. In the meantime, global competition and confrontation for economic hegemony, as well as for assertion as “the” nation to be reckoned with,
rage on, with China in the forefront and the fledgling European Union conglomerate, India, and even Russia in line, vis-à-vis the established U.S. and Japanese economies. Worldwide anti-American sentiment, heightened by the
administration’s undiscerning America-centric hubris, undermines the U.S. opportunity for constructive alliance building needed in the progressing new
global conflict environment. Cerny states: “The U.S. attempt to use its power to
regulate and control that [traditional nation-state] system unilaterally is becoming increasingly dysfunctional.”
Where is America going in this “global war on terror”? In the “durable disorder” world, the Bush policy makers might indeed be adrift in their own words. In
the first place, the “global” aspect had better not be their view of the altogether
complex world, in a casual “all terrorisms are the same” shrug, or worse, a political rhetoric rationalizing the war in Iraq as the all-in-one answer to the soperceived universal, worldwide terrorism network. The Iraq war in the current
“garrison” stage is a war against the precipitously engendered “insurgents”
whose “global” ties extend only across the borders of Iraq proper to infiltrating
Islamic-jihad neighbors. “Global,” on the other hand, should connote and promote America’s identifying with other nation-states over the globe facing their
respective terrorist insurgents—in Europe, Russia, Asia, and Americas.
Secondly, “war” might suggest the most cathartic and seemingly effective
means of combating terrorism. But in the new world of plurality, as Cerny asserts, “security itself ” must be transformed to “pursuing a civilianization of politics and society, stressing social development, welfare, and good governance.”
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Here, if for a questionable motive of regime change, the current U.S. attempt to
establish a new Iraqi government, train security forces, and repair infrastructures may be on the right track. On the other hand, can the United States hand
over an American war against Iraqis—albeit “insurgents”—to the Iraqis for an
Iraqi war against Iraqis? Even the “foreign” insurgents are Iraqis’ Islamic (albeit
jihadist) “brothers.” To note, the Iraqis so far have not come out to embrace the
American “liberators” with open arms, either.
Terrorism is an act of unilateral violence on unsuspecting innocents—solely
to intimidate the targeted nation’s psyche. Unlike the clashes of opposing nations’ broad geopolitical stands in major conflicts, terrorism operates but for a
specific and dire insurgent cause—that is, “the incredible frustrations engendered by the revolution of rising expectations in a globalizing world” (Cerny).
The cause could obviously be intense—although the “self-sacrificing notion”
may not be so foreign. Did not a “Western” patriot ask for “liberty or death”?
Cerny suggests: “What is needed is not so much a war on terror as political, economic, and social war on the causes of terror.”
That may be a tall order for this White House, with its demonstrated aversion
to making intellectually rigorous and necessarily empathic foreign policies. At
any rate, it will be some time before the stigma of the Iraq war—judged insolent
(by the world), costly (by the American taxpayers), fraught with personal sacrifice (by American families), and ill conceived and prepared (by experts)—can be
erased to restore U.S. credibility and prestige. The American military deserves
better.

THOMAS S. MOMIYAMA

U.S. Senior Executive Service (Ret.), formerly director of Aircraft Research & Technology Division, Naval Air Systems Command, associate fellow and Public Policy
Committee member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Senior Executive Fellow 1981 Harvard Kennedy School of Government
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HOW COMFORTABLE WILL OUR DESCENDENTS BE WITH THE CHOICES
WE’VE MADE TODAY?
Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2004. 150pp. $18.95

John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A.
Lovell Professor of History at Yale University and one of the preeminent historians of American, particularly Cold
War, security policy. Surprise, Security,
and the American Experience is based on
a series of lectures given by the author
in 2002 addressing the implications for
American security after the 11 September attacks. It is a succinct and masterful statement of the central national
security dilemma that presently faces us.
For many, especially critics of the current administration, President Bush’s
post-9/11 policies in response to the
threat presented by militant Islamism
represent a radical and scary departure
from historical U.S. policy. Many putatively are aghast at the introduction of
preemptive/preventive war into the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 and the apparent shift to a
harsh hegemonic unilateralism.
Gaddis argues that far from being a
radical departure, the Bush administration’s response to the attacks represents
considerable continuity with American
historical tradition. Twice before in
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U.S. history, American assumptions
about national security were shattered
by surprise attack, and each time U.S.
grand strategy profoundly changed as a
result.
After the British attack on Washington,
D.C., in 1814, John Quincy Adams as
secretary of state articulated three principles to secure the American homeland
against external attack: preemption,
unilateralism, and hegemony. The
Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, was declared unilaterally and
preemptively in reaction to the Spanish
empire’s collapse in Latin America
(though in practice it was enforced by
British naval supremacy, not American
power).
For over a century, the United States
expanded its territory and influence
through force majeure exercised against
“failing states,” another phenomenon by
no means new in our times. Florida was
ceded by Spain under pressure in 1810,
Texas and the Southwest were taken from
a chaotic Mexico in the mid-nineteenth
century, overseas Spanish possessions
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were seized in 1898 after an ostensible
“terrorist” attack on USS Maine, and
myriad lesser interventions took place in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Fear
of multilateral entanglement peaked
with insistence on being an “associated
power” during World War I, rejection
of the League of Nations, and pre–
World War II isolationism. America remained content with hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere and unilateralism
in dealings with other nations and international organizations; preemption of
the dictators in the 1930s, always infeasible domestically, would have been
impossible given European democracies’
appeasement policies.
Transportation revolutions from the
late nineteenth century onward diminished the value of geographical separation that underpinned this strategy, as
spectacularly proven by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December
1941. Obliged by necessity—the United
States had insufficient power to defeat
both Germany and Japan in a reasonable amount of time and at an acceptable cost—to depart radically from
unilateralism, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt moved quickly to establish a
“Grand Alliance” with Britain and the
Soviet Union.
By the end of World War II, America
“was able to move in a remarkably
short period of time from a strategy
that had limited itself to controlling the
western hemisphere to one aimed at
winning a global war and managing the
peace that would follow. Equally significant is the fact that FDR pulled off this
expanded hegemony by scrapping
rather than embracing the two other
key components of Adams’ strategy,
unilateralism and preemption.”
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To keep allies with widely disparate war
aims together, FDR sought to “embed
conflicting unilateral priorities within a
cooperative multilateral framework. . . .
If the present war could provide the incentive to build structures and procedures that would prevent new [wars],
then all would benefit.” Absent this,
“there was sure to be something worse,
whether in the form of a less than decisive victory against Germany and Japan,
or a postwar economic collapse, or even
a replay of the post–World War I retreat by the United States back into the
unilateralism of the nineteenth century
that had . . . contributed to the coming
of World War II. The result was de
facto American hegemony, but in contrast to anything John Quincy Adams
could ever have imagined, it was to arise
by consent.”
Gaddis argues that this was the radical
departure in U.S. security policy, not
what has happened since 11 September.
Since World War II, the underlying
principle vis-à-vis other nations was
that “there should always be something
worse than the prospect of American
domination,” a condition easy to maintain during the Cold War standoff with
the Soviet Union. This ensured an
“asymmetry of legitimacy” between the
United States and the Soviet Union that
“did much to determine how the Cold
War was fought and who would ultimately win it.” Preemption as policy
routinely was rejected on the basis that,
given the lessons of the bloody world
wars, an impossibly high moral ante
was needed to justify starting a war and
incurring the inevitable costs for an unknown benefit, even in the face of a
clear and present danger.
But what if there is no longer “something worse”? One curious question
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post–Cold War is why there have been
no serious efforts among other nations
to build countervailing groupings to
“balance” near-hegemonic U.S. global
power, French urgings notwithstanding. “The reason, very likely, was the
habit of self-restraint Americans had
developed—because they had had to—
during the Cold War, a habit they did
not entirely relinquish after it ended.”
The shocking and lethal nature of the
9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact that
they had been executed by a mere
group of zealots, resulted in a rapid,
radical change in U.S. national security
strategy. Key Cold War assumptions no
longer applied. The post–Cold War international environment was not benign; terrorists were neither deterrable
nor containable like states but potentially had equivalent lethality; the international state system had declining
authority; and there was no longer a
security environment in which all the
players knew and respected the rules.
The 2002 National Security Strategy
avers that the United States will “identify and eliminate terrorists wherever
they are, together with the regimes that
sustain them.” Though multilateral action is preferred (“The United States
will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community”),
unilateral preemption may be necessary
(“We cannot let our enemies strike
first.”). The United States will maintain
de facto hegemonic power sufficient “to
dissuade potential adversaries from
pursuing a military build-up in hopes
of surpassing, or equaling, the power of
the United States.” The strategy seeks to
make such implicit hegemonic power
palatable by linking it to such universal
principles as “No people on earth yearn
to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or
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eagerly await the midnight knock of the
secret police.” Lastly, the strategy and
subsequent policy statements argue that
terrorism (that we care about) is
spawned largely by the lack of representative institutions in tyrannical regimes;
thus “terrorism—and by implication
the authoritarianism that breeds it—
must become as obsolete as slavery, piracy, or genocide” through the spread
of democracy. Gaddis finds much to respect in this strategy, particularly its intellectual coherence. However, he notes
glaring flaws in its execution. The
“most obvious failure has to do with
the relationship between preemption,
hegemony, and consent.” The run-up to
and aftermath of the Iraqi war have
raised doubts about the willingness of
much of the world to consent to American hegemony if used to preempt in the
absence of compellingly clear and present danger, doubts aggravated by the
fact that the Bush administration “has
never deployed language with anything
like the care it has taken in deploying its
military capabilities.” It is this lack of
multilateral “consent”—and the supposed departure from widely accepted
historical norms—that has animated
much of the opposition to current policies both at home and abroad.
This poses a problem that will not soon
disappear. As Gaddis notes, “the means
we choose in this post-September 11th
environment could wind up undermining the ends we seek. It is also possible,
though, that the ends we seek, given the
new threats we face, can be achieved
only by means different from those that
won World War II and the Cold War.
This much at least is clear: the dilemma
is a difficult one, and its resolution will
largely determine the relationship
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between surprise, security, and the
American experience in the 21st
century.”
Gaddis closes with a poignant anecdote.
One of his Yale undergraduates “asked
in the dark and fearful days that followed September 11th, ‘Would it be OK
now for us to be patriotic?’ ” to which
he responds, “Yes, I think it would.” This
is a commentary both on the smug
self-indulgence of many elites during
America’s post–Cold War “vacation
from history” and on the uncomfortable “disconnection in our thinking between the security to which we’ve
become accustomed and the means by
which we obtained it.” It is intellectually fashionable in many venues today
to condemn the sometimes morally ambiguous policies that have nonetheless
brought us the national security we historically have taken for granted. But as
Gaddis notes: “The better approach, I
think, is to acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history. Like most other
nations, we got to where we are by
means that we cannot today, in their
entirety, comfortably endorse. Comfort
alone, however, cannot be the criterion
by which a nation shapes its strategy
and secures its safety. The means of
confronting danger do not disqualify
themselves from consideration solely
on the basis of the uneasiness they produce. Before we too quickly condemn
how our ancestors dealt with such
problems, therefore, we might well ask
ourselves two questions: What would
we have done if we had been in their
place then? And, even scarier, how
comfortable will our descendants be
with the choices we make today?”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 304pp. $24.95

As the United States enters its fifth year
in the war on terrorism, too little is
known about al-Qa‘ida. Though several
top al-Qa‘ida operatives, like Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, are now in custody, and detainee reporting from
Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Airbase, and
other locations provides a historical
snapshot of the pre-9/11 organization
led by Usama Bin Laden, the United
States still lacks the vocabulary to understand how and why terrorism
threatens. This is partly due to the impact of global counterterrorist operations (the Congressional Research
Services notes that three thousand suspected al-Qa‘ida members have been
detained by about ninety countries),
conflicting strategies within Bin Laden’s
organization (global legion of militants
or global inspiration), and the diversity
of groups that compose contemporary
depictions of al-Qa‘ida (the Egyptian
al-Jihad, the Indonesian Jemaah
Islamiyah, or the Kashmiri Haarakat
ul-Mujahidin, to name three of the
many disparate nationalist groups
lumped together with al-Qa‘ida).
Jason Burke, a chief reporter for the
London Observer who spent about four
years in Pakistan and Afghanistan, argues that al-Qa‘ida (Arabic for “the
base of operation” or “foundation”) is
an overused term and mischaracterizes
the nature of international terrorism. In
contrast to the pre-9/11 view that Bin
Laden is al-Qa‘ida, or the post–Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan)
view that al-Qa‘ida is a global coalition
of factions, Burke argues it is less an organization than an ideology. “Osama
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bin Laden did not create it nor will his
death or incarceration end it”—he has
been a “peripheral player in modern Islamic militancy.” Al-Qa‘ida is bigger
and different from Bin Laden and his
Egyptian deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The word denotes a purpose, not an
organization.
Throughout the book, Burke weaves a
personal narrative drawing from his experiences on the ground and upon a
deep understanding of international
terrorism. He argues, “contemporary
Islamic militancy is a diverse and complex historical phenomenon.” It is
driven by local political grievances, economic frustration, and government
repression.
Burke’s two-year-old assertion that
al-Qa‘ida is more of an ideology than a
group is gaining currency and is now
more widely accepted within the U.S.
government. The Defense Department
has now defined “countering ideological support for terrorism,” or CIST, as a
major component of its strategy in the
global war on terrorism. In order to win
this war, it is simply not enough to protect the homeland, neutralize terrorists,
and eliminate terrorist safe havens.
Rather, the goal is to create the conditions that prevent terrorism from becoming an international threat. As
such, the Bush administration’s efforts
to promote democracy and eliminate
tyranny are seen as the means to establish pluralism and to provide opposition
groups a nonviolent venue to express
grievances. In many authoritarian
countries today, there are few options
for peaceful regime change. Burke’s
travels and interviews led him to the
conclusion that “as national Islamic
movements, moderate or violent, are
crushed or fail, anger is channeled into
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the symbolic realm and into the international, cosmic, apocalyptic language
of bin Laden and his associates.”
Burke’s work adds to the Defense Department’s effort to analyze, by deconstructing al-Qa‘ida, what motivates
radical terrorist groups and understand
why the United States is increasingly a
target. For Burke, “the world is a far
more radicalized place now than it was
prior to September 11th.” It is the freelance operators without obvious connection to any group who should worry
us the most; without a peaceful way to
resolve their perceived injustice, they
resort to violence.
The distance from 9/11, counterterrorism successes with international
partners, and the lack of additional attacks in the United States allow for a
more thoughtful debate on why the
United States is perceived negatively in
the world and how local conditions
spawn terrorist movements. For those
who are ready for the answers, Burke’s
book is a good place to start. He not
only corrects conventional misunderstandings of al-Qa‘ida but offers a good
representation of the radicalism the
United States is attempting to contain.
DEREK S. REVERON

Naval War College

Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies Choose to
Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking, 2005. 525pp.
$29.95

In his Pulitzer Prize–winning Guns,
Germs and Steel, Jared Diamond, professor of geology at UCLA, used a blend of
history, archaeology, geography, and anthropology to explain how Western civilizations rose to dominance. In Collapse,

151

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

148

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 4, Art. 1

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Diamond uses the same approach to explore what causes some civilizations to
fall into ruin while others survive or
prosper. This second volume is perhaps
more important in that it goes right to
the heart of today’s global war on terrorism and to steps that the West can
take to minimize the potential for catastrophic failure, not only in the developing world but in the West itself.
Diamond contends that the collapse
(“drastic decrease in human population
size and/or political/economic/social
complexity, over a considerable area,
for an extended time”) of many past societies is tied to unintended ecological
suicide. He tracks this idea through a
number of case studies, including the
failed Polynesian cultures on Easter
Island and in the southwest Pacific, the
Anasazi and Mayan civilizations in the
Americas, and the Viking colony on
Greenland. His analysis includes lists of
environmentally based causes, and decisions that societies either made or
failed to make that ultimately determined their fate. He then traces these
same ideas to today’s world and hazards
some projections into the future.
This process of ecocide is measured in
eight interrelated categories: deforestation and habitat destruction; soil erosion,
salinization, etc.; poor water management; overhunting; overfishing; the introduction of harmful alien species;
population growth; and the increased
per capita impact of people. Historically
these categories have worked in tandem
over time to produce collapse. This was
true even in situations where conditions were not inherently catastrophic.
A case in point is the demise of the
Norse civilization in medieval Greenland. The Vikings’ once-thriving colony
died out, clinging to a maladapted
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cultural heritage to the last. As the Vikings’ society withered, their Inuit
neighbors survived by adapting to the
changing climate wrought by the mini
Ice Age of the Middle Ages.
Diamond also notes the recent emergence of four new categories that add to
the concern: climate change caused by
humans, the buildup of toxic chemicals
in the environment, energy shortages,
and full human utilization of the earth’s
photosynthetic capacity. Diamond’s
discussion of these points tends to the
esoteric, but several points are clear.
Global warming, degradation of soils
and fishing grounds through toxic poisoning, and decreasing availability of
reasonably affordable energy are real
problems. More importantly, they are
part of a larger issue—that of the
earth’s capacity to sustain a growing
population striving to achieve firstworld status. The global, political, and
social strains of billions of people aspiring to consume resources on a scale
equaling that of Western societies is
bound to be disruptive.
Diamond recognizes that there is more
to the problem of collapse than that. No
radical “tree hugger,” Diamond is neither narrow-minded nor anti-business.
He takes a broad look at a variety of
contributing factors, including climatic
change, hostile neighbors, declining
support from friendly neighbors, and
most importantly, a society’s response
to environmental degradation.
By way of illustration, Diamond opens
with a case study of Montana. Once one
of the wealthiest states, Montana is now
among the poorest. This change flowed
from multiple factors: deforestation,
pollution from mining, introduction of
foreign plant and fish species, loss of
soil fertility and productivity, and
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degradation and shortage of water.
Diamond points also to a growing disparity between the super-rich flocking
in to enjoy the scenery and the economically distressed local population
whose means of livelihood are being
eroded, and the political tensions that
inevitably result.
This same confluence of problems,
many coming as a result of conscious
decisions on the part of leaders or citizens, is being played out across the
globe. One would expect Africa, the perennial loser in such comparisons, to
hold the anchor position as the continent most likely to fail. Not so. Australia heads the list, due to the legacy of
aggressive importation of harmful species; government policies that promote
and reward deforestation and soil ruination; destruction of aquatic habitats
needed for sustainable fisheries; and
other problems. Diamond opines that
these conditions are not irreversible but
that the continent’s sustainable population is probably around eight million,
somewhat less than half its current
level. While one may question the exactitude of the eight-million figure, his
case of overpopulation in relation to
sustainability over time is well made, at
least in terms of capacity for food
production.
Turning to Africa, Diamond offers an
instructive analysis of the Rwandan
genocide. Taking a Malthusian view
over the more common Hutu-versusTutsi source of disruption, he demonstrates how a complex mixture of poverty, fear, and opportunism, not tribal
affiliation, drove the genocide. In the final analysis it all came down to land. As
the population exceeded the land’s ability to sustain it, the traditional fabric of
Rwandan society was ripped apart. This
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situation was exploited by government,
tribal, and even religious leaders who
turned the destitute against the merely
poverty stricken. The result was the
mass murder of people who had some
land by those who had none.
For all the apparent doom and gloom,
Diamond is cautiously optimistic about
the future. Despite past failures, there
are too many stories of societies successfully adapting to changing circumstances for us to despair. Technology
can also contribute to success, though
we are wise not to consider advances as
a panacea. As to the importance of
turning things around, he notes that today’s terrorists may be well educated
and moneyed but argues that “they still
depend on a desperate society for support and toleration.” He further notes,
“well nourished societies, offering good
job prospects . . . don’t offer broad support to their fanatics.” Perhaps it is this
angle, if not that of survival itself, that
holds the greatest interest for today’s
national security community.
THOMAS E. SEAL

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

George, Roger Z., and Robert D. Kline, eds. Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense Univ. Press, 2004. 564pp. $150

The current climate of reform and
blame affecting the intelligence community can deflect attention from its
substance and value as a contributor to
policy and military operations. Lost in
the shuffle of reorganization and fingerpointing are issues that will consistently
remain important challenges—matters
of defining and improving analysis,
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educating intelligence consumers on the
possibilities and constraints of intelligence, dealing with the embedded and
new challenges of collection in a world
dominated by previously unimagined
threats, and balancing security with the
need to share. It is against this backdrop
that the editors, George and Kline, have
collected essays by an impressive list of
authors addressing many of the issues
especially salient to intelligence practitioners and their consumers in this time
of reflection and reform.
The anthology provides an excellent
baseline for educating any analyst or
consumer, new or experienced, on
many of the issues consistently at play
within the intelligence community.
Providing content and context to the issues of requirements, collection, exploitation, analysis, and consumer use, the
book provides an excellent foundation
for understanding the challenges inherent in each part of the intelligence cycle.
It is ideal for its intended use as a textbook for future analysts and policy
makers, and is equally suited for anyone
interested in how the intelligence community and its components operate.
The book is well organized, providing
different perspectives on important issues. The organization allows the
reader, as any great anthology does, to
pick up the book and select an article or
group of articles. An additional benefit
of the thoughtfully considered collection is the diversity of perspectives. Essays by practitioners, theorists, and
consumers each give glimpses into
every role that might not otherwise be
known. This range of views helps meet
the stated intentions of the book—to
stir thought on how the community
does and should work and how it
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should best serve all of its diplomatic,
policy, and military consumers.
Some sections are particularly thought
provoking. The essays devoted to “Intelligence and the Military,” for example,
make the reader consider what kinds
of options are available and should be
pursued in strengthening the relationship between military and civilian intelligence practitioners and agencies:
Where should the lines for collection,
analysis, and dissemination be drawn or
redrawn in order to exploit most effectively each group’s relative strengths?
Or more basically, what are the real
strengths of each outfit? What should
they be?
The parts devoted to the “Challenges of
Analysis” and “The Perils of Policy Support” produce valuable insights into
how the different organizations are
configured for their roles in the intelligence process. The “Challenges of Analysis” section describes some of the
ongoing challenges of analysis and how
the CIA, primarily, has developed
methods to address these challenges.
“The Perils of Policy Support” describes
how consumers view and use intelligence. However, and though both of
the last-named sections provide interesting insights into how each side currently operates, they offer little in the
way of suggestions for improving the
status quo. Perhaps an additional article
in each of these sections, proposing or
otherwise articulating several options
for the way ahead, based on current legislative language or the state of debate,
would be warranted in a future edition.
Deception, while a critical issue, probably
gets too much play. Its treatment is a bit
too founded in historical examples. In the
realms of open sources, cyberspace, and
network-centric adversaries, deception
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issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged
to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be
coupled with the one devoted to opensource analysis to discuss the still
unwieldy problems of the future of
intelligence—reams of information
from a variety of unknown sources that
current “INT” equipment and methods
are not ready to handle.
Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in
classes, the outcomes of the debates it
will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future
readers.
JAMIESON JO MEDBY

RAND Corporation

William J. Lahneman, ed. Military Intervention:
Cases in Context for the 21st Century, Oxford,
U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 224 pp. $26.95

Most students of international affairs
would agree that understanding the
causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security
issues facing the United States in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and
Security Studies at the University of
Maryland, has assembled a gifted group
of analysts to examine seven instances of
military intervention and, through the
use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while
identifying ways to increase the chances
of success in an intervention.
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The eleven contributors to this volume
have impressive credentials. Together,
they compose a potent mix of security
scholars and practitioners. In addition to
Lahneman himself, of special note are
William Zartman and John Steinbruner.
Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and
Conflict Resolution, and the Director of
Conflict Management at the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
John Steinbruner, Director of the Center
for International and Security Studies at
the School of Public Policy, University
of Maryland, is also the author of The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton
Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the
study of decision making.
Military Intervention examines six cases
of military intervention: Somalia
(1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994),
Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000),
and East Timor (1999). A seventh case
involving Cambodia is also provided,
although in this instance, rather than
focusing on a single intervention, the
authors examine interventions from
1806 to 2003. Lahneman’s stated intention was that each case be examined
through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the
intervention force to the extent to
which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to
produce a lasting peace. As analytical
approaches go, this one seems well
suited to support comparative analyses
and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately,
as is sometimes the case with a collection
of essays, some authors approached this
requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on
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Cambodia veers the farthest from it.
Editing a volume of this nature can be a
thankless task, but Lahneman would
have been better served by insistence
that his contributors specifically answer
his questions. The lack of such consistency may obscure elements the cases
have in common, resulting in a missed
opportunity to increase a systemic understanding of intervention.
That said, this volume is a useful addition to the body of work that, to paraphrase Alexander George, attempts to
bridge the gap between the realms of
academic theory and practical application. Of particular value in this regard is
the first chapter of the book, written by
Steinbruner and Jason Forrester. The
authors confirm what many security professionals have long believed, that “civil
conflicts are actually economic battles
over the control of resources waged under
conditions in which allocation can not be
managed by legal methods or legitimate
government domination.”
Other chapters are less useful. First,
with the possible exception of East
Timor, there are deeper and more complete descriptions of the crises to be
found than those in this book. Second,
in some cases, the author’s conclusions
raise questions that beg to be answered
but are left hanging. For example, David
Laitin, writing on the intervention in
Somalia, argues that “early, decisive
action” could have been taken. Yet he
acknowledges the political will for such
early action was lacking and does not
address how such resolve might have
been created. Laitin also fails to ask how
an early intervention operation in Somalia could have been terminated.
Could the applicable mandate have
been achieved, or would long-term stability have required the presence of
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peacekeepers? Furthermore, Laitin perpetuates the idea that only eighteen
U.S. servicemen were killed in the battle
of Mogadishu. This number does not
take into account the deaths of two soldiers assigned to the reaction force, nor
does it acknowledge the Malaysian soldier who lost his life during the rescue
effort. This may seem a small point, but
it raises troubling questions about the
depth of Laitin’s research.
Steven Burg’s analysis of the intervention
in Bosnia reveals different shortcomings.
The key point of the chapter—that states
do not mount serious interventions unless national interests are involved—is
widely accepted. However, Burg’s chapter
contains both unsupported assertions and
a lack of detail concerning aspects of the
case that may not be familiar to the lay
reader. Still, his identification and description of seven stages of intervention is
both thought provoking and useful.
As mentioned earlier, the case on
Rwanda is well written and argued.
Khadiagala does not insult the reader’s
intelligence by asserting that Western
states could not have intervened in
time—he clearly attributes their failure
to act in Rwanda to a lack of political
will. More debatable is his assertion
that both sides in the conflict were
counting on external actors to save
them from a weak peace agreement.
The evidence presented seems sketchy,
especially given the Revolutionary
United Front’s reluctance to allow any
effort at a political settlement until it
had conquered the country.
The cases on Haiti, East Timor, and Sierra
Leone are straightforward. Their respective conclusions include the ideas that
fostering peace is conducive to longterm U.S. security, that valid political
processes are central to peace, that

156

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Autumn 2005 Issue

military intervention alone is not enough
to “end a conflict whose basic cause is
state collapse,” and that peacekeepers
may be better served by developing successful strategies to transfer power than
by focusing on “exit strategies.” These
conclusions are well supported, and it is
difficult to argue with any one of them.
The case of Cambodia, presented in
such a different fashion, concludes that
future military intervention in Cambodia is unlikely. The analysis predicts
that other interventions—notably exploitative economic ones—will increase
and that the forces of globalization will
prove injurious to the average Khmer.
Unfortunately, the chapter ends before
explaining these findings in detail.
The final chapter, written by Lahneman
himself, is in many ways the most valuable. Lahneman provides his own summary of the book’s cases, then identifies
a variety of challenges and prescriptions
associated with intervention operations.
These findings range from the commonsense (“A coalition of willing states
should conduct military intervention”)
to the provocative (“Operations taken
solely for humanitarian reasons tend to
be too little and too late”).
In the final analysis, Lahneman’s book
is less useful for the insights it provides
into the specifically examined cases
than for the questions it raises that
should be answered before any intervention is ordered. This work is also an
invitation to deepen the current national discussion on intervention and
nation building. As Lahneman suggests,
this discussion is too important to be
confined to the ivory tower; the invitation should not go unanswered by the
academic and security communities.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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Moore, Jeffrey M. Spies for Nimitz: Joint Military
Intelligence in the Pacific War. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2004, 336pp. $29.95

Despite its title, this book is not about
spies but about what is referred to in
today’s parlance as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”: a sustained
process of research and analysis, based
on all source collection efforts, that
identifies important aspects of potential
combat environments. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield provides
planners and commanders with “combat intelligence”—about the terrain,
weather conditions, enemy order of
battle and dispositions—needed to
conduct an upcoming operation. For
instance, without knowledge of tidal
conditions, currents, the composition
and slope of a beach, or the location of
underwater obstructions and mines,
amphibious operations can be doomed
to failure before they begin.
In this history of the performance of
U.S. intelligence in the Pacific during
World War II, Jeffrey Moore links the
intelligence provided to planners by the
Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean
Area (JICPOA) to the outcome of the
major amphibious assaults against
Japanese-occupied islands. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, always
important, was of great strategic significance in the “island hopping” campaign
undertaken by the United States. Planners had to identify atolls or islets that
were lightly defended by the Japanese
yet possessed the anchorages, landing
strips, and flat terrain that made them
suitable as operating bases for the next
stage in the campaign. When intelligence analysts provided accurate pictures of the battlefield, operations
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generally went smoothly and U.S. casualties were light. When they underestimated enemy strength, failed to warn
the assault of strange topographic conditions, or failed to anticipate shifts in
enemy strategy, the outcome was a
grinding attritional battle that generated high losses.
American intelligence analysts and
planners knew very little about the
Marshall, Mariana, or Caroline Islands.
Of course, many of the atolls and islets
targeted in the American march across
the Pacific were extraordinarily isolated
and had been inhabited mostly by Polynesians before the war. More surprisingly, planners also knew little about
American islands that had been seized
by the Japanese in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Guamanians
who had left their home island when the
Japanese invaded had to be consulted
about topography, road networks, and
tidal conditions to support plans for the
assault on Guam. The U.S. Navy had
supposedly been planning operations
against Japan for years; it is hard to explain why so little effort had been made
to gather basic information about the
Pacific islands.
In assessing JICPOA’s performance,
Moore identifies a perplexing trend—
that U.S. intelligence actually deteriorated as the war progressed. Intelligence
performed relatively well against early
targets (Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Tinian,
and Guam), probably because these
atolls were lightly defended by the Japanese and relatively few fortifications
had to be identified in the planning of
shore bombardment. At the start of the
war, the Japanese mostly constructed
beach defenses, which were easy to spot
by submarine and aerial reconnaissance. There were also some early
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successes in the exploitation of Japanese
material and personnel. Documents
that were left behind in Guam by the
Japanese Thirty-first Army headquarters were a windfall of information
about Japanese defenses across the
Pacific. JICPOA, however, lacked the
translators and analysts needed to go
through these materials quickly, a phenomenon that is referred to today as
“information overload.” The tempo of
the campaign was so fast, and intelligence analysis so slow, that important
information often reached commanders
after a battle was already joined, by
which time information could yield
only diminishing returns.
Worse, as the war progressed, the Japanese
constructed increasingly sophisticated
and well camouflaged fortifications in
depth, and the time available for U.S.
analysts to survey and identify island
defenses decreased. Operations were executed in rapid succession, and JICPOA
could no longer keep pace. Intelligence
estimates decreased in quantity and accuracy just as Japanese defenses were
increasing in strength and lethality. The
attitudes of senior U.S. officers also
changed, as American materiel superiority began to take its toll on the Japanese. Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield took a backseat to maintaining the momentum of the drive across
the Pacific. Commanders were more interested in bringing the overwhelming
weight of U.S. naval, Marine, and army
units quickly to bear against the Japanese so that the ghastly attritional campaign might end as soon as possible. As
Moore notes, the island campaigns
were brought to an end not by brilliant
maneuver but by the virtual annihilation of Japanese garrisons.

158

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Autumn 2005 Issue

Moore looks on the bright side of
JICPOA’s modest performance, but he
finds only one outstanding success by
its analysts during the war. Ironically, it
was in support of an amphibious operation that never occurred, the planned
invasion of Kyushu in the autumn of
1945. Because Japanese garrisons usually fought to the death and inflicted
high casualties on attacking forces, the
five hundred thousand defenders of
Kyushu were capable of turning the
opening phase of the attack on the
home islands into a bloodbath.
JICPOA’s accurate estimates of the
steady buildup of Japanese forces on
the island led military planners to support a less costly way to end the war in
the Pacific—the use of the atomic
bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945.
JAMES J. WIRTZ

Naval Postgraduate School

Lacquement, Richard A., Jr. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 211pp. $67.95

Richard Lacquement provides an important narrative history and critical
analysis of the Defense Department’s
official policy studies and reviews from
the end of the Cold War through the
early administration of George W.
Bush. The book addresses several key
themes, highlighting the scope and
speed of military reform efforts and the
failure, in the author’s view, of defense
transformation. Each chapter provides
a review, discussion, and critique of the
official documents on American defense policy and strategic thinking in
the post–Cold War decade. The book
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traces the major themes and issues in
the official Defense Department policy
reviews, including the 1990 Base Force,
the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995
Commission on Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces, and the 1997 and
2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.
Lacquement is an Army field artillery
officer who has served on the faculties
of the U.S. Military Academy and the
Naval War College. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War,
his first book, is based on his Princeton
University doctoral dissertation. It is
the product of serious academic research that is informed throughout by
the sincere search of a soldier-statesman
for better ideas in the development of
the U.S. armed forces’ capabilities to
serve the nation’s current and future
security needs.
From Les Aspin, through William Perry
and William Cohen, to Donald Rumsfeld,
defense secretaries and their official
policy documents have addressed the
Defense Department’s and services’ efforts at transforming the post–Cold
War military. Lacquement’s argument
is that more change throughout the
1990s would have been better. He contrasts the influence of outsiders,
mainly political defense reformers, to
that of insiders, members of a mostly
conservative military culture and status
quo–oriented senior military leadership. Lacquement characterizes Bill
Clinton’s defense secretary, Les Aspin,
and Connecticut senator Joseph
Lieberman as champions of innovation,
while portraying the Joint Chiefs of
Staff chairmen Generals Colin Powell
and John Shalikashvili as resistant to
revolutionary new thinking on defense
issues.
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In tracing the evolution of these official
policy documents, Lacquement comes
out on the side of the glass-half-empty
view of the Defense Department’s attempts at reshaping post–Cold War
military capabilities and service organizations and programs. He argues that
major weapons programs and service
budget shares overrode sound strategic
thinking; that innovation champions
were stymied by senior officers; and
that incrementalism prevailed over
transformation. Lacquement is clearly
on the side of the proponents for more,
better, and faster defense
transformation.
Toward the end of his book, Lacquement
also raises important questions regarding the nation-building capabilities of
U.S. forces engaged in current complex
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. For instance, he calls
for additional civil affairs and psychological operations forces. In recent military history, those nation-building
debates have gone back to the arguments over the appropriate roles and
missions of U.S. ground forces in the
war in Vietnam (Lacquement cites
Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and
Vietnam [Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1998], for instance). Nevertheless, his
arguments lend an element of currency
to those engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan policies regarding “postconflict”
and stability operations. The final chapter, “Evaluation and Recommendations,” introduces possibilities for
engaging in some out-of-the box thinking on winning the next war by leveraging technology and the revolution in
military affairs; supporting effective
peace operations; and fighting the
global war on terrorism while improving homeland defense. These are
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significant enough research topics for a
second book.
What this work does not provide is an
assessment of the innovations that were
attempted and in some cases executed
during the Clinton and early Bush eras.
My hunch is there were innovations at
many levels within the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the combatant commands
that deserve additional attention and
more research. For instance, how are
we to explain the relative successes in
the use of military capabilities to
achieve political objectives in Balkans
peacekeeping, as well as in the wars in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Would
a more thoroughly transformed military have resulted in even fewer American and civilian casualties, and better
coordinated NATO operations in
Kosovo? More effective combined,
joint, and special operations in Afghanistan; or a quicker completion of the
conventional battles in Iraq?
Lacquement’s book, carefully read,
provides critical insights into the assumptions and themes in the evolution
of the key policy and strategy documents in the decade following the end
of the Cold War. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War
serves to inform and ground a study of
the history of major Clinton-era defense policy reviews. Gauging the size,
scope, and speed of change while retaining the readiness and military capabilities to defend against current and
emerging threats, of course, represents
an important research agenda. For all
these reasons, Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War is
an important book for students of international security and American
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defense policy, and especially readers
interested in defense transformation.
JOSEPH R. CERAMI

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Bell, Christopher M., and Bruce A. Elleman, eds.
Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective. London: Frank Cass,
2003. 288pp. $125

Throughout this excellent collection of
essays on what might rightly be called
the mystique of mutiny runs a significant thread—that from centuries of
laws and regulations governing naval
conduct and discipline there has
emerged no precise or universally accepted definition of mutiny. Ambiguity
has clouded every effort to create one.
The only consistent element, despite
the number of crewmen involved and
the growth of simple disobedience into
violence, is the necessary presence of
usurpation and subversion of authority.
This is evident in what thirteen writers
contribute here, in an authoritative and
attractive style and tone. The mutinies
they have selected for study are of a
character so dramatic that no matter
how scholarly the approach and painstaking the research, each tale is likely to
intrigue the reader. Certain selections
may be familiar: the Russian battleship
Potemkin, the mass uprising that shook
the German High Seas Fleet in 1918,
Invergordon, and the Port Chicago mutiny. The authors—Robert Zebroski,
Michael Epkenhans of Germany’s Otto
von Bismarck Foundation, Christopher
M. Bell, and Regina T. Akers of the Naval Historical Center—tackle their subjects with fresh appraisal and zeal. The
bloody Potemkin revolt led to the fall of
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the Romanovs. The mutinous German
seamen sabotaged their government’s
war effort. The Invergordon mutiny
threw Great Britain off the gold standard. Thanks mostly to the NAACP’s
brilliant young lawyer, Thurgood
Marshall, the Port Chicago episode not
only struck a blow at racial discrimination but highlighted the endless debate
of what constitutes a mutiny. Also, it
should not be forgotten that President
Clinton’s pardon of Freddie Meeks in
1999 still leaves the names of forty-nine
African-Americans on record as the
only convicted mutineers in U.S. naval
history.
The lesser known mutinies are dealt
with by equally qualified experts with
comparable skill and revelation. In 1910
the fury of Brazilian sailors against brutal employment of the lash reflected
that country’s discontent. After winning minor reforms from the ruling
class, the men of the dreadnoughts
Minas Geraes and Sao Paulo continued
to show the Brazilian flag above
subequatorial waters, maintaining their
country’s reputation as South America’s leading naval power. The mutiny
in the Adriatic Sea aboard the AustroHungarian armored cruisers Sankt
George and Kaiser Karl VI in February
1918 is said to have helped bring down
the Hapsburg monarchy. Yet as the author of “The Cattaro Mutiny, 1918,”
Paul G. Halpern of Florida State University, asserts, the revolt lasted only
two days. Its causes were traceable to bad
food, boredom, and plain war-weariness.
Also mutinous, after four years of war
with Germany, were French sailors
when ordered into war against Russian
Bolsheviks. While this event is the principal focus of the essay by French history professor Philippe Masson, notice
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might have been taken of concurrent
mutinous outbreaks prompted by the
same disinclination to fight Russians,
after fighting Germans, onboard British
warships off Archangel and among
American troops in the same region.
Homesickness and wartime restrictions
were among the reasons why Australian
tars defied their officers in 1919. The
Chilean navy’s revolt had its roots, as
had that of the men of Invergordon, in
the world economic depression, but the
Chilean navy’s revolt is notable as the
first naval mutiny crushed by air bombardment. Indian sailors in the waning
years of the British Raj staged lowerdeck protests against their officers; the
Canadian fleet developed “a tradition of
mutiny” in the 1930s; and the Chongqing mutiny off Manchuria in 1949
“played a pivotal role in the . . . founding of the People’s Republic of China.”
Each story is briskly told, thoroughly
detailed, and accompanied by comprehensive source data. Perhaps fortunately for riddle lovers, the question
persists—what is a mutiny? Many of the
Port Chicago fifty awaiting trial were
bewildered, believing that a mutiny involved a crew overthrowing its officers
and taking command of the ship.
High-level brass can be just as confused. At a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing following the
Vietnam-era disturbances on the U.S.
aircraft carriers Constellation and Kitty
Hawk, the chairman asked Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval
Operations, to define mutiny. Zumwalt
passed that one on to his lawyer. The
chairman wondered aloud if the Caine
mutiny of Herman Wouk’s novel,
though fictional, was not the real thing;
the CNO suggested that what happened
on the Bounty was a genuine mutiny.
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This book mentions these troubles on
the American flattops only in passing.
Were all the episodes it covers truly
mutinies? Let the question rest. This is a
fine book, eminently readable, and as
definitive as any work can claim to be
on the still mysterious matter of
mutiny.
LEONARD F. GUTTRIDGE

Alexandria, Virginia

Brown, Stephen R. Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner, and a Gentleman Solved the Greatest Medical
Mystery of the Age of Sail. Markham, Ont.:
Thomas Allen, 2003. 254pp. $23.95

The conquest of scurvy played as great a
role as any naval battle in the history of
England’s domination of the world during the Age of Sail. Today we understand that scurvy is a condition caused
by dietary deficiency. The typical menu
for a sailor in the eighteenth century
consisted of biscuits, salt beef, salt pork,
dried fish, butter, cheese, peas, and
beer—hardly sources of vitamin C. According to the 1763 annual register tabulation of casualties among British
sailors in the Seven Years’ War with
France, of 184,999 men, 133,708 died
from disease, primarily scurvy, while
only 1,512 were killed in action. Such
numbers are hard to comprehend today.
Brown implies that America won its independence because the ravages of this
disease prevented the British fleet from
maintaining an effective blockade. Only
a few years later, having conquered
scurvy, the same navy thwarted Napoleon
from mounting an invasion force and
sustained a blockade preventing the
French and Spanish from consolidating
their ships into an effective fleet.
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This book is a definitive history of
scurvy. It had been known among the
ancients, but its effects became truly
dreadful during the Age of Sail, when
ships would be at sea for months on
end. The beginnings of a concerted
search for its cure might be ascribed to
the ill-fated circumnavigation of the
world by George Anson in the years
1740–44. Five warships and one sloop
began the journey, but only one ship returned. Scurvy had felled so many men
that ships had had to be scuttled and
abandoned for lack of sufficient crews.
When Anson became First Lord of the
Admiralty, he encouraged scurvy research and made changes to shipboard
hygiene.
Three names stand out in the search for
a cure: James Lind, a surgeon, performed controlled experiments; James
Cook, a mariner, managed to circle the
globe without his men’s succumbing to
scurvy; and Gilbert Bane, a gentleman,
was able to overcome tradition-bound
prejudices and persuade the Admiralty
to issue daily rations of lemon juice,
which finally eliminated the dreaded
disease.
Scurvy is important reading for today’s
naval officer, not only because it tells a
historically fascinating tale but also because it examines how progress was
made by “thinking out of the box” and
going beyond the assumptions of the
times. As early as the early seventeenth
century open minds discovered a cure
but did not fully understand why it relieved the effects of the disease.
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“Common sense” at that time made the
approach seem implausible, and the
cure was lost. Scurvy was eventually
defeated, but its cause was not fully
understood until the twentieth century.
The Nobel laureate Albert SzentGyorgyi isolated ascorbic acid in 1932,
and today we are able to buy inexpensive megadoses of vitamin C.
The story told by Stephen Brown is fascinating in the way it ties together
seemingly disconnected events to show
that cause and effect are not always linear. Vasco de Gama recorded the first
naval outbreak of scurvy during his
1497 voyage around the Cape of Good
Hope. Iroquois Indians helped Jacques
Cartier’s crew survive scurvy while wintering on the banks of the St. Lawrence
in 1534. The East India Company defeated scurvy in the early 1600s, but, as
we have noted, the cure was lost. Scurvy
developed during the Irish potato famine
of 1847 and appeared among the FortyNiners of the California Gold Rush.
Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner, and
a Gentleman Solved the Greatest Medical
Mystery of the Age of Sail will fascinate
the history buff, the health-conscious
reader, and anyone who can appreciate
the difficulty we as humans have in accepting empirical evidence when it appears to contradict the conventional
wisdom. At the very least, the reader
will find interesting the story of how
sailors endured the Age of Sail.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA

Monterey, California
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FROM THE EDITORS
VICE ADMIRAL JAMES B. STOCKDALE, USN (1923–2005)
The editors have their own reasons for regret at the passing of Vice Admiral
James B. Stockdale (whose eulogy is reprinted on pages 3–4)—the admiral was a
member of the Naval War College Review Advisory Board and a former president
of the Naval War College. A 1947 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served
first in destroyers, later as a naval aviator. In 1965 he was shot down over North
Vietnam, becoming the senior U.S. naval prisoner of war until his release in
1973. Admiral Stockdale was the president of The Citadel in Charleston, South
Carolina, joined the Hoover Institution as a senior research fellow, and briefly
entered national politics after retirement from naval service in 1979. Vice Admiral Stockdale was a holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor.
NEWPORT PAPER 23
The twenty-third of our Newport Papers monograph series, The Atlantic Crises:
Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William Hopkinson, is
available from the editorial office and online. It is a commonsensical and timely
overview of the origins and evolution of the transatlantic relationship since the
Second World War, paying particular attention to the U.S. relationship with
Great Britain and its impact upon intra-European debates. Mr. Hopkinson argues that the current breach may be far more serious than those of the past. He is
especially well placed to comment wisely on transatlantic relations, having
served in the British Ministry of Defence navigating the shoals between Great
Britain, the United States, and the Continent. The Naval War College Press is
pleased to be able to publish this important look at the past, present, and future
of one of the most important strategic issues facing the United States.
2004 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW PRIZE WINNERS
The President of the Naval War College has awarded cash prizes to the winners,
nominated by faculty committees, of this year’s Hugh G. Nott Prize and Edward
S. Miller History Prize, for articles appearing in 2004.
The Hugh G. Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors
of the year’s best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize). The winner
this year is Richard A. Lacquement, for “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Winter
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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2004 ($1,000). The President also awarded prizes ($330) to three runners-up:
Susan D. Fink, for “The Trouble with Mixed Motives: Debating the Political, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Intervention,” Summer/Autumn 2004; Timothy
D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen, for “Dealing with Russian Tactical Nuclear
Weapons: Cash for Kilotons,” Spring 2004; and Ian Story and You Ji, for “China’s
Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Winter 2004.
The Miller Prize ($500) was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S.
Miller for the author of the year’s best historical article. This year’s winners are
Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, for “A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean,” Spring 2004.
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